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Foreword
Foreword
Buoyed by the uptick in the world economy, the performance of the euro 
area continued to improve somewhat during 2014. However, it remains 
weak, with discrepancies across EU member states where political uncer-
tainties and economic rigidities persist. The government bond purchases by 
the European Central Bank now give new hope for southern Europe and 
France, as it may well depreciate the euro and help overcome their competi-
tive crises, inflating Germany and other northern euro countries in the 
process.  
Like its predecessors, this year’s report by the European Economic Advisory 
Group at CESifo (EEAG), the fourteenth in the series, identifies some fields 
that need to be tackled to both strengthen the Eurozone and accelerate the 
European integration process. In this respect, the report’s title – “Blurring 
the Borders” – highlights three border-related issues that have recently 
gained prominence on the political agenda and that are analysed from an 
economic point of view: the energy strategy, regional disparity, and 
migration. 
While the EU integration process has seen national boundaries become 
ever blurrier over the years, this has not been the case in energy supply. 
Chapter 2 makes the case for thinking about energy policies not in terms of 
energy markets defined by national borders, but of the EU as an integral, 
unified market, for the sake both of economic rationality and security of 
supply.
The progressive blurring of boundaries has also seen a backlash of sorts: 
during the crisis, national borders re-emerged as a significant determinant 
of regional development within Europe, an issue we discuss in Chapter 3, 
with a call for European policies that achieve regional promotion with 
cross-regional structural funds. 
Lastly, the precarious situation in some countries triggered by the crisis and 
the increased migration flows resulting from the EU’s Eastern enlargement 
have propelled migration to the forefront of public debate. Our contribu-
tion to this debate can be found in Chapter 4, with a pitch to decouple wel-
fare claims from national states and promote contribution-based social in-
surance systems. 
As always, the Report also contains a thorough analysis of the economic 
situation of the EU and other countries around the world, together with a 
forecast for the coming year. 
2EEAG Report 2015
Foreword
The EEAG, which is collectively responsible for all parts of the report, con-
sists of a team of six economists from five countries. This year the Group is 
chaired by Ákos Valentinyi (Cardiff  Business School) and includes 
Giuseppe Bertola (EDHEC Business School), John Driffill (Birkbeck 
College), Harold James (Princeton University), Jan-Egbert Sturm (KOF 
Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich) and myself  (Ifo Institute and 
University of Munich). The members participate on a personal basis and 
do not represent the views of the organisations that they are affiliated with.
I would like to express my gratitude for the valuable assistance provided by 
the scholars and staff  at CES and Ifo who helped to prepare the report. 
This year’s participants were Nadjeschda Arnold and Christopher Weber 
(assistants to the group), Tim Oliver Berg, Atanas Hristov and Nikolay 
Hristov (economic forecast), Lisa Giani Contini and Julio Saavedra (edit-
ing), Christoph Zeiner (graphics), Katja Kügler and Elisabeth Will (type-
setting) and Ines Gross (cover). I also wish to thank Swiss Re for hosting 
our autumn meeting. 
Hans-Werner Sinn
President, CESifo Group
Professor of Economics and Public Finance
Ludwig Maximilian’s University Munich
Munich, 24 February 2015
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Recommendations foR euRope
Chapter 2     The European Energy Conundrum: Power Failure
• Formulate an effective bargaining strategy to ensure a global reduction in CO2 emissions. In this context, it 
would be preferable to extend the UN ETS mechanism, which currently covers only 30 percent of emissions, 
to the whole world.
• Establish a European energy union with a single market that does not discriminate against suppliers from other 
countries. This includes the principle of one price, which enhances efficiency and energy security for all EU 
countries and can be achieved via improved and more interconnected energy grids. The single energy market 
should be supported by the European monitoring of national energy policies to ensure mutual consistence, 
with penalty procedures for measures that are incompatible with a fundamental Europe-wide commitment to 
sustainable energy on a global level.
• Eliminate fixed feed-in tariffs as incompatible with a Europe-wide energy strategy. Such tariffs are incompatible 
with the single European energy market, inter alia because of the principle of one price.
• Commit to price flexibility in energy markets following the logic of unbundling, which means separating suppli-
ers from energy producers and delivery systems (pipelines, grids). This would reduce monopoly power, hence 
increase competition and price flexibility. 
• Provide public investment in the enhanced connectivity of energy networks like gas pipelines and power transmis-
sion lines. The principle of one price enhances efficiency, but requires more interconnected energy networks, 
which calls for investment. Given the widespread post-crisis sentiment that Europe should initiate large infra-
structure investment projects, member states could coordinately fund new energy transmission channels, in-
cluding both electricity gridlines and gas pipelines, with public, or a mixture of public and private capital.
Chapter 3     European Regional Disparity: Borders Strike Back
• Coordinate policy reforms across euro area countries. Uncoordinated policy reforms in individual countries al-
ways affect the resource allocation across countries. However, when uncoordinated reforms are pursued in 
countries linked by flexible exchange rates, they are often coordinated de facto by adjustments in the exchange 
rate. This mechanism is absent among members of a monetary union. Hence, the lack of policy coordination 
can be very costly in a monetary union, as shown by the European sovereign debt crisis. The coordination of 
policies with strong redistributive implications is hard to achieve. However, an explicit framework for assessing 
the euro area implications of policy reforms of individual member states should be created at the very least.
• Design cross-regional policies for structural funds and employment to exploit potential spillovers between neigh-
bouring regions. EU cohesion policies target regions. However, the evidence suggests that, despite the EU’s re-
gional approach, country specific effects tend to dominate regional ones when it comes to regional disparities. 
This is partly because existing policies do not take into account cross-regional spillovers and complementari-
ties. Hence it is important to enhance existing EU policies with cross-regional and regional level cross-national 
policies.
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Chapter 4     Migration in the European Union: Too Much of a Good Thing?
• Uphold the principle of the free movement of people, and discourage the use of overheated rhetoric in migration 
debates. Economies absorb changes in the labour force better than people realise. The scale and costs of “wel-
fare tourism” have been overstated. Nonetheless, rules that seem unfair may create social and political 
problems. 
• Use available instruments to limit recent migrants’ access to welfare benefits. The insurance principle of social 
insurance should be strengthened, and strict criteria of availability for work as a condition of receiving bene-
fits should be adopted. A home country principle for welfare benefits could be introduced to replace the cur-
rent residence principle.
• Foster the economic development of poorer members. Migration will naturally slow down as new member states 
catch up to older members economically. The sooner incomes converge across the union, the sooner the pres-
sure of migration will dwindle. Although regional convergence in old member states raises various issues, 
which we discuss in our regional chapter, most new member states have been growing faster than the old ones 
since they joined the EU, suggesting that income convergence is taking place.
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Summary
The world economy continued to recover in 2014 aid-
ed by strong growth in the United States. The situa-
tion in Europe, however, remains fragile. Several 
countries outside the euro area, particularly the 
United Kingdom, grew robustly. The performance of 
the euro area improved compared to 2013, but re-
mains weak and uneven across member states. 
Unemployment is high in several countries, keeping 
social tensions at a high level. Depreciation of  the 
euro is helping the economic recovery in general, but 
as international competitiveness varies greatly across 
the euro area, the positive effect of  depreciation also 
differs from country to country. Despite the progress 
made in consolidating fiscal positions, high debt lev-
els foreshadow future fiscal problems in some coun-
tries. Moreover, the outcome and impact of  the re-
forms currently being implemented in several euro 
area countries are still uncertain. On balance, howev-
er, the reforms will support the recovery in 2015. This 
year’s EEAG report emphasises that tighter coordina-
tion of  national policies is required to achieve desired 
objectives in some key areas; while a lack of  coordi-
nation may turn out to be particularly costly both for 
individual countries and for the European Union as a 
whole.
Chapter 1 of the report discusses the immediate mac-
roeconomic outlook for the global economy, with a 
particular focus on the European situation. Chapter 2 
focuses on energy policy, and emphasises that the case 
for a genuine European energy union is even stronger 
than the case was for a monetary union in the 1980s 
and 1990s. Chapter 3 analyses the evolution of region-
al disparities in Europe, highlighting that both the de-
cline and the recent increase in disparities were driven 
by uncoordinated national policies. Finally, Chapter 4 
looks at the contentious issue of European migration. 
It highlights that a commitment to free mobility, a si-
multaneous commitment to a generous welfare state, 
and enlargement of the EU to include members much 
poorer than existing ones, creates problems and 
tensions.
Chapter 1
Macroeconomic Outlook
Despite a slowdown in momentum in many industrial-
ised countries, the world economy managed to remain 
in recovery mode last year. It is expected to gradually 
gain some further momentum in 2015. 
In contrast to most industrialised countries and de-
spite interest rate hikes, the emerging economies con-
tinued to grow moderately during 2014. The underly-
ing economic dynamics were very heterogeneous 
across the emerging markets. Whereas the pace of ex-
pansion in India and many economies of East Asia 
accelerated significantly, Latin America witnessed a 
substantial decline in growth. Overall, the emerging 
economies will this year achieve growth rates roughly 
comparable to last year. On the one hand, many of 
them will benefit from the continuing recovery taking 
place in the industrialised world. On the other hand, 
several emerging economies are facing a marked flat-
tening of their population growth, which reduces po-
tential growth, while for oil-exporting countries such 
as Brazil, Russia and many economies in the Middle 
East, the strong decline in oil prices means a loss of 
national income. 
Cheaper oil prices are supporting the slow, but steady 
acceleration in the advanced economies. In the 
United States in particular, the upturn is expected to 
continue. The US recovery is more advanced than in 
the euro area and is underpinned by the improved as-
set position of  households, a well-capitalised bank-
ing sector and a still very expansionary monetary 
policy. Whereas the business sector in the United 
States has clearly regained confidence in the future 
outlook of  the US economy and has increased its in-
vestment activities substantially, firms in Europe re-
main reluctant to invest. The US government has 
used the economic recovery to reverse the increase in 
public consumption, and in that sense has demon-
strated clearly anti-cyclical behaviour. In the euro 
area, on the other hand, the role of  the public sector 
has increased substantially during the crisis, and 
there are no signs that this is going to be reversed any 
time soon. On the contrary, the pressure to imple-
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ment austerity and structural reform programmes 
has decreased in the last two years; with public con-
sumption on the rise again in the euro area as a re-
sult. Progress in the crisis-afflicted countries to im-
prove their international competitiveness by ulti-
mately reducing relative price levels will remain slow 
and hampered by the sporadic resurgence of  political 
uncertainty. 
Continued robust growth in the United States and the 
United Kingdom will allow for monetary policy to 
become less expansionary in both countries. 
Monetary policy in the euro area, however, is still 
moving in the opposite direction. Although it has 
helped to dispel uncertainties related to the viability 
of  the monetary union and the stability of  the finan-
cial system, which should have created incentives for 
firms and households to invest, actual investment dy-
namics have remained flat to date. Numerous interna-
tional conflicts, as well as renewed discussion of  a po-
tential Greek exit from the euro area, are counteract-
ing the monetary stimulus provided by the European 
Central Bank.
Besides the sharp fall in oil prices, the recovery in the 
euro area is also being reinforced by the depreciation 
of its currency. While plunging oil prices are benefit-
ting energy producers and consumers, the currency 
depreciation mainly supports firms with competitive 
positions in international markets. Partly due to dif-
ferences in competitiveness, the pace of economic re-
covery will vary across Europe. Among the larger 
economies, Spain in particular is likely to grow signifi-
cantly faster than the euro area average, while France 
and Italy are likely to see only slow growth. The latter 
two countries have been suffering from similar struc-
tural problems for years and have lost price competi-
tiveness since the introduction of the euro. Their 
shares of world trade have decreased markedly as a 
result. 
The weak economic recovery in Europe will also be 
supported by the structural reforms already imple-
mented in some crisis-afflicted countries. Moreover, 
the reduced consolidation efforts are supporting the 
business cycle. These efforts, however, imply a signifi-
cant risk to stability at the same time. Public debt lev-
els remain high and, as the recent re-emergence of sus-
picion towards Greece shows, renewed doubts about 
their sustainability could lead to a new escalation of 
the euro crisis. 
Falling oil prices have triggered a further decline in in-
flation rates in the euro area. Although this is certainly 
supporting economic developments, it also entails a 
risk. The longer low inflation rates persist, the greater 
the risk that inflation expectations will lose their an-
chor. This could subsequently create further down-
ward pressure on inflation. In a still to be considered 
extreme scenario, the euro area could slip into defla-
tion, which would place a heavy burden on growth. 
Currently, however, long-term inflation expectations 
for the euro area still appear to be quite firmly 
anchored. 
Chapter 2
The European Energy Conundrum: Power Failure
European energy policy is currently poorly coordinat-
ed between the member states of the European Union, 
although substantial gains could be achieved through 
enhanced cooperation both at the European and the 
global level. The argument in favour of a European 
energy union – a genuine common energy market with 
common regulation – is even stronger than the case 
that was successfully made in the 1980s and 1990s for 
a monetary union. 
The difficulty of  formulating a forward-looking ener-
gy policy arises from the difficulty of  comparing dif-
ferent types of  risk and drawing appropriate policy 
lessons. There are at least four different perceptions 
of  risk, and, while all are clearly present, they tend to 
be seen in quite contrasting ways in different 
European countries, and consequently produce var-
ied and mutually incompatible responses from na-
tional political authorities: the risk of  increased CO2 
emissions leading to climatic change; the risks of  a 
nuclear disaster; threats of  a cut-off  of  imported en-
ergy (gas or oil) supplies; and the likelihood of  a net-
work breakdown. 
The greater the diversity of supply, and the more mar-
ket alternatives exist (including different forms of en-
ergy), the more resilient the energy economy becomes 
against unanticipated events, including attempts to 
blackmail energy users. For these advantages to mate-
rialise, however, the interconnectivity of national en-
ergy markets has to be improved dramatically, while 
regulatory policies with regard to the different energy 
sources need to be harmonised across the countries of 
Europe. 
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Chapter 3
European Regional Disparity: Borders Strike Back
The original premise of the Single Market was that the 
promotion of economic integration brings prosperity 
to the European Union, reduces income disparities 
across member states, and by reducing differences be-
tween member states and within regions, it enhances 
social and political cohesion within Europe. The in-
struments to promote “economic and social cohesion” 
are primarily left to the member states and lower levels 
of government. Only a small set of supranational pol-
icy instruments exists in the form of EU cohesion pol-
icies directly motivated by the effects on regional and 
national income inequality of the European economic 
integration process.
The evidence seems to suggest that the policy was 
successful as there was a substantial reduction in dis-
parities over time both in terms of  labour productiv-
ity (as measured by GDP per employee) and unem-
ployment rates until the crisis. However, closer in-
spection of  the data leads to a somewhat different 
conclusion. Region al disparities in labour productiv-
ity declined up until the mid-2000s, but subsequently 
increased throughout the euro area‘s economic crisis. 
Moreover, disparities within countries changed rela-
tively little, their initial decline and subsequent rise 
being primarily due to changes in disparities between 
countries and, to a much lesser extent, due to chang-
es between regions within countries. This suggests 
that whatever contributions EU cohesion policy 
made to the convergence process, country-specific 
factors, including policies, played a more important 
role. The evolution in unemployment rates reveals a 
similar pattern. Disparities in regional unemploy-
ment rates declined as of  the late 1990s and up until 
the crisis. Moreover, polarisation in the labour mar-
ket (the number of  regions with much lower and 
much higher unemployment rates than the European 
average) also declined. Since the outbreak of  the cri-
sis, however, regional disparities in unemployment 
rates have been increasing, and regional labour mar-
kets have become more polarised. Again, the dispari-
ties within countries have changed relatively little 
over time. Unemployment disparities altered primar-
ily due to changes in unemployment rates between 
countries.
We argue that the evidence on the evolution of  dis-
parities before and after the crisis suggests that unco-
ordinated national economic policies were likely to 
lead to a fall in regional disparities first, and to a rise 
later. This occurred despite the presence of  suprana-
tional redistributive policy instruments. The process 
started in the 1990s when the announcement of  the 
euro improved expectations in the EU’s relatively 
poor periphery that these countries would converge 
rapidly to the income levels of  the rich EU core. As a 
result, capital flowed from the capital-rich core to the 
capital-poor periphery. This capital outflow de-
pressed wages in the core and the corresponding cap-
ital inflow raised wages and employment in the pe-
riphery. The capital flow also led to falling disparities 
both in terms of  labour productivity, and unemploy-
ment across regions. The nature of  the capital flow, 
however, suggests that this primarily occurred due to 
falling disparities across countries, while disparities 
across regions within countries remained roughly the 
same. Depressed wages in the core made it more like-
ly that a labour market reform would be carried out 
in the core (in Germany in particular), while rising 
wages made it less likely that a similar reform would 
be carried out in the periphery. Reform in the core 
and the lack of  it in the periphery eventually led to 
divergence. Firstly, it led to price divergence as prices 
in the periphery were rising faster than in the core. 
Secondly, it led to divergence in labour productivity, 
which grew more slowly in some periphery countries 
than in the core. Finally, once the financial crisis hit 
Europe, the core and the periphery reacted asymmet-
rically, reinforcing the divergence among regions that 
had started years before the crisis and that had been 
driven not by regional, but by country specific fac-
tors such as national policies. The lack of  coordina-
tion in policy choices reversed the regional conver-
gence of  the European regions firstly in terms of  la-
bour productivity some years before the crisis, and 
secondly in terms of  unemployment rates after the 
crisis broke out. This underlines the importance of 
policy coordination in such matters as labour market 
reform too.
Chapter 4
Migration in the European Union: Too much of a good 
thing?
The European Union is committed to the principle of 
the free movement of people within its frontiers, which 
is central to the concept of EU citizenship. But this 
principle has given rise to concerns caused by the in-
clusion of more Eastern European countries with 
much lower wages. Many people in Germany, Britain, 
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the Netherlands, Austria and other “old EU” mem-
bers, particularly those with low skills in precarious 
low-wage jobs, who are threatened by unemployment 
and disadvantaged in housing markets, fear the conse-
quences of the unlimited movement of workers from 
the East. They fear that their wage and job prospects 
may be undermined by the employment of immigrant 
workers at lower salaries; that incoming migrants may 
push up rents and property prices; that migrants may 
impose greater burdens on the welfare state, particu-
larly if  they (the migrants) have lower skills and wages 
than the indigenous population, are more prone to un-
employment, and likely to pay lower taxes. The debate 
about migration and public policy has become highly 
charged as a result.
There is a sense that the scale of migration has in-
creased in recent years. But migration data provides a 
mixed picture. The net flow of migrants into Germany 
was very high in the early 1990s – more than 15 mi-
grants per 1,000 inhabitants in 1990 following the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union, but subsequently declined, 
until a resurgence in 2009 following the financial crisis. 
Spain and Ireland had very large inflows in their boom 
years in the early 2000s, which have turned into signifi-
cant outflows in recent years. Illegal immigration led 
to a sudden up-tick in migration into Italy in 2013 and 
2014. Compared with these experiences, net immigra-
tion into the UK since 1990 has not been remarkable. 
However, gross flows have increased. From a gross in-
flow and outflow of around 200,000 persons per year 
in the 1970s and 1980s (a period in which the UK 
largely had a small net outflow of migrants), the gross 
inflow rose to over 500,000 per year and the gross out-
flow to around 300,000 in 2013, giving a net inflow of 
over 200,000 persons a year. The rise in gross flows 
may be contributing to people’s sense that communi-
ties are changing around them and the unease felt by 
parts of the population. This disquiet is being com-
pounded by the EU’s lingering recession, prolonged 
austerity policies, and years of stagnating, or actually 
falling, net-of-tax wages.
The economic effects of migration are clearest in the 
labour and housing markets, taxes and public spend-
ing. They depend on the skills, occupations and ages 
of migrants relative to the existing population. 
Immigration from outside the EU is generally restrict-
ed in terms of its scale and by the type of immigrant 
admitted, typically with a preference for highly edu-
cated professionals. Free movement in the EU draws a 
relatively young, unskilled, low-wage migrant flow to 
the more generously redistributive Northern old-EU 
member states. Projected net inflows based on current 
policies are predicted to lower dependency ratios and 
partly offset population falls, in Germany for exam-
ple, up to 2080 and beyond. 
Evidence from many empirical studies suggests that 
labour markets can better absorb migrant flows, with 
smaller changes in unemployment rates and wages, 
than is generally supposed. The immigration of  rela-
tively highly skilled workers actually raises the wages 
and employment of  less-skilled workers, and raises 
profits. The immigration of  low-skilled workers has 
modest impact effects, reducing wages and increasing 
the unemployment of  unskilled indigenous workers 
in the short run, but these return to normal fairly 
quickly. Absorption is quicker in boom times and 
slower in recession, which partly accounts for current 
troubles. 
The immigration debate tends to focus on those 
countries that are net recipients of  migrants, but mi-
gration also matters for countries that are net sources 
of  migrants, such as Poland. It is often supposed that 
net emigration may cause the loss of  a country’s 
brightest and best, subjecting it to a brain drain. 
Poland’s experience challenges such a view. Between 
2004 and 2008, when there was a mass exodus of 
young workers to the UK and Germany, Poland’s un-
employment rate halved. Subsequently, economic 
growth took off  and many earlier migrants returned, 
often with new skills and ideas. Migration seems to 
have worked as a useful shock-absorber in Poland’s 
transition to EU membership. 
In the economic literature on the subject migration is 
often portrayed as imposing a burden on a welfare 
state, which acts as a magnet (the welfare magnet) for 
the poor and causes “welfare tourism”. There is evi-
dence that more generous welfare benefits attract 
more migrants, but the effect is small relative to the ef-
fect of the wage gap, employment prospects, and the 
existence of a group of earlier migrants from the same 
country or region, who provide a supportive social 
network for new migrants in the country of destina-
tion. There is, however, evidence that a more redistrib-
utive state attracts relatively less-skilled, lower-wage 
migrants. There is also evidence that migrant popula-
tions make more use of the welfare state than native 
populations. This evidence points to a conflict be-
tween the generosity of welfare states, the principle of 
social inclusion and the free movement of people. 
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To mitigate this conflict, we suggest strengthening the 
insurance principle in social insurance. This would in-
volve making more benefits dependent on contribu-
tions, adopting strict criteria of availability for work 
as a condition of receiving benefits, and using other 
active labour market policies to help poor and unem-
ployed people into work. A home country principle 
for welfare benefits might be introduced to replace the 
current residence principle, under which people would 
receive benefits at the rates provided by the states in 
which entitlement was built up. The EU can also miti-
gate the problem by fostering the economic develop-
ment of poorer members via structural funds and in-
ducements to institutional reforms. The problem of 
high migration could then prove a temporary concern. 
Migration flows may reverse when wages and job pros-
pects improve in the source economies, as seen in the 
case of Poland. The EU may have to compromise, and 
balance this trio of mutually incompatible goals for 
some years.
13 EEAG Report 2015
Chapter 1EEAG (2015), The EEAG Report on the European Economy, “Macroeconomic Outlook,” CESifo, Munich 2015, pp. 13–50.
MacroeconoMic outlook
1.1 Introduction
The world economy managed to remain in recovery 
mode last year and is expected to gradually gain 
some further momentum in 2015. The diverging de­
velopments between and within regions will, how­
ever, persist. Monetary policy differed substantially 
among emerging countries in 2014; and this year it 
will also begin to drift apart within the industrial­
ised world. The economic situa­
tion in the United States and the 
United Kingdom should allow 
for monetary policy to become 
less expansionary. Monetary 
policy in the euro area, however, 
is still moving in the opposite di­
rection. Although it has helped 
to reduce uncertainties related 
to the viability of  the monetary 
union and the stability of  the fi­
nancial system, which should 
have created incentives for firms 
and households to invest, actual 
investment dynamics have prov­
en flat to date. Numerous inter­
national conflicts, as well as the 
renewed discussion of  a poten­
tial Greek exit from the euro 
area, are counteracting the mon­
etary stimulus provided by the 
European Central Bank.
Whereas the business sector in 
the United States clearly re­
gained confidence in the future 
outlook of  the US economy, 
firms in Europe remain reluctant 
to invest (see Figure 1.1). The 
US government has used the 
economic recovery to reverse the 
increase in public consumption 
and, in that sense, has behaved 
in a clearly anti­cyclical manner. 
In the euro area, on the other hand, the role of  the 
public sector increased substantially during the cri­
sis, and there are no signs that this is going to be re­
versed any time soon. On the contrary, the pressure 
to implement austerity and structural reform pro­
grammes has receded in the last two years; and pub­
lic consumption has risen again in the euro area as a 
result. Progress in the crisis­afflicted countries to im­
prove international competitiveness by ultimately 
reducing relative price levels will remain slow and 
hampered by occasional flare­ups of  political 
uncertainty. 
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In Europe, the recovery is largely being supported by 
the sharp fall in oil prices and the depreciation of the 
euro. While the first factor is benefitting producers 
and consumers of energy, the second mainly supports 
firms with competitive positions in international mar­
kets. Partly because of differences in competitiveness, 
the economic recovery will differ across the European 
Union member states (see Table 1.A.2). Of the larger 
economies, Spain is likely to grow significantly faster 
than the euro area average, while France and Italy are 
likely to experience only low growth. The latter two 
countries have been suffering for years from similar 
structural problems like high government spending, 
significant tax and social contribution burdens on 
firms, inflexible labour markets and overregulation of 
the private economy, leading to strong deindustrialisa­
tion. In addition, French and Italian firms have lost 
price competitiveness since the in­
troduction of the euro. Their 
shares of world trade have de­
creased markedly as a result. 
Hesitant attempts, at best, have 
been made at the political level to 
slowly improve this situation. 
The mild economic recovery in 
Europe in 2015 will be supported 
not only by the weaker euro and 
lower oil prices, but also by struc­
tural reforms that have already 
been initiated, as well as reduced 
consolidation efforts. On the oth­
er hand, high public debt levels 
still pose a significant risk to sta­
bility as the recent re­emergence 
of suspicion towards Greece 
shows. If renewed doubts about 
the sustainability of sovereign 
debt were to arise in other euro 
area member states, this could 
lead to a fresh escalation of the 
euro crisis. Uncertainty regarding 
the future course of a new Greek 
government has already led to in­
creases in Greek bond yields. 
Another downside risk for the 
economy of the euro area is a re­
newed escalation of the Ukraine / 
Russia conflict. The real economic 
recovery would also probably be 
weaker if  demand from abroad, 
and especially from emerging 
markets, turned out to be lower than expected. The re­
covery, however, could be even stronger should oil pric­
es or the euro continue to fall.
1.2 The current situation
1.2.1 The global economy
Whereas the pace of global industrial production 
slowed markedly during the summer half  of 2014, the 
growth rate of world trade accelerated (see Figure 1.2). 
Global industrial production grew only half  as much 
in the second and third quarters of 2014 as in the pre­
vious winter half­year. This development mainly re­
flects the significant slowdown in economic momen­
tum in the advanced economies, where industrial out­
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put virtually stagnated during the summer. The in­
creased dynamics in world trade are largely due to a 
normalisation of trade in the emerging economies.
Over the course of last year, the Ifo World Economic 
Survey results started to paint an increasingly diverg­
ing picture of assessments of the global economy by 
economic experts (see Figure 1.3). Whereas the econo­
my of North America continued to improve, the op­
posite was basically true of the economies of Latin 
America. 
Economic developments in the euro area and in Japan 
were the main triggers for the overall slowdown in eco­
nomic growth in the advanced economies observed 
since spring 2014. The slowdown in the euro area was 
not least the result of growing scepticism about the will­
ingness of the French and Italian governments to ur­
gently undertake key structural reforms in their labour 
and product markets, and to embark on a clear, substan­
tial and credible course of fiscal consolidation. This “re­
form gridlock” continues to weigh on the attractiveness 
of both countries for investors, adversely affecting their 
medium­term growth prospects. Along with growing 
pessimism, economic sanctions related to the political 
conflict with Russia had a dampening effect on econom­
ic activity in the euro area in summer 2014. 
In Japan, aggregate economic performance declined 
during the second and third quarters. The country 
therefore fell into its fourth technical recession (as 
measured by at least two consecutive quarters of nega­
tive growth) since 2008. This was due mainly to the 
VAT increase in April 2014, which led to a sharp de­
cline in private consumption. 
Aggregate production in the 
United States and in the United 
Kingdom, on the other hand, 
continued to show robust growth 
rates, and employment growth 
even accelerated. The recovery in 
these countries is more advanced 
than in the euro area and is sup­
ported by the improved asset po­
sition of households, a well­capi­
talised banking sector and mone­
tary policy that remains very 
expansionary.
In contrast to most industrialised 
countries and despite interest rate 
hikes, the emerging economies 
continued to grow moderately during 2014. As in the 
industrialised world, however, the underlying econom­
ic dynamics were very heterogeneous across the emerg­
ing markets. Whereas the pace of expansion in India 
and many economies of East Asia accelerated signifi­
cantly, Latin America witnessed a substantial decline 
in growth. 
In India, the fading of political uncertainty after the 
parliamentary elections in April / May 2014 and the 
willingness signalled by the new government to carry 
out much­needed structural reforms improved the in­
vestment climate. In addition, various public infra­
structure investments were made, which had been 
placed on hold last winter. Several East Asian coun­
tries benefited from strong growth in private domestic 
demand, not least resulting from the growing prosper­
ity of the population. The Chinese economy per­
formed robustly during the summer of 2014. The gov­
ernment has taken a number of supportive measures 
to counter the downturn in momentum seen in China’s 
industrial and construction sectors at the beginning of 
the year. For the time being at least, these measures 
have helped to stabilise growth rates close to the gov­
ernment’s target of 7.5 percent. 
In Latin America aggregate industrial production ac­
tually declined during the first half  of 2014 and has 
only started recovering slowly since then. While 
Mexico profited from the recovery in the United 
States, the economies of Brazil and Argentina have 
been heavily burdened by steadily falling commodity 
prices since 2011. In addition, already huge structural 
problems in Argentina have been exacerbated further 
and the unresolved dispute with foreign investors re­
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lated to the public debt restruc­
turing carried out in 2001 has no­
ticeably constrained the country’s 
access to international financial 
sources. 
Despite the geopolitical tensions 
in Eastern Europe and in the 
Middle East, the oil price de­
clined substantially in 2014, par­
ticularly during the fourth quar­
ter of the year. After peaking in 
June 2014, the price of a barrel of 
Brent Crude fell by over 40 per­
cent to reach 57 US dollars by the 
end of 2014. This decline was 
largely driven by (expected) sup­
ply­side changes, such as the continuing expansion of 
oil production in the USA (fracking) and increased 
production in Iraq. However, for many weaker than 
expected economic developments also imply that 
some demand­side aspects cannot be ruled out. 
Inflation rates all around the world started to decline 
during the last months of 2014 as a result (see 
Figure 1.4).
1.2.2 United States
While the US economy was dominated in the first 
quarter of 2014 by the effects of a harsh winter, the 
subsequent quarters revealed a strong underlying 
growth momentum (see Figure 1.5). Economic output 
increased by well over an annualised 4.5 percent dur­
ing the summer half­year. This was primarily due to 
increases in domestic demand, 
with private consumption grow­
ing at about 3 percent and private 
fixed investment by over 8.5 per­
cent during the same period (see 
Figure 1.6). Except for in the 
third quarter, the strong perfor­
mance of the domestic economy 
has, via a rise in import growth, 
led foreign trade to contribute 
negatively to GDP growth.
Despite initially unfavourable 
weather conditions, around 
240,000 new jobs per month have 
been created since the beginning 
of 2014, which comes close to the 
levels of previous recoveries. Employment was able to 
exceed pre­crisis levels for the first time in May last 
year as a result, and the participation rate, which had 
been declining since 2008, has started to stabilise. 
Furthermore, the unemployment rate dropped signifi­
cantly from 6.7 percent in early 2014 to 5.6 percent in 
December of last year (see Figure 1.7). 
In view of the weaker than average dynamics of this 
recovery and slightly under­utilised capacities until re­
cently, inflation in the United States has remained rel­
atively low to date, despite ultra­loose monetary poli­
cy. Although the annual inflation accelerated in the 
first half  of 2014 from close to 1.5 percent at the turn 
of 2013/14 to about 2 percent last summer, the rate of 
inflation subsequently fell back to 0.7 percent in 
December (see Figure 1.8). The sharp decline in oil 
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prices and a strengthening of the 
US dollar are the root causes of 
this downturn. 
1.2.3 Asia
In China, the economy gathered 
speed over the course of last year. 
After a slight trough at the begin­
ning of the year, GDP growth 
picked up again during summer. 
This was mainly supported by 
private consumption. However, 
the government also introduced a 
number of measures to support 
the economy after its weak start 
to 2014. For instance, additional 
investment in the rail network 
and tax breaks for small business­
es successfully boosted produc­
tion over the summer. 
In contrast to previous periods, 
overall weaker impulses emanat­
ed from investment. The slow­
down in investment activity was 
mainly due to a cooling down of 
the property market and, in turn, 
residential construction. Due to 
significant oversupply, property 
prices started to stagnate at the 
beginning of 2014. In some re­
gions they even fell slightly. 
House prices in China have been 
falling steadily since spring 2014. 
For the first time since mid­2013, 
net exports also provided a posi­
tive contribution to growth, 
mainly during the second half  of 
last year. This is not only due to 
higher export growth, but also to 
lower intermediate goods de­
mand stemming from weaker in­
vestment activity. 
Economic development in Japan 
deteriorated significantly last 
year. After a strong first quarter, 
which was characterised by exten­
sive advance purchases triggered 
by the upcoming value added tax 
a) In constant prices, seasonally adjusted and work-day adjusted.
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis, last accessed on 31 January 2015.
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increase from 5 percent to 8 percent in April last year, 
GDP fell in the subsequent two quarters. A govern­
ment stimulus package, which was planned to amount 
to about 1 percent of GDP, failed to offset this down­
turn. The main reasons for the decline were both lower 
investments and weak consumer demand. The latter 
was to be expected as a counter­movement to pre­
emptive purchases in the first quarter.
Last December, the inflation rate in Japan was 2.4 per­
cent, after peaking at 3.7 percent in May. About 2 per­
centage points of current inflation rates are due to the 
increase in value added tax. On the other hand, rela­
tively stable core inflation indicates that most of the 
more recent fall in the inflation rate probably reflects 
the oil price shock; and both are only of a temporary 
nature. 
The economic performance of India improved over 
the course of last year. Positive momentum for this ac­
celeration came from both external and domestic de­
mand. Consumer confidence, for instance, also im­
proved because of the reduced inflation rate which, in 
turn, fostered real income growth. After two­digit CPI 
inflation rates through parts of 2013, inflation subse­
quently followed a downward trend, reaching 4.4 per­
cent in November last year. 
The outcome of the parliamentary elections in May 
2014 increased optimism about future economic de­
velopments, inducing private investment to start grow­
ing again slightly, after having been subdued in 2013 
and early 2014. The new government raised expecta­
tions of a series of structural reforms, including la­
bour market liberalisation.
In the Asian Tiger countries 
(South Korea, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong and Singapore), the pace 
of  economic expansion acceler­
ated slightly last summer. Both 
external and domestic demand 
growth increased somewhat 
compared to the beginning of 
last year. As usual, however, eco­
nomic developments differed 
substantially across these coun­
tries. Whereas the most signifi­
cant growth contributions in 
Taiwan and Singapore came 
from private consumption and 
investment, growth in South 
Korea and Hong Kong was driv­
en by an increase in public demand triggered by a 
variety of  policy decisions. In addition, the central 
bank in South Korea reacted to the slowdown in 
growth by cutting its base rate by 25 basis points in 
both August and October. 
In the emerging Asian countries (Indonesia, Thailand, 
Malaysia and the Philippines), growth accelerated 
somewhat, after a weak first quarter of 2014. Although 
the region was still burdened by the weak global econ­
omy and a multitude of restrictive fiscal policies, this 
was more than offset by the increase in private 
con sumption. 
1.2.4 Latin America and Russia
The overall economic expansion of the Latin­
American region (Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Vene­
zuela, Columbia and Chile) remained subdued in the 
first half  of last year. This was at least partly caused 
by weaker demand globally and low commodity pric­
es. Consequently, net exports contributed only mar­
ginally to overall growth, and most of the stimulus 
came from private consumption. Investments stagnat­
ed again; and even started to decelerate over the course 
of the year. This was most evident in Brazil, where 
output declined during the first half  of last year. More 
restrictive monetary policy, which constituted the re­
sponse to increased capital outflows and the resulting 
devaluation as of mid­2013, worsened the financial 
conditions for households and firms. As of the begin­
ning of 2014 steadily rising inflation was instrumental 
in three interest hikes at the beginning of the year and 
two in November and December.
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The central banks in Colombia and Argentina have 
also recently increased their interest rates. Whilst high 
inflation was central to monetary tightening in 
Colombia, the hike in Argentina reflected the central 
bank’s concerns over currency depreciation. Despite 
substantial purchases of Argentine pesos by the cen­
tral bank, which melted down the country’s foreign re­
serves from around 52 billion US dollars in early 2011 
to 27 billion US dollars in spring last year, its currency 
has lost almost 50 percent of its value against the US 
dollar since 2011 – most of which occurred in early 
2014. The decline in reserves has more or less halted 
now, at least temporarily. Although the technical de­
fault, which occurred in the summer of 2014, did not 
trigger an immediate crisis, it means that a return to 
the international capital markets has receded to the 
future. In an attempt to improve the current account 
balance, import controls were increased. The increas­
ing interventionism and high macroeconomic imbal­
ances that have accumulated over the years (excessive 
fiscal policy, high inflation) are counterproductive to 
attracting foreign investments, which are also impor­
tant to circumventing a further decline in foreign 
reserves. 
Although inflation was above­target, interest rates 
were lowered in both Chile and Mexico last year. In 
both countries, monetary policy is trying to support 
the economy. Overall, the region is likely to have ex­
panded by only 0.9 percent in 2014.
The Ukraine crisis hit Russia in the midst of a long 
ongoing phase of weak economic developments. Due 
to spiralling geopolitical tensions and sanctions be­
tween Russia and the West, the existing core problems 
of the Russian economy, such as the low diversifica­
tion of investment activities and international capital 
flight, have been further exacerbated. The withdrawal 
of capital, which has been ongoing since 2009, accel­
erated at the beginning of last year. With the move to­
wards a floating flexible exchange regime rate in early 
November, the depreciation of Russia’s exchange rate 
reached a climax in mid­December. Overall, the rou­
ble depreciated by over 30 percent against the euro 
and by 40 percent against the US dollar last year. To 
prevent an even stronger fall, the Russian central bank 
was forced to increase its interest rates stepwise during 
the year. Its base rate reached 17 percent by the end of 
the year. 
Uncertainty and unfavourable financial conditions 
dampened investment, leading to a fall in gross fixed 
capital investment in the first half  of 2014 compared 
to the previous year. Despite the generally unfavoura­
ble economic conditions, industrial production per­
formed better than expected. This occurred for several 
reasons: firstly, many sectors benefited from a ban on 
imports of Ukrainian goods and the production losses 
in the Donbass region. These primarily include com­
panies in metal production and processing, the arms 
industry and food processing. Furthermore, Russia’s 
import restrictions helped the domestic food industry 
and agricultural sector to increase their production. In 
addition, the strong devaluation of the rouble dis­
counted domestic goods compared to imported goods. 
Lastly, the state expanded its contracts with local 
companies. Overall, industrial production increased 
by 1.4 percent during the first eleven months of 2014 
as compared to the same period in 2013. 
Nevertheless, and although private consumption was 
one of the major pillars of the Russian economy pre­
viously, this demand component developed less dy­
namically than the years before. Retail sales in 2014 
rose more slowly than in 2013. Inflation, which in­
creased from 6 to 9 percent during the year, also placed 
a burden on real disposable income. After basically 
stagnating throughout the year, GDP has probably in­
creased by 0.7 percent in 2014 as compared to 2013. 
This is largely due to falling gross fixed capital invest­
ment, weak private consumption and declining 
exports.
1.2.5 The European economy
The cyclical situation
After four quarters of real GDP growth at annualised 
rates of around 1.5 percent, the recovery in the 
European Union continued at a slower pace. During 
the two summer quarters of 2014 growth amounted to 
approximately 1 percent (see Figure 1.9). After a deep 
and prolonged recession, output expanded for seven 
quarters in a row: from the last quarter of 2011 until 
the first quarter of 2013. The degree of expansion was 
extremely low in 2014 and remained well below that of 
previous recoveries. In addition, economic activity 
over the summer was weaker than expected last spring. 
One reason for this were fresh doubts as to whether 
the French and Italian governments are willing and 
able to carry out the necessary labour and product 
market reforms, as well as initiating a credible consoli­
dation of their fiscal budgets. Similarly, changes in 
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minimum wage laws and an effectively reduced retire­
ment age lowered investment incentives in Germany. 
Other constraints included the political conflicts in the 
Ukraine and the Middle East. All of these events had 
a clear negative impact on business confidence in 
Europe. As a result, gross fixed capital investment de­
clined during the summer half  of 2014.
Over the course of last year the growth contributions 
from private consumption in particular, as well as from 
public consumption, increased steadily. Government fi­
nal consumption expenditure mainly benefited from 
the fact that fiscal consolidation measures did expire in 
some member states and no significant new measures 
were adopted. Private consumption continued to grow 
and reached, albeit at only a moderate 2 percent, its 
highest quarterly growth level since 2007 to date in the 
third quarter of 2014 (see Figure 1.11). The small, but 
steady decline in inflation rates did 
relieve household budgets and 
thus supported this development. 
The recovery in consumer spend­
ing was reflected in the steady 
growth in consumer confidence in 
2013 and early 2014 (see Figu­
re  1.10). During the summer 
months confidence fell somewhat 
again, stabilising in autumn at a 
level that was still relatively high 
historically. Hardly any stimulus 
came from net exports, as both ex­
ports and imports picked up to a 
similar extent over the course of 
2014 (see Figure 1.9). After stag­
nating in the European Union and 
contracting by 0.5 percent in the 
euro area in 2013, growth in real 
GDP reached 1.3 and 0.8 percent 
in these areas respectively in 2014.
The recovery in Europe has also 
helped to stabilise the labour mar­
ket. The unemployment rate in 
the euro area stood at 11.5 per­
cent in November 2014, which is 
slightly lower than at its peak of 
12 percent in September 2013. 
Employment also increased 
slightly during last year, although 
it still remains well below pre­cri­
sis levels. Without higher growth, 
a more substantial and sustaina­
ble recovery of the labour market probably remains a 
long way off.
Inflation in Europe has turned to historically low lev­
els. The average inflation rate in 2014 of 0.4 percent in 
the euro area (and 0.6 in the European Union) was 
well below the medium­term target of the European 
Central Bank (ECB) of below or close to 2 percent. In 
autumn 2011, it stood at 3.0 percent and has fallen al­
most continuously since. For two years now, inflation 
has been below target (see Figure 1.12). The core infla­
tion rate (headline inflation excluding energy and un­
processed food) stood at just 0.7 percent at the end of 
last year, down from 2.0 percent in autumn 2011. The 
fall in core inflation, as also shown by reduced increas­
es in the GDP deflator, mainly reflects the continued 
under­utilisation of production capacities and the low 
scope for firms to increase prices as a result. 
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Furthermore, the necessary ef­
forts in crisis countries to improve 
competitiveness through wage 
and price reductions are also ex­
erting deflationary pressures on 
the euro area as a whole. Finally, 
the price effects of past tax in­
creases (e.g. increases in value 
added tax rates) have almost com­
pletely faded. That overall infla­
tion fell more strongly than the 
core rate was due to falling energy 
and food prices. All in all, howev­
er, the risk of entering a self­rein­
forcing deflationary spiral of fall­
ing prices and demand still ap­
pears to be low, albeit rising.
Differences across Europe
The economy of Germany cooled 
down significantly during the 
summer half  of 2014. At the be­
ginning of the year, real GDP had 
risen dynamically at an annual­
ised rate of 3.1 percent during the 
first quarter. This, however, was 
partly driven by favourable 
weather conditions; the mild win­
ter did boost construction invest­
ment. Partly as a correction, eco­
nomic output decreased in spring. 
However, this also reflected a 
much weaker underlying trend 
than was assumed during the win­
ter. In the subsequent third quar­
ter overall economic production 
barely increased. On balance, real 
GDP stagnated during the sum­
mer of 2014. As a result, the utili­
sation rate decreased in industry, 
but remained slightly above its 
long­run average.
The weakness of the German 
economy during summer was 
largely related to firms increasing­
ly returning to replacement in­
vestments, after investing quite 
heavily in the acquisition of new 
equipment in the previous winter 
Source: Eurostat, last accessed on  31 January 2015.
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season; leading to a decline in gross capital formation. 
Business sentiment has deteriorated since the begin­
ning of 2014. It was weakened not only by the eco­
nomic risks in the world and in the euro area and the 
uncertainties in the wake of new and old international 
crises, but also by the costly and employment­reduc­
ing reform projects of the German government. A le­
gal minimum wage with high coverage and full pen­
sions at the age of 63 were decided upon. Industry 
players downwardly revised their investment plans as 
a result. 
During the second quarter, construction investment 
shrunk due to weather­related rebound effects. The 
deterioration in the overall investment climate itself  
was felt during the third quarter. Favourable financ­
ing conditions were neither able to provide enough 
countervailing impulses to construction nor to equip­
ment investment. These overall unexpected changes 
in sentiment also led to a strong reduction in invento­
ries and therefore had a negative effect on overall 
production. 
Only consumption developed robustly during the 
summer months. Promoted by an increase in the real 
income of  households, price adjusted private con­
sumption expanded remarkably. Government con­
sumption also increased substantially. Overall eco­
nomic development was also propped up by foreign 
trade: although both imports and exports increased, 
the latter did so at a faster pace, resulting in a posi­
tive contribution from net exports. Taken together 
these developments, however, were not enough to 
offset the investment­driven decline in domestic 
demand.
Employment continued to develop favourably, albeit 
at a gradually slower pace over the course of the year. 
The unemployment rate hardly declined as a result 
(see Figure 1.13). 
During the first half  of 2014, France almost fell back 
into a recession, which was followed by weak econom­
ic growth during the second half  of last year. As in 
2013, the strongest spending impulses came from the 
government sector. The loss in competitiveness, com­
bined with the weak willingness to carry out the struc­
tural reforms necessary in the longer­run, have placed 
a heavy burden on the private economy. The willing­
ness of firms to invest is very low and gross fixed capi­
tal formation is therefore falling steadily. Exports have 
so far neither benefited from Europe’s slow recovery, 
nor the reduced value of the euro, resulting in hardly 
any positive dynamic in the labour market. The unem­
ployment rate hardly changed and reached 10.3 per­
cent at the end of last year. 
The economic recovery in the United Kingdom, which 
began in early 2013, continued throughout 2014. As in 
2013, the recovery was largely driven by domestic de­
mand. Both private consumption and investment con­
tinued to provide strong impulses and government 
spending also contributed significantly during the 
summer. Despite the economic recovery and the rapid 
recovery of the labour market – the unemployment 
rate fell from 7.1 percent at the end of 2013 to below 
6 percent at the end of 2014 – with wage and inflation 
dynamics remaining weak. Consumer prices rose, even 
without considering the significant drop in energy and 
food prices in October, by only 1.5 percent compared 
to the previous year. 
In Italy investments have been 
continuously falling since the be­
ginning of 2011, reaching levels in 
2014 that had previously last been 
seen in 1997. The country has 
now been in recession since mid­
2011. Although the decline in 
production has started to abate, 
mainly because private consump­
tion stopped falling and the ex­
port­oriented sectors are benefit­
ing somewhat from the overall re­
covery in Europe, a turnaround 
has not yet been achieved. With 
ever­changing governments con­
stantly reversing course, it is diffi­
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cult to create an environment in which long­term in­
vestment decisions appear fruitful and a general wait­
and­see attitude seems to have captured the Italian 
business sector. Moreover, Italy remains vulnerable to 
any increased tensions in government bond markets, 
with its public debt amounting to 132 percent of GDP 
in 2014. Real GDP is expected to have fallen by 
0.4 percent last year.
In mid­2013 the economy of Spain pulled out of reces­
sion. Since then, GDP growth has accelerated slowly, 
reaching an annualised 2.0 percent growth rate in the 
third quarter of 2014. With the exception of public 
consumption, all major spending components have 
contributed significantly to this recovery. Albeit still at 
historically high levels, the unemployment rate is ben­
efiting from this turn for the better and has steadily 
been declining since the end of 2013. 
In Portugal real GDP has also been on an upward 
trend since spring 2013. Even Greece emerged from its 
deep and prolonged recession at the start of 2014. 
Mainly export growth, as well as private consumption 
and investment more recently, have positively contrib­
uted to this change. In both countries, the effects of 
the turnaround are already noticeable in their labour 
markets. Unemployment has been steadily falling 
throughout 2014. Although the labour market is also 
improving in Cyprus, its economy is still shrinking. 
Together with Italy, Cyprus remained the only euro 
area member state in recession last year.1 
In the Central and Eastern European member states of 
the European Union, economic recovery has slowed 
somewhat since mid­2014. This was mainly due to 
weaker demand from the euro 
area. Although export growth 
was still strong until the middle of 
the year, it lost momentum some­
what in the third quarter. 
Domestic demand was robust al­
most everywhere. Except in 
Croatia, consumer spending, sup­
ported by low price dynamics, 
continued to grow in the region. 
Government consumption in­
creased markedly in several coun­
1 Although the annual growth rate for 
Finland is also negative for 2014, it man­
aged to emerge from recession in spring last 
year. Finland is suffering from a decline in 
one of its key industries, as well as weak ex­
ternal demand from the euro area and 
Russia – one of Finland’s main trading 
partners.
tries during the second half  of the year. Equipment 
investments also made an overall positive contribu­
tion to the increase in GDP in the region. Their expan­
sion was facilitated by the significant revival in Eastern 
European credit markets. Nevertheless, large differ­
ences between countries continue to prevail. While 
firm lending recently increased again in Poland, the 
Czech Republic and Bulgaria, borrowing remains dif­
ficult for companies in Romania, Hungary and 
Croatia. 
1.3 Fiscal and monetary policy
1.3.1 Fiscal policy
The restrictiveness of fiscal policy will abate in the ma­
jor advanced economies, albeit to differing degrees. 
Although fiscal policy in the United States will con­
tinue to reduce its structural budget deficit, the sched­
uled spending cuts that fall within this and last years’ 
budgets are significantly lower than those in 2013 (see 
Figure 1.14). In addition, many federal states are plan­
ning to increase their spending again. 
In Japan, value added tax (VAT) was increased by 
three percentage points in April 2014. This measure is 
supposed to act as the trigger initiating fiscal consoli­
dation in the years ahead, which in the light of a pub­
lic debt approaching 250 percent of GDP, appears to 
be desperately needed. At the same time, a temporary 
stimulus package was introduced in a bid to mitigate 
some of the negative impact of the VAT increase. 
Nevertheless, fiscal policy in Japan was highly con­
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tractionary last year. Although a 
further VAT increase scheduled 
for October 2014 was postponed 
until 2017, fiscal policy will re­
main restrictive, as previous stim­
ulus packages are set to expire.
In the majority of emerging econ­
omies, fiscal policy is likely to 
have a mostly neutral effect. 
China was the only economy that 
was substantially supported by 
public investment programmes in 
2014. Furthermore, the Chinese 
government has indicated its will­
ingness to extend these infrastruc­
ture investments once again, 
should its economy continue to lose momentum. The 
Russian government is being forced to intervene and 
stimulate its economy so as to mitigate the negative ef­
fects on the industrial and banking sectors of eco­
nomic sanctions related to the political conflict with 
the West.
In the United Kingdom the consolidation effort is also 
gradually waning. In the euro area, fiscal policy is sim­
ilarly becoming less restrictive after three to four years 
during which much­needed consolidation efforts did 
generate clear negative economic impulses in many 
places (see Figure 1.15). Not only does the low interest 
rate environment create incentives for debt­financed 
spending, the European Commission also relaxed the 
deficit and debt reduction plans for many member 
states in 2013. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that these 
revised fiscal targets will not be met by countries like 
France and Italy. The French government announced 
as early as September that it will not meet its budget 
target of 3.8 percent in 2014, as provided by the (re­
laxed) stability programme of the European 
Commission. It appears very unlikely that it will reach 
its deficit target of 3 percent this year either. In Italy, 
fiscal deficits are also higher than planned. The Italian 
government does not want to respond to its deterio­
rating fiscal position caused by lower than expected 
economic growth with additional consolidation meas­
ures. Although in the latest assessment of the 
European Commission, the government was given 
three more months to bring the 2015 budget into line 
with EU requirements, it appears likely that the 
European Commission will act in an accommodative 
manner again. Whereas this will take the pressure off  
in terms of short­term economic developments, the 
combination of very high public debt and low growth 
outlooks could, however, raise fresh doubts about the 
solvency of some individual euro area countries; and 
thereby give rise to renewed turmoil in financial mar­
kets. Furthermore, the credibility of any European 
agreement on fiscal constraints is further reduced. 
While deficits, especially when adjusted for cyclical ef­
fects, have been falling in recent years, according to 
the autumn forecast of the European Commission 
hardly any further declines are likely for this year. In 
France and Italy in particular, some increases in struc­
tural deficits appear likely, as no significant additional 
consolidation measures are scheduled.
The budgetary situation in the crisis­afflicted coun­
tries of Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain 
has improved noticeably. With the exception of Spain, 
all of these countries have probably achieved a prima­
ry surplus in 2014. Spain is also making substantial 
progress towards this goal. Both the improving eco­
nomic situation and temporary increases in particular 
tax rates up until the end of last year allowed Spain to 
outperform its deficit target of 5.8 percent of GDP. 
The scheduled income tax reform will probably lead to 
a temporary increase in Spain’s budget deficit.
In light of the continuing recovery, the overall govern­
ment deficit for the euro area and the European Union 
is expected to decline slightly to 2.6 percent in 2014 
from 2.9 percent in 2013 (see Table 1.1). Hardly any 
further consolidation is to be expected this year. The 
very hesitant recovery will, for example via somewhat 
higher employment, lead to a slight improvement in 
the budgetary situation in many member states. In ad­
dition, the strong decline in government bond yields 
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will further dampen government interest payments. 
Therefore, the deficit ratio for the euro area as a whole 
is forecast to continue to decline slightly to 2.4 percent 
this year.
1.3.2 Monetary conditions and financial markets
Monetary conditions
Monetary policy in the major advanced economies re­
mains very accommodative. However, the degree of ex­
pansion started to diverge in the various regions as of 
the beginning of last year. Differences in the degree of 
utilisation of production factors, and therefore poten­
tial inflationary pressures, are mainly responsible for 
this divergence. Given the robust economic develop­
ment in the United Kingdom and in the United States, 
the central banks of these countries stopped their pro­
grammes to buy securities as early as in mid­2012 and 
October 2014 respectively. Both countries are also ex­
pected to start increasing their interest rates again this 
year. Nevertheless, and in accordance with statements 
made under the heading of “forward guidance”, both 
central banks will continue to pursue expansionary 
monetary policy for quite some time to come. 
In Japan, on the other hand, the degree of monetary 
expansion has increased again. At the start of 2013 
the Bank of Japan announced that it would try to 
Table	  1.1	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Public finances	  
  Gross debta) Fiscal balancea) 
  
1999–
2007 
2008/ 
2009 
2010–
2013 2014 
1999–
2007 
2008/ 
2009 
2010–
2013 2014 
Germany 62.2 68.6 78.5 74.5 – 2.2 – 1.5 – 1.2 0.2 
France 62.3 73.3 87.0 95.5 – 2.5 – 5.2 – 5.2 – 4.4 
Italy 102.9 107.4 120.4 132.2 – 2.9 – 4.0 – 3.4 – 3.0 
Spain 48.2 46.1 76.4 98.1 0.2 – 7.7 – 9.0 – 5.6 
Netherlands 49.3 55.6 63.8 69.7 – 0.6 – 2.6 – 3.9 – 2.5 
Belgium 100.8 95.8 102.6 105.8 – 0.5 – 3.3 – 3.7 – 3.0 
Austria 66.2 74.1 81.9 87.0 – 2.2 – 3.4 – 2.7 – 2.9 
Greece 102.3 118.0 162.3 175.5 – 5.3 – 12.6 – 10.5 – 1.6 
Finland 40.6 37.2 51.1 59.8 3.8 0.8 – 2.0 – 2.9 
Portugal 59.6 77.6 115.0 127.7 – 4.3 – 6.8 – 7.2 – 4.9 
Ireland 31.1 52.4 110.9 110.5 1.6 – 10.5 – 14.7 – 3.7 
Slovakia 40.5 32.1 47.8 54.1 – 5.3 – 5.1 – 4.6 – 3.0 
Slovenia 25.7 28.1 52.0 82.2 – 2.3 – 4.0 – 7.6 – 4.4 
Luxembourg 6.6 15.0 20.8 23.0 2.5 1.4 0.1 0.2 
Latvia 12.2 27.5 42.1 40.3 – 1.7 – 6.5 – 3.3 – 1.1 
Cyprus 59.2 49.7 76.1 107.5 – 2.5 – 2.4 – 5.3 – 3.0 
Estonia 5.0 5.8 8.1 9.9 0.7 – 2.5 0.1 – 0.4 
Malta 65.5 65.3 68.8 71.0 – 5.0 – 3.8 – 3.1 – 2.5 
Euro area 69.0 75.0 88.7 94.7 – 1.9 – 4.2 – 4.2 – 2.6 
United Kingdom 39.8 58.7 82.8 89.0 – 1.8 – 7.9 – 7.8 – 5.4 
Sweden 49.0 38.5 36.9 40.3 1.1 0.6 – 0.6 – 2.4 
Denmark 43.6 36.9 45.0 44.1 2.3 0.2 – 2.4 – 1.0 
Poland 43.2 49.0 54.6 49.1 – 4.1 – 5.6 – 5.1 – 3.4 
Czech Republic 24.6 31.4 42.6 44.4 – 3.7 – 3.8 – 3.1 – 1.4 
Romania 19.5 18.2 34.8 39.4 – 2.6 – 7.2 – 4.3 – 2.1 
Hungary 58.9 75.0 79.4 76.9 – 6.3 – 4.1 – 3.7 – 2.9 
Croatiab) 28.2 40.2 63.2 81.7 – 2.9 – 4.3 – 6.1 – 5.6 
Bulgaria 45.0 13.7 17.0 25.3 0.5 – 1.3 – 1.8 – 3.6 
Lithuania 20.5 22.2 38.1 41.3 – 1.8 – 6.3 – 5.4 – 1.1 
European Unionb) 61.8 68.3 82.9 88.1 – 1.7 – 4.6 – 4.6 – 3.0 
United States 47.2 79.4 100.1 105.6 – 2.6 – 10.3 – 8.9 – 5.5 
Japan 167.0 201.0 231.6 245.1 – 5.9 – 7.3 – 9.0 – 7.1 
Switzerland 63.3 50.1 49.1 47.2 0.2 1.2 0.3 0.5 
a) As a percentage of gross domestic product. For the European countries, definitions according to the Maastricht 
Treaty. For the United States, Japan and Switzerland, definitions are according to the IMF. –  
b) Data on Croatia is only available from 2001 onwards. 
Sources: European Commission, Autumn 2014; IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2014.	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achieve its inflation target of 2 percent in two years’ 
time by resorting to massive quantitative easing. 
Given the unexpectedly sharp economic downturn in 
the summer of 2014 and a still very weak core infla­
tion rate, the Bank of Japan decided in early November 
to expand its monthly purchases of securities by over 
20 percent to 80 trillion yen. Given that the Bank of 
Japan’s uncollateralised overnight call rate is already 
at a historical low of 0.1 percent and is almost zero, no 
interest rate changes are expected for this year. 
The central bank of China has also become more ex­
pansionary in recent months. Triggered by the slow­
down in the construction sector and the real­estate 
market, it relaxed liquidity provision in some sectors 
slightly over the summer (while keeping restrictions in 
place in areas where the risk of a bubble appears high­
est). In addition, it lowered its base rate by 40 basis 
points to 5.6 percent in November. 
In view of historically low infla­
tion rates, the Chinese central 
bank is likely to loosen its mone­
tary policy stance again as soon as 
the economy is expected to slow 
down noticeably.
Most central banks in emerging 
economies have been forced to 
raise their key interest rates sever­
al times in recent months. This 
was either aimed at fighting infla­
tion that was considered to be too 
high (Brazil) or at counteracting 
the devaluation of their exchange 
rates triggered by the monetary 
policy shift in the United States 
(India, Indonesia). Russia’s cen­
tral bank also increased its inter­
est rate sharply and intervened 
massively in the foreign exchange 
market to counteract the strong 
depreciation of the rouble. It 
came under pressure in spring as 
a result of the Russian­Ukrainian 
conflict. Facing dwindling foreign 
exchange reserves and continuing 
withdrawal of capital, the Russian 
central bank decided in early 
November 2014 to stop its foreign 
exchange intervention and, at 
least for the time­being, have a 
fully floating Russian currency. 
ECB monetary policy has become more expansionary 
as production capacity remains underutilised and the 
inflation rate has fallen almost continuously. In addi­
tion, lending has not picked up in the euro area either. 
Whereas corporate credits have been falling since the 
end of 2011 and consumer credits stabilised last year 
at low levels, only mortgages appear to be benefitting 
from the low interest rate environment and are in­
creasing slowly (see Figure 1.16). In two steps of 
10  basis points each, the main refinancing rate was 
lowered to 0.05 percent in June and September last 
year (see Figure 1.17). This also caused the deposit 
rate to turn negative in June. As a result, the banking 
sector has since withdrawn most of its excess reserves 
from the ECB system (see Figure 1.18). 
With these steps, the ECB clearly signalled that all 
conventional interest rate policy measures have now 
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finally been exhausted. Its governing council subse­
quently decided on a number of additional measures 
to revive lending in the euro area and drive inflation 
back to its target. These include the unlimited alloca­
tion of liquidity within the main refinancing opera­
tions, which has been extended until the end of 2016. 
Furthermore, so­called Targeted Longer­Term Re­
financing Operations (TLTRO) were introduced that 
were auctioned in September and December last year 
and intended to provide cheap four­year funding at a 
fixed 0.10 basis point mark­up over the prevailing 
MRO rate percent interest rate to the banking sector. 
These funds were supposed to be linked to the amount 
of credit provided by the bank to the private economy 
which, however, is difficult, if  not impossible, for the 
ECB to control. Although the banking sector would, 
in principle, have been able to borrow up to approxi­
mately 400 billion euros under this programme, the 
programme only managed to allot around 80 billion 
euros in September and 130 billion euros in December.
 
The ECB also started a purchase programme for asset 
backed securities and covered bonds in order to fur­
ther strengthen lending by banks to the private sector. 
In mid­January both programmes amounted to only 
around 35 billion euros. This could be due to the fact 
that unlike in the United States, and to a lesser extent, 
the United Kingdom, most firm­funding in Europe 
takes place via bank loans instead of issuing bonds, 
making European financial markets smaller and much 
less liquid. The intention, however, is to further devel­
op these markets in the euro area. In view of the ECB’s 
stated goal of expanding its balance sheet by around 
1 trillion euros to reach around 3 trillion euros – the 
level of early 2012 – the disappointing volumes of pre­
vious measures and the further 
decline in inflation, which turned 
negative in December 2014 for 
the first time in five years, prompt­
ed the ECB to further extend its 
asset purchase programme. 
In January the ECB decided to buy 
60 billion euros of securities every 
month starting in March 2015 un­
til September 2016. The ECB will 
not only buy private sector debt, 
but will also purchase the central 
government bonds of euro area 
countries as well as, although to a 
lesser extent, bonds from European 
agencies and institutions. Central 
government debt will be bought according to the equity 
share of member countries in the ECB. This pro­
gramme’s goal is to increase the liquidity of banks and 
decrease the opportunity costs of lending by lowering 
the return on alternative investments. An additional in­
centive for banks to undertake further lending is the cur­
rently negative overnight deposit facility at the ECB. To 
avoid the sharing of hypothetical losses due to haircuts 
or the defaults of single countries, the majority of cen­
tral government bonds will be bought by their respective 
central bank. 
The ECB has now used up most of its options to fur­
ther loosen monetary policy, and has urged the gov­
ernments of the euro area countries to swiftly imple­
ment additional product and labour market reforms. 
Such reforms are necessary because monetary policy 
can only strike an accommodative stance, while it is 
down to individual governments to make improve­
ments to the business environment for firms that will 
boost investment activity. 
To what extent the extended asset purchases are legal 
according to the current treaties remains somewhat 
unclear. The government bond­buying Outright 
Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme launched 
in 2012 is currently being reviewed by the EU’s highest 
court. The first report indicates that the programme is 
to be considered legal. This makes it more likely that 
the ECB’s extended asset purchase programme will 
also be considered to fall within its mandate.
The situation in the money markets continued to ease 
further over the course of 2014. The money market 
spread between not­secured and secured loans in the 
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2.0
0
250
500
750
1,000
1,250
08 09 10 11 12 13 14
Billion euros % points
Liquidity provision by the ECB and the money market spread
a) Difference between the 3-month (unsecured) Euribor and the 3-month (secured) Eurepo (monthly average). 
b) Monthly average of main and longer-term refinancing operations and the use of the marginal lending 
facility of the ECB. c) Monthly average of the use of the deposit facility and fixed-term deposits at the ECB. 
Source: European Central Bank, last accessed on 31 January 2015.
Money market spreada)
(right-hand scale)
Net liquidity provision
Liquidity absorbing
measuresc)Liquidity 
providing
measuresb)
Figure 1.18
28EEAG Report 2015
Chapter 1
money market currently stands at just over 0.1 per­
centage points, indicating increased confidence be­
tween banks (see Figure 1.18). At the height of the fi­
nancial crisis in the autumn of 2008 and during the 
euro crisis at the end of 2011 and early 2012, the inter­
est rate premium was sometimes above 1 percentage 
point. There is also growing evidence that cross­bor­
der interbank trade is increasing again, although the 
volume is still significantly lower than its pre­crisis lev­
els. Increased transparency regarding the capital re­
quirements of the largest banks in the euro area, as 
created by the Asset Quality Review and the ECB’s 
bank stress test, will support the further normalisa­
tion of the interbank market. Compared to its prede­
cessors, the latest banking stress test was both more 
extensive and restrictive. Nevertheless, not all doubts 
about the resilience of the banking sector have been 
allayed. In particular, it has not been investigated 
whether and how a prolonged de­
flation period would affect the 
stability of systemically impor­
tant banks.
Bonds, stocks and foreign 
exchange markets
In bond markets yields have fall­
en due to the low inflation rates, 
the recent ECB decisions and in 
anticipation of further monetary 
policy measures. An extension of 
the asset purchase programmes 
of corporate and government 
bonds seems likely. Interest rates 
on ten­year government bonds 
fell substantially over the course 
of 2014 and, at the end of last 
year, stood at only 1.1 percent for 
the synthetic euro­area bench­
mark bond (see Figure 1.19). 
With the exception of Greece, 
yields on government bonds of 
crisis­afflicted countries contin­
ued their downward trend and 
within euro area disparities con­
tinued to abate (see Figure 1.20). 
Growing uncertainty regarding 
the future course of Greek policy 
as of October led to a substantial 
increase in the risk premium on 
Greek government bonds. 
Yields on corporate bonds of any rating, and particu­
larly on covered bonds, also decreased significantly. 
Although to a lesser degree, this also holds for firms 
located in countries with strong credit ratings. These 
covered bonds play an important role in bank finance 
and are currently trading at historically low levels.
However, the low funding costs of the banking sector 
are not yet reflected in the lending rates for non­finan­
cial corporations in the crisis countries. Since the be­
ginning of 2012 these rates have varied between 3.5 to 
5.5 percent, which is substantially higher than the 
rates that firms in highly creditworthy member states 
have to pay and comparable to the levels faced by the 
crisis­afflicted countries in 2005 (see Figure 1.21). This 
is due to both demand and supply­side effects. Firstly, 
the creditworthiness of many companies in the crisis 
countries is poor due to a deep recession and the 
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bursting of credit bubbles, implying that the relatively 
high lending rates reflect appropriate risk premiums. 
Secondly, the fact that the lower refinancing costs of 
banks are not fully transmitted to lending rates for the 
non­financial corporate sector also points to supply­
side constraints. Many banks in the crisis countries 
continue to hold high and still rising inventories of im­
paired loans, resulting in a reluctance to lend. A sus­
tainable consolidation of bank balance sheets has still 
not been fully accomplished. This reluctance to lend is 
also reflected in the development of loan portfolios. 
Whereas the volume of outstanding loans in non­cri­
sis countries has started to increase slightly, those in 
the crisis countries continues to shrink, albeit at de­
clining rates. 
All in all, financial conditions, for households and 
firms are likely to continue to remain favourable in 
Europe. In the euro area, monetary policy is further 
increasing its expansionary stance 
and interest rates will remain low. 
Differences between the crisis­hit 
countries and those that enjoy 
high credit ratings within the euro 
area, however, remain and are 
only slowly decreasing as the re­
covery of the former countries’ 
banking sectors is still far from 
complete. Lending is therefore 
only likely to revive very slowly.
The international normalisation of 
risk preferences continued to shift 
asset allocation away from govern­
ment bonds and towards other 
bonds, and particularly stocks. As 
a result, stock market indexes re­
mained on the upward trend that 
they set in mid­2012, for the first 
half of last year at least (see 
Figure  1.22). Measured in local 
currencies, the Dow Jones industri­
al average, the Nikkei 225 and the 
Euro STOXX 50 improved by 
10.3  percent, 11.8 percent and 
4.8  percent respectively during 
2014. The FTSE 100 was the only 
index that stagnated. The apprecia­
tion of the US dollar in particular, 
but also of the British Pound made 
the gains more pronounced from a 
euro area perspective. 
When financial markets started to realise that the eco­
nomic recovery in the euro area was not as buoyant as 
some had expected, some corrections did take place 
during the second half  of last year (see Figure 1.23). 
In the end, the Athex (Greece) and the PSI (Portugal) 
witnessed overall declines of around 20 percent over 
the year. The Irish ISEQ, by contrast, experienced a 
gain of approximately 16 percent in 2014. 
From spring last year onwards, the euro entered a 
clear depreciation course against the US dollar (see 
Figure 1.24). The increase in the growth differential 
between the United States and the euro area, com­
bined with the prospect of even more diverging mon­
etary policy regimes, has made the US dollar more at­
tractive and the euro less so. A similar picture emerges 
when looking at real effective changes, i.e. when cor­
recting for inflation differentials and weighting by ex­
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port shares: there has been an 
overall clear depreciation of the 
euro since spring 2014, whereas 
the US dollar has been appreciat­
ing in real terms against the 
Unites States’ major trading part­
ners’ currencies since mid­2014 
(see Figure 1.25).
As far as the other major curren­
cies in the world are concerned, 
the yen went through another de­
preciation phase from the sum­
mer of last year onwards. This 
was again largely triggered by fur­
ther (expected) loosening of mon­
etary policy in Japan. After an in­
itial real depreciation phase 
prompted by monetary policy 
and ensuing movements in the 
nominal exchange rate vis­à­vis 
the US dollar during spring 2014, 
the real effective exchange rate of 
China started appreciating 
strongly again in 2014. This re­
flects both the somewhat higher 
inflation rate in China compared 
to most of its trading partners, 
and the newly set­in moderate ap­
preciation of the renminbi against 
the US dollar. 
1.4 The macroeconomic outlook
1.4.1 Assumptions, risks and 
uncertainties 
The poor economic shape of sev­
eral euro area countries continues 
to pose a major risk to the global 
economy. Despite the structural 
reforms that have been carried 
out in Spain, Ireland, Portugal 
and Greece over the past three 
years, the necessary adjustments 
are far from complete, and nu­
merous structural problems per­
sist. This is reflected, among oth­
er things, in the slow pace of rela­
tive price adjustment (see Figu­
re 1.26). In order to restore their 
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competitiveness within the euro area and keep their 
external debt at sustainable levels, former crisis coun­
tries must lower their relative prices. If  they fail to do 
so, these countries remain fragile and vulnerable to 
changes in sentiment. The elections in Greece are a 
case in point. As a result, government bond yields for 
that country have clearly increased. However, at the 
time of writing, this effect has not spilled over to other 
countries (Spain, Portugal, France and Italy). So far 
at least, financial markets do not see a big risk of con­
tagion from recent developments in Greece to other 
countries. Compared to 2012, the European Union 
now has more safeguards in place against possible 
contagion (bailout funds, commitment of the ECB as 
lender of last resort and a partial banking union), 
which appear to be credible. The ongoing reform grid­
locks in France and Italy are also potentially worri­
some. These impasses reduce the medium­term growth 
prospects of the two economies and could, in princi­
ple, give rise to doubts about their solvency in finan­
cial markets.
The low inflation rate in the euro area also remains a 
risk. Core inflation has steadily slowed from 2 percent 
at the end of 2011 to 0.7 percent by the end of last 
year. The longer the phase of low inflation persists, the 
greater the risk that inflation expectations will lose 
their anchor. This, in turn, could further increase 
downward pressure on inflation. In a scenario that is 
still to be considered extreme, the euro area could slip 
into deflation. A falling price level would increase the 
real value of nominal debt. Given the high public and 
private debt levels in many places in the euro area, this 
could be a heavy burden on growth. Currently, how­
ever, long­term inflation expectations for the euro area 
still appear to be quite well an­
chored. Furthermore, a substan­
tial part of the current slowdown 
in inflation stems from falling en­
ergy and food prices. The core in­
flation rate adjusted for these 
components is currently more 
than twice as high as the overall 
rate of inflation and is most likely 
to average at around one percent 
this year. Furthermore, part of 
the reduction in inflation is to be 
endorsed as it reflects the struc­
tural adjustment that is taking 
place in the euro area. Structurally 
weak euro area countries are 
striving to improve their interna­
tional competitiveness. This requires that the prices of 
their products increase less than elsewhere or even de­
cline. Indeed, there are clear indications that (slow) 
progress is being made in labour costs and thereby 
competitiveness (see Table 1.2). All euro area coun­
tries have shown reductions in relative unit labour 
costs during the period 2010–2014, while these reduc­
tions have been more pronounced in the crisis­inflicted 
countries of Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal.
Further geopolitical risks relate to the ongoing con­
flict between Russia and the Ukraine and the Islamic 
threat in the Middle East. An escalation of the 
Russian­Ukrainian conflict could cause a spiral of 
mutual sanctions between Russia and the West and an 
increase in overall uncertainty. An escalation of the 
crisis in the Middle East could lead to an increase in 
oil prices given that this region is still one of the 
world’s leading oil producers. 
Finally, considerable risks are to be associated with 
the recent hikes in asset prices. The indices of some 
major stock markets rose sharply, despite the relative­
ly weak global economy. In the United States, price­
earnings ratios in 2014 reached levels last seen in the 
years 2006/2007. Hence, these ratios are very high by 
historical standards. Accordingly, it is possible that 
some segments are already overheated again. A sharp 
correction could worsen the wealth position of house­
holds and the financing conditions for firms, and 
thereby have negative implications for the world econ­
omy. Finally, in China there is a risk that the decline in 
housing prices, observed since the middle of last year, 
may accelerate. As the real­estate boom in the last five 
years was associated with a massive credit expansion, 
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a stronger than expected correction could weaken the 
Chinese economy more than forecast. As China is the 
world’s second largest economy, this would also nega­
tively impact our outlook for the world economy.
This forecast is based on the assumption that a barrel 
of Brent crude will cost 60 US dollars this year on av­
erage, after reaching a price close to 100 US dollars on 
average in 2014. Exchange rates are assumed to fluctu­
ate around their values observed in recent months, 
which implies that the euro will trade at around 
1.20 US dollars.
1.4.2 The global economy
The global economic slowdown has become evident 
since mid­2014 in the significant reduction in the Ifo 
World Economic Climate, as well as in a variety of other 
national indicators. The economic expectations derived 
from the Ifo World Economic Survey suggest that the 
global rate of expansion this winter season will remain 
subdued, despite some improvement (see Figure 1.27). 
The fall in oil prices during the last quarter of 2014 is 
likely to be an additional factor supporting global eco­
nomic developments this year. Lower oil prices are 
mainly likely to benefit oil consumers such as the ad­
vanced economies, as well as China, India and the econ­
omies of East Asia. In these countries the energy costs 
of households and firms will decline relative to their in­
come. For oil­exporting countries like Brazil, Russia and 
many economies in the Middle East, the strong decline 
in oil prices means a loss of national income. 
The cheaper oil price is supporting the slow, but steady 
acceleration in the advanced economies, which, in turn, 
is allowing the world economy to slowly gain momen­
Source: OECD Economic Outlook No. 96, November 2014.	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2009 
2010 
– 
2014 
1999 
– 
2009 
2010 
– 
2014 2014 
Germany 1.0 2.5 0.1 1.0 0.3 1.2 0.7 1.5 – 1.2 – 0.7 0.3 1.3 1.3 
France 2.7 2.0 1.1 1.1 0.7 0.9 2.1 1.0 0.4 – 0.8 – 2.1 – 0.4 – 0.4 
Italy 2.2 1.2 – 0.2 0.1 – 0.4 0.1 3.1 1.1 1.5 – 1.0 – 3.8 – 0.6 – 0.5 
Spain 3.5 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.5 1.6 3.7 – 1.5 2.1 – 3.3 – 1.1 0.9 0.9 
Netherlands 3.3 1.7 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.6 2.4 0.6 0.9 – 1.6 – 0.4 0.0 1.4 
Belgium 2.7 2.2 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.6 2.2 1.5 0.7 – 0.5 – 1.1 0.3 0.7 
Austria 2.1 1.9 0.5 0.4 0.9 0.2 1.4 1.7 – 0.3 – 0.1 – 0.6 – 0.6 – 2.7 
Greece 5.0 – 3.9 1.8 – 3.3 1.4 – 0.8 4.5 – 3.3 2.3 – 5.3 0.1 – 1.6 6.0 
Finland 3.2 2.4 1.7 0.6 1.0 0.6 2.2 1.7 0.3 – 1.2 – 0.6 – 3.9 – 1.6 
Ireland 5.2 – 0.9 2.4 – 1.3 1.7 1.9 3.8 – 1.0 2.7 – 3.2 2.4 1.4 9.3 
Portugal 3.7 0.0 0.7 – 0.6 0.9 0.9 3.2 – 1.4f) 0.8 – 1.7 – 1.3 2.2 – 0.1 
Slovakia 7.7 2.6 3.7 1.9 3.7 2.5 3.1 0.6 3.5 – 1.3 4.3 4.4 1.4 
United 
Kingdom 4.1 2.1 1.8 0.0 1.2 0.7 2.8 0.9 – 1.4 0.8 – 1.3 – 2.3 – 4.6 
Sweden 3.3 1.7 1.5 0.6 1.5 1.1 2.6 1.4 – 0.8 2.4 – 0.7 – 0.3 0.3 
Denmark 3.6 1.5 1.3 – 0.3 0.6 0.9 3.0 0.8 1.5 – 1.7 0.0 – 2.3 – 1.5 
Poland 5.5 3.1 1.8 1.3 3.7 2.5 2.3 1.2 – 0.7 – 0.2 2.6 1.8 1.0 
Czech 
Republic 6.0 1.1 3.6 0.3 3.0 1.0 2.6 0.8 3.8 – 2.0 4.5 2.2 5.2 
Hungary 8.5 1.7 2.3 – 0.9 2.5 0.3 6.5 2.1 3.4 – 1.9 5.5 0.7 3.9 
Iceland 6.7 5.6 1.3 2.8 2.4 0.1 4.9 5.1 – 3.7 5.1 1.5 – 0.3 0.8 
Norway 5.0 3.3 – 0.1 – 0.6 0.6 0.2 4.5 3.8 2.7 2.4 – 3.2 – 4.5 – 2.5 
Switzerland 1.7 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.8 0.4 1.3 0.3 0.3 2.6 – 1.1 – 0.8 – 13.3 
Japan – 1.3 0.1 – 0.1 0.9 0.7 1.4 – 1.5 – 0.8 – 1.8 – 5.6 – 3.4 – 0.6 4.9 
United States 3.7 1.8 1.5 0.2 1.8 1.2 1.9 1.3 – 1.6 – 0.8 – 1.8 – 0.6 0.5 
China                 3.9 4.6 12.5 5.0 3.7 
a) Growth rates for the total economy. – b) Compensation per employee in the private sector. – c) Compensation per 
employee in the private sector deflated by the GDP deflator. – d) Competitiveness: weighted relative unit labour 
costs. – e) Ratio between export volumes and export markets for total goods and services. A positive number 
indicates gains in market shares and a negative number indicates a loss in market shares. – f) Covers the period 
2010–3. 
Table 1.2
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tum. The recovery in North America in particular, 
largely driven by the United States, is expected to con­
tinue resulting in its strongest growth contribution since 
the start of the global financial crisis (see Figure 1.28). 
In India, as well as several emerging countries in Latin 
America, aggregate production growth is likely to pick 
up somewhat during the forecast period. Numerous 
structural problems, on the other 
hand, will act as a brake on growth 
in important advanced economies 
(euro area, Japan), as well as in 
some major emerging economies 
(Brazil, Argentina). The Chinese 
economy is expected to see a some­
what lower growth rate, as intend­
ed by the political leadership. All 
of this will make the growth con­
tributions coming from these re­
gions roughly comparable to those 
of last year. 
In the United States, domestic de­
mand will provide for a strong re­
covery during the forecast period. 
The improved financial situation of households and 
enterprises, increasing improvements in the labour and 
housing market, the expansionary monetary policy, 
and the decreasing restrictiveness of fiscal policy in the 
United States are all of importance. In addition, the 
sharp fall in energy and commodity prices will support 
the economy overall. 
Box 1.1
Revision of the System of National Accounts
In Europe, a general revision of the System of National Accounts (SNA) took place last year. From the third quarter of 2014 onwards, 
European countries started to generate national account statistics using the so­called European System of Accounts 2010 (ESA 2010), which is 
based on the System of National Accounts (SNA 2008) as developed by the United Nations. The previous version (ESA 95) was discontinued 
after the release of figures for the second quarter of 2014. Unless mentioned differently, this chapter uses ESA 2010 (or SNA 2008) figures 
throughout.
As compared to the previous system, the quantitatively most significant change relates to the accounting of research and development (R&D) 
expenditure. Previously, R&D expenditure by firms was treated as an intermediate input and, as a result was not directly included in GDP. 
Now this is treated as investment activities and therefore directly enters into gross fixed capital formation, which in turn is, via the national 
income account identity, part of GDP. Consequently, the R&D expenditure of firms directly increases GDP. The government’s R&D expendi­
ture was previously part of government consumption. This, like public investment, is now also recorded as part of gross fixed capital forma­
tion. Public consumption spending thereby declines to the same extent. Overall, GDP is therefore not affected by this change in the year it is 
spend. However, this will lead to an increase in GDP in the following years. Gross value added of the public sector is determined from the cost 
side. As the depreciation of R&D expenditure increases – in a bookkeeping sense – costs, this will lead to an increase in GDP. 
Another GDP­effective amendment relates to the assignment of military goods in national accounts. According to the previous ESA 95, mili­
tary equipment that can be used by civilians (such as barracks) were recorded as fixed capital investment. All other military equipment (such as 
tanks) were recorded as an intermediate input and thereby increased government consumption. In the new system, military weapons systems 
that are used for more than one year are counted as assets and their acquisition is recorded as investment. This reflects the fact that weapons 
are used continuously for the provision of security services. As with public R&D expenditure, the acquisition of these military goods is GDP­
neutral in the year of acquisition. In the following years, GDP increases due to depreciation on these weapons systems.
Furthermore, the definition of economic sectors has been changed in certain situations. In general, it appears that more economic units are 
allocated as part of the government sector. On the expenditure side, this means that a GDP­neutral shift in the consumption of private organi­
sations towards that of the government sector has taken place. 
Another innovation is the recording of goods sent abroad for processing without change of ownership (and vice versa). Previously, these goods 
were reported as exports when shipped and as imports on their return, with an increase in value as a result. According to ESA 2010, only the 
import of value added is now recognised. Several other smaller changes relate to insurance and pension payments. Furthermore, a harmonisa­
tion of the kind of illegal activities accounted as part of GDP took place.
All in all, this revision led to an increase of 3.3 percent on average in nominal GDP in the euro area during the period 1995–2013. Thanks to the 
revision, the investment share of GDP increased by 1.4 percentage points on average. The private and public consumption share decreased by 
0.9 and 0.5 percentage points respectively. Both import and export shares declined by 1.9 percentage points on average, leaving the contribution 
of net exports basically unchanged. The deficit and debt ratios of the public sector have, in general, fallen slightly. 
Not all countries have been affected to the same extent. Whereas all countries have, on average, seen an upward revision in the level of GDP 
(albeit not in every year), the average growth rate has declined for some countries (e.g. Germany, Italy and Greece). The level shifts also differ. 
In particular, the Netherlands, Italy and Ireland now have a larger share of euro area wide GDP. Germany, France, Spain and Greece have lost 
some relative importance. 
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In the United Kingdom strong growth in domestic de­
mand is the primary cause driving the robust recovery. 
In the euro area, the recovery will probably also contin­
ue during the forecast period, albeit at a much slower 
pace than in the United States or the United Kingdom. 
The economy of the euro area will benefit from not very 
restrictive fiscal policy, more expansionary monetary 
policy and the decline in energy prices. In addition, the 
depreciation of the euro is likely to support exports to 
the rest of the world. However, many member countries 
of the euro area continue to suffer from massive struc­
tural problems that will weigh heavily on economic de­
velopment. In many places the banking sector is still in­
adequately capitalised, the debt of households and firms 
remains high, international competitiveness is relatively 
low, and product and labour markets are still not very 
flexible. While some countries (Spain, Ireland, Portugal 
and Greece) are implementing some structural reforms, 
and are thereby increasing their attractiveness and com­
petitiveness, the Irish case – in which many reforms were 
initiated in 2009 – shows that it 
takes time before such reforms can 
bear fruits. In France and Italy, 
however, many much­needed re­
forms have so far failed to materi­
alise. Accordingly, these countries 
are expected to hardly expand at 
all over the forecast period and 
may therefore prove a heavy bur­
den on growth within the mone­
tary union. 
In Japan, the pace of expansion is 
expected to remain low this year. 
Although monetary policy re­
mains very expansionary, the 
emergent restrictive fiscal policy, 
the recent fall in the real income of 
private households, as well as 
structural weaknesses such as a 
shrinking workforce, strong seg­
mentation in the energy and ser­
vice sectors, as well as over­regula­
tion and rigidness in labour and 
product markets do not allow for 
more than a slow recovery.
The pace of growth in the emerg­
ing economies in 2015 will be com­
parable to last year. A number of 
structural factors will cause 
growth to remain below levels seen 
during the decade before the global financial crisis. 
Financing conditions are also expected to continue to 
deteriorate, because long­term interest rates in the 
United States will increase with the ongoing recovery, 
which will make emerging economies less attractive for 
many global investors. Nevertheless, China’s economy 
is expected to remain resilient and India should expand 
dynamically. Only the commodity­exporting economies 
of Latin America and Russia are likely to go through a 
period of economic weakness due to the sharp fall in 
commodity prices. In addition, Russia is likely to suffer 
from economic sanctions and a sharp withdrawal of 
foreign capital triggered by the Russian­Ukrainian 
conflict. 
All in all, and largely driven by the continuing recov­
ery in the United States, world GDP will increase by 
3.5 percent this year, after 3.3 percent in 2014, when 
using purchasing­power­parity adjusted weights to 
aggregate the economies (see Figure 1.29). Using 
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market prices, world economic growth will reach 
2.8  percent this year, after 2.5 percent in 2014. 
Accordingly, world trade is expected to have expand­
ed by just 2.6 percent in 2014. Although it will remain 
subdued from a longer­term perspective, its growth 
rate will manage to rise to 4.0 percent this year (see 
Table 1.A.1).
Due to robust growth in domestic demand, the cur­
rent accounts of  most emerging economies will con­
tinue to deteriorate. In the euro area, however, the 
gradually improving export performance of  some 
member countries and their rather moderate domes­
tic economic expansion will lead to an improvement 
in the current account balance. The current account 
deficit of  the United States is likely to remain virtual­
ly unchanged. Rising growth in the imports of  goods 
and services in the United States are almost fully 
compensated for by a further expansion of  gas and 
oil exports. 
1.4.3 United States
After fiscal policy turned restrictive again during the 
winter of 2013/14, it took a more neutral stance in the 
course of last year. During the summer half, public 
spending contributed significantly to the increase in 
gross domestic product. Over the past two years, both 
spending cuts and cyclically higher tax revenues have 
led to a significant reduction in the budget deficit. As a 
result of the Republican majority in Congress and a 
Democratic president, no further significant consoli­
dation efforts are to be expected until the next presi­
dential election in 2016. Hence, the federal budget def­
icit is only going to improve slightly for cyclical rea­
sons. For the fiscal years 2014 and 2015 it is expected 
to be 2.8 percent and 2.7 percent of gross domestic 
product respectively. 
Despite significant improvements in the labour mar­
ket, the Federal Reserve is only slowly abandoning its 
ultra­loose monetary policy stance. The low inflation 
rate and the high vulnerability of international capital 
markets are prompting the Federal Reserve to move 
cautiously. Last year the Federal Reserve reduced the 
volume of its purchasing programme for mortgage­
backed securities and government bonds stepwise 
from 85 billion US dollar a month in December 2013 
to zero in October 2014. However, the US central 
bank will still refrain from bringing its balance sheet 
back to pre­crisis levels – and until further notice it 
will replace expiring papers with new ones. Regarding 
future interest rate policy, the projections of the mem­
bers of the relevant Federal Open Market Committee 
suggest that the target for the federal funds rate will be 
raised for the first time in the first half  of this year 
from its current low of 0–0.25 percent. The federal 
funds rate is expected to reach a level of about 1 per­
cent by the end of 2015. Hence, monetary policy will 
become less expansionary, although the continued 
negative real short­term interest rates will continue to 
stimulate the economy.
Survey­based economic indicators suggest that during 
the winter private consumption and machinery and 
equipment investment continued to show high rates of 
expansion. Ongoing improvements in the labour mar­
ket and the substantial fall in oil prices will support 
private consumption and boost the economy as a 
whole. Manufacturing activity is showing signs of 
gathering pace and improved business confidence will 
further support investment activity. The growth con­
tribution of net exports, on the other hand, is expected 
to show a gentle slowdown. Weak growth abroad and 
the increased value of the US dollar will dampen US 
export growth. Furthermore, previously weak import 
demand will normalise. Nevertheless, the overall rate 
of economic expansion should remain strong, since 
low inflation and strong labour market developments 
are about to support real disposable income and thus 
private consumption. In addition, after a year in 
which construction investment developed only weakly 
and remained well below historically normal levels, it 
should be able to contribute to an improvement in the 
growth rate once again.
All in all, real GDP growth of 2.4 percent in 2014 will 
accelerate to about 3.2 percent this year (see 
Figure 1.30). Both the oil price shock and the stronger 
US dollar will allow the inflation rate to slow down 
from 1.7 percent in 2014 to 1.1 percent this year (see 
Table 1.A.1). Finally, the unemployment rate, which 
averaged at 6.2 percent last year, is expected to decline 
further to 5.5 percent on average in 2015. 
1.4.4 Asia
In China a further weakening of the real­estate market 
will lead the authorities to increase its infrastructure 
investment. The National Development and Reform 
Commission of China already approved several new 
major construction projects at the end of last year, in­
36EEAG Report 2015
Chapter 1
cluding 16 railway stations and 5 airports. This will 
provide additional impulses to construction to coun­
tervail the weakening property market.
The People’s Bank of China has reacted to the recent­
ly economic slowdown and fall in inflation by easing 
liquidity conditions for regional banks in particular. 
In November last year, it also lowered its base interest 
rate by 0.4 percentage points to 5.6 percent. The infla­
tion rate in November last year was only 1.4 percent, 
the lowest level since November 2009 and well below 
the official inflation target of 4 percent. 
On the one hand, the low inflation and the weakening 
of construction activities might induce the central 
bank to increase its expansionary efforts. On the other 
hand, defective developments in the real­estate sector 
in the past may move to the foreground. Above and in 
comparison to historical standards, lending by shad­
ow banks to domestic building investors has increased 
very sharply in recent years. The central bank may 
therefore attempt to tighten lending in this area to 
counteract further misallocation. Steps towards fur­
ther liberalisation of household savings rates in 
November 2012 also point in this direction: allowing 
banks to set savings rates more freely will, at least in 
the longer run, lead to more competition between 
banks, lower banks’ mark­ups and raise saving rates 
(although it will not necessarily lead to higher lending 
rates for firms). This will make real­estate investments 
less attractive, thereby reducing the aforementioned 
misallocation.
For the forecast period a variety of indicators suggest 
that the pace of growth will continue to gradually slow 
down. Industrial production be­
gan to decelerate in recent months. 
In addition, survey indicators 
have weakened. However, strong 
forecast consumer demand and 
the still abundant scope of fiscal 
policy to act make it unlikely that 
there will be any significant eco­
nomic slowdown in China. All in 
all, after growth of 7.4 percent in 
China’s real GDP in 2014, it will 
expand by 7.1 percent this year.
In October 2014, the Bank of 
Japan further relaxed its expan­
sionary monetary policy. In order 
to achieve its inflation target of 
2 percent, it increased the annual purchase volume of 
government bonds and exchange­traded funds (ETFs) 
by 10 trillion yen to 80 trillion yen (which amounts to 
about 16 percent of GDP). These additional measures 
are intended to suppress the already very low long­
term interest rates further and prevent a further fall in 
the inflation rate. 
The loose monetary policy of the central bank is likely 
to have contributed significantly to the depreciation of 
the yen, which has lost about 30 percent of its real val­
ue in the past three years (see Figure 1.25). A marked 
increase in exports as a result of this improvement in 
competitiveness is, however, not likely, at least in the 
short term. Firstly, large companies have already 
moved a significant part of their production capacities 
abroad and therefore can only partially benefit from 
the devaluation. Secondly, the costs of imported in­
puts have increased significantly due to the devalua­
tion. For many, especially small and medium­sized 
companies, this has a dampening effect on earnings 
and inhibits the production and export of goods and 
services.
Fiscal policy will become more restrictive over the 
course of 2015. Although the government has post­
poned the next increase in value added taxes, original­
ly planned for October 2015, for one and a half  years, 
no further stimulus measures are scheduled after the 
end of the last programme.
Overall, economic growth will remain low in Japan. 
Declining real household incomes are likely to continue 
to weigh on consumer spending. In addition, the disap­
pointing structural reforms initiated by the current gov­
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ernment mean that corporate investments will continue 
to stagnate. Structural factors (shrinking population, 
rigid labour markets with lifetime employment con­
tracts, over­regulation in many product and service 
markets) remain a drag on growth. Overall, output is 
expected to rise by about 0.8 percent this year, after 
0.3  percent in 2014. Inflation should lie at around 
2.0 percent this year, versus 2.8 percent in 2014. 
Although fiscal policy in India is likely to remain fo­
cused on consolidating the government’s budget, it 
will not increase its degree of restrictiveness any fur­
ther this year. On the one hand, the government is 
planning to cut various subsidies such as those on fuel 
in order to reduce the state budget deficit. On the oth­
er hand, however, significant public investments to im­
prove India’s ailing transport and energy infrastruc­
ture have been announced. Although the inflation rate 
has managed to fall below the inflation target of 6 per­
cent, the restrictive stance of monetary policy is not 
expected to diminish. The fall in inflation since the be­
ginning of 2014 was mainly due to the strong slow­
down of inflation in food prices, whose fluctuations 
are usually substantial, but purely temporary. 
A variety of leading indicators suggests that the 
Indian economy has continued to pick up during these 
winter months. Growth is expected to accelerate 
slightly due to robust domestic demand, and despite 
deficient infrastructure and the recent rise in refinanc­
ing costs. The increased business confidence and the 
planned expansion of public spending on infrastruc­
ture is likely to boost aggregate investment. Private 
consumption is expected to benefit from rising real in­
comes. Consumption growth will therefore be able to 
accelerate. All in all, real GDP will grow by 7.1 per­
cent this year after 6.1 percent in 2014.
Economic growth in the group of Asian Tiger coun­
tries (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore) 
is expected to accelerate somewhat this year, fuelled 
mainly by domestic demand. Private consumption and 
investment will benefit from a brightening of labour 
market conditions and the improved financial situation 
of households and firms. A more expansionary fiscal 
stance in Hong Kong and South Korea will further 
strengthen domestic demand this year. Furthermore, 
exports will continue to expand at a rapid pace, espe­
cially given the expected robust recovery in the United 
States. The outlook for the emerging Asian countries 
(Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines) is 
rosy. Thanks to accelerating domestic demand and an 
increase in trade flows between the countries of this re­
gion, the pace of economic growth is expected to con­
tinue to increase. When these two groups of countries 
are taken together, real GDP is expected to expand by 
4.3 percent this year after 3.8 percent in 2014; while in­
flation is expected to accelerate from 3.4 percent last 
year to 3.8 percent in 2015.
1.4.5 Latin America and Russia
There are signs of a slow economic recovery in the 
Latin­American region (Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, 
Venezuela, Columbia and Chile) this year. After indus­
trial production in most countries declined for several 
months in a row, a return to more positive develop­
ments has been seen recently. Although this suggests 
that the worst is over, overall economic growth is ex­
pected to increase only slightly this year, with the two 
economic heavyweights of the region, Brazil and 
Argentina, despite some forecast improvements, still 
falling far short of their past growth performance. 
Whereas Brazil continues to suffer from its unresolved 
structural problems (high tax burden, bureaucracy and 
infrastructure bottlenecks), in Argentina unfavourable 
economic conditions (such as import and capital con­
trols), high inflation and the technical default of last 
summer are dimming the outlook for this year. 
Furthermore, as long as Argentina fails to reach an 
agreement with those creditors who have not been re­
scheduled after the 2001­default (the so­called 
Holdouts), the financing of further deficits will prove 
difficult. More than ever, the government is likely to 
depend on monetising its government debt, which will 
continue to fuel the already high inflation rate. Vene­
zuela continues to suffer from the recent fall in oil pric­
es. Inflation will continue to soar and the economy is in 
a recessionary state. Mexico and Colombia, which saw 
relatively high growth rates last year, will lead the re­
gion in the year ahead as well. Mexico, in particular, 
will benefit from the upturn in the United States. 
Business sentiment in the manufacturing sector has 
brightened significantly from the middle of 2014 on­
wards, with comprehensive reforms paving the way for 
a higher long­term growth rate. Overall, the region’s 
growth rate is expected to reach 2.0 percent in 2015.
In Russia, the value of the rouble is likely to remain 
under pressure as the withdrawal of capital is expected 
to continue. About half  of Russian state revenues 
stem from the export of raw materials. Whereas the 
fiscal accounts are denominated in depreciating rou­
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bles, its oil exports are invoiced in an appreciating dol­
lar. The depreciation of the rouble is therefore cush­
ioning commodity price related losses in the state 
budget.
There are, however, also substantial risks and costs as­
sociated with the rouble devaluation. For instance, the 
burden associated with debt denominated in foreign 
currencies increases. About three quarters of Russia’s 
foreign debt, which amounted to 731 billion US dol­
lars mid­2014, is denominated in foreign currencies. 
The largest debtor is the corporate sector (216 billion 
US dollars), followed by the banking sector (170 bil­
lion US dollars). The solvency of the banking sector is 
currently, in principle, backed up by the central bank, 
which has foreign currency reserves amounting to 
420 billion US dollars (in early December 2014). The 
ratios of total external debt (foreign and local curren­
cy) to exports (35 percent) and to GDP (123 percent) 
are also below the thresholds that the World Bank 
considers problematic. Although for some individual 
debtors, especially in the corporate sector, liquidity 
problems might occur, an area­wide default is not to 
be expected this year.
This year, Russia is likely to slide into a recession. The 
strong fall in energy prices will reduce export revenues, 
which in 2012 and 2013 contributed significantly to 
overall economic growth and, in general, to the fi­
nancing of the state budget. The continued devalua­
tion of the rouble will increase the cost of imports and 
thus lead to a further increase in inflation. Thus, pri­
vate consumption is hardly likely to expand further. 
As a result of the rise in inflation, the central bank will 
continue to increase its key rate. The unfavourable fi­
nancial conditions will further 
dampen investment. This will be 
partially offset by an increase in 
government investment, which 
could be financed out of the 
National Wealth Fund, the vol­
ume of which amounts to about 
82 billion US dollars or 5 percent 
of Russian GDP. International 
capital markets on the other hand 
will initially remain virtually 
closed for both state and industry. 
Stimuli are expected from indus­
trial production as a result of the 
import substitution policy. If  
these stimuli are strong enough, 
the Russian economy may avoid a 
recession. However, the downside risks associated to 
further capital withdrawals and the wider implications 
of the oil price collapse effectively outweigh such an 
upside scenario.
1.4.6 The European economy
The cyclical situation
The economic recovery in Europe, and particularly in 
the euro area, is expected to continue this year. 
However, there is still no real upswing in sight, as 
shown by the confidence indicators of the European 
Commission (see Figure 1.10) and the results of the 
Ifo World Economic Survey (see Figure 1.27 and 
Appendix 1.B), the latter of which sharply deteriorat­
ed during the second half  of last year. The pace of ex­
pansion is likely to increase only slightly in the coming 
quarters, and to remain well below previous recover­
ies, partly because numerous structural problems in 
the euro area remain unresolved. For the European 
Union, we expect a growth rate of 1.3 percent this year 
(see Figure 1.31), while the rate for the euro area is 
forecasted to be 0.9 percent.
Both investment and private consumption are likely to 
increase slightly in the near future. The former will 
also benefit somewhat from the less restrictive lending 
practices of the banking sector. The completed review 
of the asset quality of banks by the ECB has strength­
ened confidence in the stability of the banking sector 
somewhat. This has a positive impact on private in­
vestment. However, the high and still rising debt ratio 
of the corporate sector will continue to have a damp­
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ening effect on the supply of credit. As a result of geo­
political conflicts, uncertainty grew over the course of 
2014. This will fade gradually, prompting firms to pick 
up deferred investment projects. In addition, rising de­
mand will gradually allow firms to also think about 
increasing capacities in addition to carrying out re­
placement investments. 
Private consumption is expected to continue to benefit 
from the extremely low price increases that free up the 
budgets of households. More specifically, the sharp 
drop in energy prices will increase real disposable in­
come. Furthermore, continued favourable financing 
conditions in some member states will make the pur­
chase of durable consumption goods appear attrac­
tive. However, many households – especially those in 
crisis­hit countries – are forced to spend a significant 
portion of their disposable income on servicing exist­
ing debts. This will, at least partly, 
counteract positive impulses.
As consolidation efforts have 
come to a virtual standstill in 
many member states and no new 
restrictive measures are expected 
to be taken, fiscal policy will be 
accommodative this year. Net ex­
ports will contribute positively as 
external demand, particularly 
from the United States, is likely to 
pick up gradually. The large in­
crease in the value of the US dol­
lar relative to the euro in recent 
months makes it attractive for US 
firms and consumers to import 
goods and services from the euro 
area. However, since imports into 
the euro area are also expected to 
grow stronger, the growth contri­
bution of net exports will fall sig­
nificantly short of that in previ­
ous recoveries (see Figure 1.32).
Although employment did pick 
up both in the euro area and in 
the European Union, the labour 
market situation is likely to re­
main tight and not to gain further 
speed during 2015 (see Fig u­
re  1.33). Despite promising re­
forms that have been launched by 
some member states aimed at re­
ducing rigidities in the labour market and thereby 
structural unemployment, it will take time for these re­
forms to take their full effect. In addition, the eco­
nomic recovery is too slow to bring about a sustaina­
ble reduction in cyclical unemployment. All in all, the 
average unemployment rate for 2015 is forecast to be 
9.9 percent, after 10.2 percent last year (see 
Figure 1.34). 
Since the underlying trend remains weak, the negative 
output gap will hardly be reduced this year. Inflation 
is therefore likely to remain low and only increase 
gradually. After 1.3 percent on average in 2013, the 
euro area inflation rate has fallen to 0.4 percent last 
year and will on average reach 0.4 percent again this 
year, implying a steady increase over the course of the 
year. This forecast is based on stable oil and food pric­
es and a fairly constant euro / US dollar exchange rate.
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Differences across Europe
After a trough in growth during summer last year, the 
economy of Germany is expected to regain momen­
tum again. Several indicators show that total output 
in the final quarter of 2014 is likely to have increased 
slightly. Seasonally adjusted production in the manu­
facturing sector rose during the final months of the 
year. Both domestic and foreign incoming orders have 
risen again. The sharp decline in crude oil prices cre­
ates terms­of­trade gains that increase purchasing 
power and thereby overall demand. Consumer confi­
dence maintained an upward trend, indicating that 
private consumption will continue to support eco­
nomic growth going forward.
Like Germany, France will also go through a weak 
phase before the recovery sets in again this winter. The 
latter will be driven by some improvements in con­
struction activity and a slight acceleration of invest­
ment. France’s low level of competitiveness and ca­
pacity utilisation will keep real GDP growth well be­
low the euro area average at 0.4 percent. Accordingly, 
inflation will also fall below the euro area average to 
reach 0.3 percent on average.
In light of weak inflation dynamics in the United 
Kingdom, the Bank of England is expected to continue 
to keep its monetary policy expansionary and only 
raise its official bank rate from its historic low of 
0.5 percent by the second half  of 2015.
The leading indicators speak for some weakening of 
economic dynamics in these winter months. Although 
still at a high level, both consumer and business confi­
dence have weakened slightly in 
the dominant services sector, 
trade and construction. The in­
dustry climate, however, has 
brightened up further. Overall, 
the British economy is expected 
to continue its strong growth se­
quence, although the recovery is 
likely to slow gradually in the 
face of  a closing output gap. In 
2014, gross domestic product is 
expected to grow by 3.0 percent, 
and by 2.6 percent in 2015 (see 
Figure 1.35). Thus foreign trade 
will continue to have a dampen­
ing effect because the pound has 
appreciated in terms of  the nomi­
nal effective exchange rate by almost 10 percent since 
the spring of  2013, and demand from the euro area, 
the main trading partner of  the United Kingdom, is 
likely to remain limited due to local economic weak­
ness. The unemployment rate will continue to decline, 
although at a slower pace than in previous months. 
On average, it is expected to be 6.2 percent for 2014 
and 5.5 percent in the following year. Inflation will 
probably accelerate slightly over the course of  the 
year, staying below the 2 percent target of  the central 
bank, and will reach the same average of  1.5 percent 
as last year.
In the course of  2015 Italy will move out of  recession. 
The major impetus for GDP growth will have to come 
from foreign trade. A domestically induced recovery 
looks improbable, given the structural and political 
problems that the country faces. Subsequently, how­
ever, these impulses might lead to improvements in 
private consumption and investment. All in all, this 
will nevertheless not be enough to turn the average 
growth rate of  real GDP positive in 2015. Inflation 
will remain low this year at an average rate of 
0.2 percent. 
Business sentiment in Spain suggests that the manu­
facturing sector will be able to gain further momen­
tum. The real­estate sector also seems to have reached 
its trough, with housing prices starting to stabilise last 
year. Renewed consumer confidence, a looser fiscal 
position and improved productivity will support 
growth in 2015. After 1.3 percent in 2014, growth will 
pick up to reach 2.0 percent on average this year. This 
will allow the average unemployment rate to slowly 
fall to 23.0 percent on average in 2015.
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Albeit somewhat weaker, a con­
tinuation of the economic recov­
ery is emerging in the Central and 
Eastern European region. No real 
stimuli are to be expected from 
foreign trade. Although price 
com petitiveness has recently im­
proved in many countries in the 
region, weak economic develop­
ments in the euro area will ham­
per exports. Furthermore, Rus­
sia’s sanctions against the Euro­
pean Union and the Russian im­
port substitution programme are 
heavily affecting Poland, where 
the share of exported goods to 
Russia amounted to 8 percent of 
total exports in 2013. With the ex­
ception of Croatia, positive im­
pulses are expected from domes­
tic demand in all countries of the 
region. The decline in unemploy­
ment and low inflation will fur­
ther support the purchasing pow­
er of consumers. Given the low 
inflation rates, central banks are 
expected to introduce further in­
terest rate cuts. This will have a 
positive impact on investment dy­
namics in the region. Leading in­
dicators suggest that the expan­
sion of industrial production, es­
pecially in the Czech Republic 
and Hungary will continue. Fiscal 
policy will become less restrictive 
than in previous years in many 
places, including the Czech Re­
public, Romania and Poland. 
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Appendix 1.A
Forecasting tablesTable 1.A.1 
 
 
GDP growth, inflation and unemployment in various countries 
  
Share 
of 
GDP growth CPI inflation Unemployment rated) 
  
total 
GDP 
in % in % 
  in % 2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015 
Industrialised countries:               
  
  
EU 28 26.6   0.0   1.3   1.3   1.5   0.6   0.6   10.8   10.2   9.9   
Euro area 19.4   – 0.5   0.8   0.9   1.3   0.4   0.4   12.0   11.6   11.4   
Switzerland 1.0   1.9   1.9   1.9   – 0.2   0.0   – 1.4   4.4   4.6   4.4   
Norway 0.8   2.0   2.2   1.9   2.1   2.1   2.1   3.3   3.2   3.2   
Western and Central Europe 28.4   0.1   1.3   1.3   1.4   0.6   0.7   10.6   10.0   9.7   
US 25.9   2.2   2.4   3.2   1.5   1.7   1.1   7.4   6.2   5.5   
Japan 9.5   1.5   0.3   0.8   0.4   2.8   2.0   4.0   3.6   3.5   
Canada 2.9   2.0   2.3   2.5   1.0   1.9   1.5   7.1   6.9   6.7   
Industrialised countries (total) 66.6   1.2   1.6   2.0   1.3   1.4   1.0   8.5   7.8   7.3   
Newly industrialised countries:     
 
    
 
  
  
  
Russia 3.2   1.3   0.7   – 2.0   6.8 7.8 12.2 . . . 
China 13.1   7.7   7.4   7.1   2.6 2.1 2.3 . . . 
India 2.9   4.7   6.1   7.1   10.9 6.9 6.5 . . . 
East Asiaa) 6.3   3.8   3.8   4.3   3.2 3.4 3.8 . . . 
Latin Americab) 7.8   2.5 0.9 2.0 9.2 9.6 7.2 . . . 
Newly industrialised countries (total) 33.4   4.9   4.4   4.5   5.4   5.1   5.1   . . . 
Totalc) 100.0   2.5   2.5   2.8   . . . . . . 
World trade growth in %   2.8   2.6   4.0   . . . . . . 
a) Weighted average of Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand. Philippines, Singapore and Hong Kong. 
Weighted with the 2013 levels of GDP in US dollars. – b) Weighted average of Brasil, Mexico, Argentina, 
Venezuela, Colombia, Chile. Weighted with the 2013 level of GDP in US dollars. – c) Weighted average of the 
listed groups of countries. – d) Standardised unemployment rate. 
Sources: EU, OECD, IMF, ILO, National Statistical Offices, 2014 and 2015: EEAG forecast. 
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Table 1.A.2 
 
 
GDP growth, inflation and unemployment in the European countries 
  Share of GDP growth Inflationa) Unemployment rateb) 
  
total 
GDP 
in % in % 
  in % 2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015 
Germany 20.8 0.1 1.5 1.5 1.6 0.8 0.6 5.2 5.1 4.9 
France 15.6 0.3 0.4 0.4 1.0 0.6 0.3 10.3 10.2 10.6 
Italy 12.0 – 1.9 – 0.4 – 0.2 1.3 0.2 0.2 12.2 12.8 13.6 
Spain 7.8 – 1.2 1.3 2.0 1.5 – 0.2 0.0 26.1 24.5 23.0 
Netherlands 4.8 – 0.7 0.7 1.1 2.6 0.3 0.6 6.7 6.8 6.4 
Belgium 2.9 0.3 1.0 0.8 1.2 0.5 0.5 8.4 8.5 8.3 
Austria 2.4 0.2 0.3 0.7 2.1 1.5 1.5 4.9 5.0 4.8 
Finland 1.5 – 1.2 0.0 0.7 2.2 1.2 1.2 8.2 8.6 8.7 
Greece 1.3 – 3.9 0.9 1.2 – 0.9 – 1.4 – 0.9 27.5 26.5 25.5 
Portugal 1.3 – 1.4 0.8 0.9 0.4 – 0.2 0.0 16.4 14.2 14.0 
Ireland 1.3 0.2 4.7 2.5 0.5 0.3 0.6 13.1 11.4 10.5 
Slovakia 0.5 1.4 2.4  2.0 1.5 – 0.1 0.5 14.2 13.2 12.4 
Slovenia 0.3 – 1.1 2.5 1.3 1.9 0.4 0.4 10.1 9.7 9.4 
Luxembourg 0.3 2.0 3.2 1.7 1.7 0.7 0.5 5.9 6.0 5.7 
Lithuania 0.3 3.3 3.1 3.0 1.2 0.2 1.2 11.8 10.6 9.1 
Latvia 0.2 4.2 2.8 1.7 0.0 0.7 0.9 11.9 11.4 11.4 
Cyprus 0.1 – 5.4 – 2.5 – 0.4 0.4 – 0.3 0.0 15.9 16.2 16.9 
Estonia 0.1 1.6 1.7 1.7 3.2 0.5 1.1 8.6 7.5 6.7 
Malta 0.1 2.5 3.7 2.0 1.0 0.8 0.8 6.4 5.9 5.7 
Euro areac) 73.5 – 0.5 0.8 0.9 1.3 0.4 0.4 12.0 11.6 11.4 
United 
Kingdom 14.9 1.7 3.0 2.6 2.6 1.5 1.5 7.6 6.2 5.5 
Sweden 3.2 1.3 1.8 1.1 0.4 0.2 0.9 8.0 8.0 7.7 
Denmark 1.9 – 0.5 0.9 1.2 0.5 0.3 1.0 7.0 6.6 6.2 
EU 22c) 93.5 – 0.1 1.2 1.2 1.5 0.6 0.6 11.1 10.6 10.3 
Poland 2.9 1.6 3.2 3.0 0.8 0.1 0.5 10.3 9.0 8.2 
Czech 
Republic 1.2 – 0.9 2.3 1.8 1.4 0.4 1.3 7.0 5.7 5.4 
Romania 1.1 3.1 1.7 2.3 3.2 1.4 1.8 7.3 6.9 6.6 
Hungary 0.7 1.1 3.3 2.5 1.7 0.0 1.6 10.2 7.4 7.0 
Croatia 0.3 – 1.0 – 0.4 0.5 2.3 0.2 0.4 17.3 16.0 16.0 
Bulgaria 0.3 0.9 1.6 2.0 0.4 – 1.6 0.3 13.0 11.5 11.0 
New 
Membersd) 6.5 1.2 2.6 2.4 1.5 0.3 0.9 9.3 8.1 7.6 
European 
Unionc) 100.0 0.0 1.3 1.3 1.5 0.6 0.6 10.8 10.2 9.9 
a) Harmonised consumer price index (HICP). – b) Standardised unemployment rate. – c) Weighted average of 
the listed countries. – d) Weighted average over Poland, Czech Republic, Romania, Hungary, Croatia and 
Bulgaria. 
Source: Eurostat, 2014 and 2015: EEAG forecast. 
Table 1.A.2
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Table 1.A.3 
 
 
Key forecast figures for the European Union 
 
2012 2013 2014 2015 
 
Percentage change over previous year 
Real gross domestic product – 0.4 0.0 1.3 1.3 
   Privat consumption – 0.7 – 0.1 1.1 1.0 
   Government consumption 0.2 0.4 1.0 0.5 
   Gross fixed capital formation – 2.6 – 1.5 2.0 1.9 
   Net exportsa) 1.1 0.4 0.1 0.0 
Consumer pricesb) 2.6 1.5 0.6 0.6 
 
Percentage of nominal gross domestic product 
Government fiscal balancec) – 4.2 – 3.2 – 3.0 – 2.7 
 
Percentage of labour force 
Unemployment rated) 10.5 10.8 10.2 9.9 
a) Contributions to changes in real GDP (percentage of real GDP in previous year). – b) Harmonised 
consumer price index (HCPI). – c) 2014 and 2015: forecasts of the European Commission. –  
d) Standardised unemployment rate.  
Source: Eurostat; 2014 and 2015: EEAG forecast. 
Table 1.A.3
Table	  1.A.4	  
	  
	  
Key forecast figures for the euro area 
 
2012 2013 2014 2015 
 
Percentage change over previous year 
Real gross domestic product – 0.7 – 0.5 0.8 0.9 
   Private consumption – 1.3 – 0.7 0.9 0.7 
   Government consumption – 0.2 0.2 0.9 0.4 
   Gross fixed capital formation – 3.4 – 2.4 0.7 0.7 
   Net exportsa) 1.4 0.4 0.2 0.3 
Consumer pricesb) 2.5 1.3 0.4 0.4 
 
Percentage of nominal gross domestic product 
Government fiscal balancec) – 3.6 – 2.9 – 2.6 – 2.4 
 
Percentage of labour force 
Unemployment rated) 11.3 12.0 11.6 11.4 
a) Contributions to changes in real GDP (percentage of real GDP in previous year). – b) Harmonised 
consumer price index (HCPI). – c) 2014 and 2015: forecasts of the European Commission. –  
d) Standardised unemployment rate. 
Source: Eurostat; 2014 and 2015: EEAG forecast. 
Table 1.A.4
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Appendix 1.B
Ifo World Economic Survey (WES)
The Ifo World Economic Survey (WES) assesses 
worldwide economic trends by polling transnational 
as well as national organizations worldwide about cur­
rent economic developments in the respective country. 
This allows for a rapid, up­to­date assessment of the 
economic situation prevailing around the world. In 
January 2015, 1,071 economic experts in 117 countries 
were polled. WES is conducted in co­operation with 
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in 
Paris.
The survey questionnaire focuses on qualitative infor­
mation: on assessment of a country’s general econom­
ic situation and expectations regarding important eco­
ifo World econoMic Survey (WeS)
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nomic indicators. It has proved to be a useful tool, 
since economic changes are revealed earlier than by 
traditional business statistics. The individual replies 
are combined for each country without weighting. 
The “grading” procedure consists in giving a grade of 
9 to positive replies (+), a grade of 5 to indifferent re­
plies (=) and a grade of 1 to negative (–) replies. 
Grades within the range of 5 to 9 indicate that positive 
answers prevail or that a majority expects trends to in­
crease, whereas grades within the range of 1 to 5 reveal 
predominantly negative replies or expectations of de­
creasing trends. The survey results are published as ag­
gregated data. The aggregation procedure is based on 
country classifications. Within each country group or 
region, the country results are weighted according to 
the share of the specific country’s exports and imports 
in total world trade.
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The european energy 
Conundrum: power Failure*
2.1 Introduction
European energy policy is currently poorly coordinat-
ed between the member states of the EU, although 
substantial gains could be achieved through enhanced 
cooperation both at the European and the global lev-
el. The argument in favour of a European energy un-
ion – a genuine common energy market with common 
regulation – may even be stronger than the case that 
was successfully made in the 1980s and 1990s for a 
monetary union. The economic principle of a single 
wholesale price is uncontroversial, but establishing the 
interconnections (creating the appropriate trade chan-
nels) in practice is difficult and requires considerable 
investment. 
2.2 Coordination problems
The opportunities and pitfalls for Europe in the energy 
context are similar to those arising in all other eco-
nomic and monetary union policy areas. The advan-
tages of a common coordinated approach are obvious. 
Pooling energy needs and consumption affords gains 
from trade and the diversification of risks. This is not 
only because wind patterns and other renewable sourc-
es of energy are imperfectly correlated geographically, 
or because of different degrees of access to imported 
energy sources, but also because the risks of nuclear 
energy production are shared by all European coun-
tries and carbon emissions create a world-wide exter-
nality, regardless of where in Europe they occur. The 
failure to achieve greater coordination reveals how the 
greater part of policy formation and preference accu-
mulation primarily occurs at the national level.
There are analogies with Europe’s problematic path to 
monetary union in the development of energy policy. 
Energy coordination in respect to coal, the primary 
fuel and basis of industrial prosperity at the time, was 
at the centre of the first major push for post-war inte-
gration and the institutional forerunner of the EU, the 
European Coal and Steel Community (1953). In-
tegration was underpinned by the notion that coal and 
steel represented the base for industrial capacity and 
military potential, and that a coordinated regime 
would produce political cohesion and European 
peace. As with monetary union, the European experi-
ence was frequently held up as a model worthy of imi-
tation in other parts of the world – until its flaws ap-
peared. In particular, the carbon emissions trading 
scheme was widely touted as a model for a global ini-
tiative to reduce the threat of global warming posed 
by CO2 emissions. 
A coordinated approach to energy, however, needs to 
address equally obvious problems that are often not 
recognised explicitly. Just as in the case of the European 
Union’s overall “growth, stability, and cohesion” ob-
jectives, the 1996 Internal Energy Market directive’s1 
goals of (1) secure, (2) environmentally compatible, 
and (3) competitive energy sources are in conflict with 
each other: renewable energy may be environmentally 
sound, but is neither secure nor inexpensive; foreign 
supplies of oil and gas may be inexpensive at a point in 
time, but are subject to geo-political risks etc.
From the economic point of view, a “we-want-it-all” 
approach to conflicting objectives is nonsense, and 
dogmatic anti-energy and anti-emissions attitudes can 
hardly be justified. Like the classic inconsistent trinity 
of national macroeconomic policy, capital mobility, 
and fixed exchange rates, such trade-offs can and 
should be addressed by careful economic assessments, 
and by coherent and pragmatic policy compromises. 
Policy choices need to provide a framework to guide 
the myriad choices of market participants, producers 
and consumers, through a pricing mechanism that is 
accepted as fair and transparent. An economic argu-
ment can be made for security-oriented policies like 
renewable energy subsidies that increase both current 
costs and self-sufficiency.
Since the necessary policy compromises are difficult to 
formulate and enforce without unified politics, the 
1 European Parliament and Council of the European Union (1996).
* We thank Hans-Dieter Karl, Wolfgang Meister and Andrew 
Sartorius for research input and assistance.
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European integration process has typically tried to 
leapfrog such difficulties by relying on market mecha-
nisms, in the hope that the latter not only enhance eco-
nomic efficiency, but also bring about a common per-
spective on common problems. 
Energy is no exception to this pattern. The European 
Commission has aimed to use market competition and 
deregulation as a means for achieving at least some of 
the ultimate goals of its energy policy, stipulating that 
energy transmission and production should be operat-
ed separately, and fostering the development of central 
energy exchanges at the national level at least.
In practice, policy remains highly relevant, and it is 
dangerous to try and sweep an obvious politico-eco-
nomic trade-off  under the carpet. In the energy field, 
the heterogeneous priorities assigned to conflicting 
goals by different actors across and within countries 
trigger inefficient competition among tax and subsidy 
systems in ways that are reminiscent of another long-
standing European policy problem: the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). The CAP was nominally 
motivated in its early phases by security considera-
tions similar to those that are currently relevant to en-
ergy (and related to them, through bio-fuel produc-
tion and regulation). It was also rooted in distribu-
tional considerations, however, and tightly linked to 
political considerations within each country, where 
agricultural markets were heavily regulated. Adoption 
of Europe-wide policies unleashes national as well as 
within-country rent-seeking activities, and results in 
distortions, which, in the CAP case, eventually ob-
scured any security considerations. Similarly, renewa-
ble energy subsidies in the energy sector clearly trigger 
political haggling and redistribution. The Emission 
Trading Scheme suffers from some of the same prob-
lems, as each national government lobbies for the as-
signment of plentiful quotas to its country’s firms.
Policy is also crucial because no market is perfect, and 
all markets need an infrastructure of rules. The energy 
market also needs a physical infrastructure that re-
quires large, slowly depreciating investments, and 
hence consistent and predictable policies and market 
conditions. As policy preferences shift to an increased 
dependence on renewable energy resources, the basis 
of price calculations shifts. Instead of a production 
system in which operating costs (paying for fossil fu-
els) constitute a major component of pricing, fixed 
capital costs form the largest element in the cost of 
producing useable energy, and marginal costs fall to a 
minimal level. 
Like welfare policy, energy policy can play a useful 
role in remedying financial market imperfections, and 
sharing appropriately long-term risks neglected by at-
omistic market participants. A case can be made that 
while markets can efficiently supply energy at a point 
in time, longer-term security can only be assured by 
policy. 
Security concerns and worries about the extent of risk 
generate considerable pressure to implement very diri-
giste measures. The French government’s General 
Commission for Strategy and Economic Foresight 
(French: Commissariat général à la stratégie et à la 
prospective), for instance, concluded that: “In a more 
fundamental approach, the role of marginal costs 
pricing as the pillar of electricity markets should be 
revised. They give an efficient dispatching of means of 
production on a day-ahead basis. But, in a market 
with an important electricity production at low mar-
ginal costs, coming for instance from a great develop-
ment of renewables, structural reforms are necessary 
to let economic signals emerge allowing for long-term 
efficient investments. They need to be, as much as pos-
sible, the result of a coordinated reflection between 
the Member States in order to define jointly the trade-
offs between security of supply, climate change and 
affordability.”2
The problem arises, however, that the individual priori-
ties are set by the separate member states, and are in-
compatible with each other. Energy issues were high-
lighted in the 2007 Lisbon Treaty3, where Article 194(1) 
recognised the reality that national states were primar-
ily in charge of determining energy policy, but set out 
the four principal overall aims of EU energy policy as:
• Ensuring the functioning of the energy market
• Ensuring the security of supply in the Union
• Promoting energy efficiency and energy saving, and 
developing new and renewable sources of energy
• Promoting the interconnection of energy networks
This article did not give the EU the competence to 
adopt measures significantly affecting a member 
state’s choice between different energy sources and the 
general structure of its energy supply; but such meas-
ures might be adopted under Article 192(3) by a spe-
2 French Government, General Commission for Strategy and Eco-
nomic Foresight, (2014), p. 13.
3 European Union (2012).
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cial legislative process of the Council, in practice re-
quiring unanimity, rather than majority voting.
In reality, however, these am bitious goals were not re-
ally achieved: major vulnerabilities re main in the en-
ergy market, no realistic scenarios predict any dramat-
ic reduction in overall dependence on energy imports, 
the task of managing energy efficiency is handled idi-
osyncratically and has perverse effects, and while there 
is some interconnectedness, many energy markets are 
quite cut off  from each other, with inadequate facili-
ties for allowing a ready commercial exchange of en-
ergy. An expansion and completion of the energy mar-
ket remains an area that offers significant potential 
gains in the efficiency of energy distribution, and that, 
in turn, could produce both productivity gains and 
substantial savings. 
Implementation of  the Lisbon Treaty’s provisions 
has taken place only in sporadic fits and starts. In 
2008, the EU laid out an ambitious programme for 
changes by 2020: the reduction of  greenhouse gas 
emissions by 20 percent, a 20 percent share of  renew-
ables, and a 20 percent improvement in energy effi-
ciency. The programme was highly ambitious as the 
reduction goals were meant to be binding for each 
individual country.
 
In 2009, the EU introduced the Third Energy Package 
(TEP) aimed at allowing greater transparency in ener-
gy markets and enhancing collaboration between na-
tional energy companies and governments. The pack-
age rested on five principles:
1. “Unbundling” of national energy markets, mean-
ing the separation of suppliers from energy pro-
ducers and delivery systems (pipelines, grids). Each 
stage of the provision of energy process was to run 
via transparent market operations.
2. The operation of a market required regulatory con-
sistency, or greater cooperation and dialogue be-
tween domestic regulatory organisations.
3. An “Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Re-
gulators” was established to “[…] promote cooper-
ation of, and complement, [the national regulatory 
authorities] at EU level.”
4. Two separate European networks of transmission 
system operators were established so as to “[…] en-
sure optimal management and sound technical 
evolution of the European transmission network.”
5. Greater investment in national gas networks and bet-
ter coordination in the operation of these networks.
The TEP immediately ran into opposition from multi-
ple energy players, including national energy compa-
nies, governments, foreign energy exporters, and con-
sumers. These parties believed that the TEP threatened 
their individual interests and control over domestic 
markets that had long been protected by regulatory 
privileges. Eastern European critics saw the TEP as 
creating a regional divide, and primarily benefitting 
Western European countries that already had signifi-
cant energy infrastructure in place, as well as diversi-
fied suppliers that could deal with the reforms. In 
short, a vision of how market coordination at an EU 
level might be achieved does exist, but it has not been 
implemented completely or satisfactorily.
The same can be said of the planned emissions reduc-
tions. On 24 October 2014 an EU Summit postponed 
the emission reduction goals to 2030, stipulating:4 
• A reduction of CO2 output by 40 percent (relative 
to 1990)
• An increase in renewable energy as a share of total 
energy consumption to 27 percent
• An increase in energy efficiency by 27 percent
It is remarkable that the two latter goals are now little 
more than mere declarations. Moreover, all national 
goals for expanding renewable energy have been 
abolished. 
Figure 2.1 shows the greenhouse gas emissions of EU 
countries and their reductions over time. While all 
countries have reduced the emissions, it remains to be 
seen what fraction of the achievements can be attrib-
uted to special effects like the current economic crisis 
or the dismantling of ex-communist industries (Ger-
many). In terms of relative reductions since 1990, the 
ranking is led by Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. 
However, as Figure 2.2 shows, the absolute emissions 
per inhabitant are still highest in Luxembourg, Esto-
nia and Ireland. 
2.3 Global interactions
The concrete outcome of the European level policy in-
itiatives is difficult to assess, because the European 
4 European Council (2014), “Cover Note,” EUCO 169/14, Brussels, 
24 October, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/
pressdata/en/ec/145397.pdf.
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projects interact with local conditions and global mar-
kets. Overall European demand for energy, which rose 
slowly over the period 1995–2006, subsequently de-
clined by around 8 percent. Part of the decline was 
due to efficiency gains and structural changes, but a 
major cause of the energy consumption slowdown is 
the worldwide financial and economic crisis, which 
has had a particularly dramatic impact in the Southern 
Eurozone. 
The EU 2008 Climate Change Package 20-20-20 emis-
sions guidelines were unfortunately timed, as they 
were issued in 2008 just before the global crisis. It was 
not policy, but the crisis that drastically reduced emis-
sions in developed countries. The 
crisis also had uncomfortable im-
plications for the European cap-
and-trade emissions trading 
scheme: the market price col-
lapsed as market participants 
struggled to cope with the inter-
action between the economic cri-
sis and an equally unprecedented 
policy experiment that was likely 
to be reformed.
The behaviour of  European con-
sumers had little impact on glob-
al levels of  energy consumption, 
or on CO2 emissions. Currently, 
most projections also show an 
energy future in which the world’s 
major energy resources will re-
main the fossil fuels oil, gas and coal, which release 
carbon into the atmosphere. A recent assessment by 
the International Energy Agency (2014) suggests that 
global energy consumption will rise by 37 percent 
from 2013 to 2040, with coal and oil rising at a rate of 
15 percent and CO2 emissions from power production 
increasing from 13.2 gigatonnes to 15.4 gigatonnes. 
In that sense, Europe’s ambitious attempts to reduce 
carbon emissions on a global level –  which should 
surely have been a policy priority – have proven at 
best irrelevant and at worst count er-productive. 
Figure 2.3 shows the time path of aggregate world-
wide CO2 emissions. It is clear that the two oil crises of 
the 1970s and the 2009 world re-
cession had an impact on emis-
sions. Europe’s special attempts 
to curtail emissions are not visi-
ble, however, in this graph, which 
indicates that other countries 
compensated for any reductions 
that took place in Europe. 
But there are now signals that the 
big emitters of CO2, notably the 
United States and China, are 
more willing to contemplate an 
international plan than they were 
in 2009, when the UN climate 
change conference in Copenhagen 
failed. In November 2014 the US 
agreed to cuts of 26–28 percent 
from 2005 levels by 2025, and 
0
5
10
15
20
25
Greenhouse gas emissions in 2012
Tons per inhabitant 
Source: Eurostat, last accessed on 19 November 2014.
Figure 2.2
150
EU 28
Belgium
Czech Republic
Germany
Estonia
Ireland Greece
Spain
France
France
Croatia
Cyprus
Latvia
Lithuania
Hungary
Malta
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Finland
Finland
Sweden
Sweden
UK
30
60
90
120
180
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Europe's CO2 emissions
Slovenia
CO2 equivalents, 1990=100
Austria
Italy
Denmark
Netherlands
Luxembourg
Belgium
Bulgaria
Source: European Environment Agency, last accessed on 24 November 2014.
Figure 2.1
55 EEAG Report 2015
Chapter 2
China agreed to plan a reduction in emissions after 
2030. But these agreements still look rather provision-
al – and belated – and will need to be worked into a 
more comprehensive global framework. That prospect 
raises the question of the most appropriate negotiat-
ing strategy for Europeans.
2.4 Assessing different risks
The difficulty in formulating a forward-looking energy 
policy arises from the difficulty in comparing different 
types of risk and drawing appropriate policy lessons. 
There are at least four different perceptions of risk, 
and while all are clearly present, they tend to be seen in 
quite contrasting ways in different European countries, 
and consequently produce varied and mutually incom-
patible responses from national political authorities.
1. There is a near certainty, backed by a massive body 
of scientific evidence, that CO2 emissions are leading 
to a rise in world temperatures. The consequences in-
clude the risk of more extreme weather events, the 
melting of polar ice caps, a rise in the sea level with 
devastating consequences for low lying densely inhab-
ited regions, the likely desertification of some parts of 
the world nearer to the equator (including Medi-
terranean Europe), as well as the extension of the cul-
tivable area (that might benefit Northern Europe, as 
well as Canada and Russia).
A policy response to this phenomenon would include 
systematic efforts to reduce CO2 emissions, although 
even such measures could only be 
expected to slow, rather than halt 
or reverse global warming. The 
circulation of greenhouse gases 
occurs at a global level, meaning 
that there is no obvious link be-
tween the extent of loss as a result 
of measures to reduce CO2 emis-
sions (that might impede indus-
trialisation efforts in emerging 
markets) and the gains from pre-
venting the negative effects of 
global warming. The widely cited 
2006 Stern report commissioned 
by the UK government5 conclud-
ed that the costs of inaction on 
CO2 were high (5 to 20 percent of 
annual GDP) and could be miti-
gated by relatively cheap anticipa-
tory measures, costing some 1percent of annual GDP; 
but that the implementation of such measures poses 
an acute collective action problem.
2. Nuclear energy is an obvious way of producing 
power without the harmful effects of CO2 emissions. 
It carries some direct environmental risks (warming of 
river water used for reactor cooling); but the major 
fear is of unlikely and very rare catastrophes (that 
might be induced by human action, such as terrorist 
attacks). The dangers arising from catastrophically 
uncontrollable nuclear reactions in power generating 
plants, as seen in Chernobyl in 1986 and in Fukushima 
in 2011, are great and terrifying. In the aftermath of 
events like Fukushima, calculations made primarily 
by the nuclear industry that sought to demonstrate 
plant safety are called into question. On the other 
hand, new research published after the Fukushima 
event has shown that nuclear power has proven far less 
harmful than the coal power it replaced. According to 
Kharecha und Hansen (2013), nuclear power stations 
globally saved 1.84 million lives in net terms between 
1971 and 2009 by lowering the number of deaths re-
lated to fossil fuels, primarily in terms of lung 
diseases.
Europeans do not approach the assessment and evalu-
ation of nuclear risks in the same way. There are very 
different national orientations to the risks arising 
from nuclear power. The most obvious contrast is be-
tween the widespread enthusiasm in Finland and ac-
ceptance in France of nuclear energy as a clean source 
5 See Stern (2006).
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and equally general scepticism in Germany and out-
right hostility in Austria.6 In the aftermath of 
Fukushima, a majority of French respondents in 
opinion poll surveys were still sympathetic to France’s 
reliance on nuclear energy, which the French govern-
ment reaffirmed its commitment to; while in May 2011 
Germany’s government announced a phase-out of nu-
clear energy by 2022.7 Older nuclear reactors else-
where will also face redundancy and decommission-
ing: the Inter national Energy Agency (2014) estimates 
that by 2040 200 of the world’s 434 nuclear reactors 
will be shut down. At the same time, however, over 
530 new reactors are likely to be constructed. 
In addition, Europe has two fundamentally different 
systems of nuclear power generation. Western design 
reactors usually involve separate contracts for differ-
ent stages of production (uranium mining, conversion 
of uranium into gaseous form, enrichment, fuel as-
sembly). By contrast, in Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) Russian de-
signed reactors rely on bundled supply services pro-
vided by a single Russian company, TVEL. Historic 
choices establish a path dependence. Hungary, for in-
stance, recently rejected a Westinghouse reactor in fa-
vour of a Russian system that was compatible with its 
existing infrastructure. The two alternatives in differ-
ent parts of Europe reflect not only contrasting per-
ceptions of safety standards, but also varying degrees 
of willingness to escape dependence on a single source 
of supply, and of trust in market processes.
3. Most industrial countries are dependent on import-
ed energy, and particularly on oil and gas. Even with a 
dramatic shift towards the enhanced use of renewable 
energy resources, carbon fuels (gas and coal) offer a 
degree of flexibility in response to demand surges to 
which no obvious or cheap alternatives exist. The his-
tory of interrupted supply threats include dramatic 
episodes, like the 1941 U.S. blockade of energy im-
ports by Japan, or most importantly, the two major oil 
crises of the 1970s. The resource curse, whereby abun-
dant natural resources (and above all energy) promote 
rent-seeking behaviour, means that many large energy 
exporters are prone to corrupt politics, instable and 
erratic policies, and a proclivity to resort to blackmail. 
It also means that the export of manufactured goods 
becomes more difficult because the revenue from sell-
ing the resource typically increases domestic wages 
and income aspirations (Dutch disease). 
6 OECD, Nuclear Energy Agency, (2010).
7 Foratom (2014); also GlobeScan (2011).
For modern Europe, the most obvious threat is posed by 
the extent of its dependence on Russian gas. Although 
there were incidents in the past in which disputes be-
tween Russia and Ukraine over the pricing of long-term 
gas contracts led to a cut-off of supplies to some areas, 
notably in January 2009, when there were major short-
ages and cut-offs in Bulgaria and Roma nia; the issue 
only reached a high level of political and popular sali-
ence as a strategic threat to Europe in the aftermath of 
the collapse of the Yanukovych regime in Ukraine and 
the subsequent Russian annexation of the Crimea and 
destabilisation of Eastern Ukraine. In 2014, tensions 
with Russia escalated to an extent reminiscent of Cold 
War conflicts, and made Europe’s dependence on im-
ported Russian gas seem like a security liability.
Europe’s dependence on imported gas, by far the clean-
est fossil fuel, has increased. EU domestic production 
of gas has fallen since the late 1990s, in line with the de-
pletion of the resources of the UK and the Netherlands 
in the North Sea. Only the Netherlands and Denmark 
are net gas exporters. There are some shale gas resourc-
es, but these may prove largely unusable, for economic 
as well as political reasons (including worries about the 
environmental consequences of shale extraction). Only 
Poland has the potential to become a major producer 
of shale gas, with 4.2 trillion cubic meters of unproven 
technically recoverable shale gas reserves (France has 
3.9 trillion, while the EU as a whole has 13.3 trillion, 
compared with 16.1 in the US).8 Gas consumption is 
also higher as a proportion of total energy require-
ments in the smaller EU countries, and especially in 
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe (Figure 2.4).
The share of gas imports in the EU has risen steadily 
from the mid-1990s (when it was around 40 percent) 
to approximately 70 percent today. In 2013, 39 percent 
of extra-EU imports (in volume) came from Russia, 
followed by Norway (34 percent), Algeria (13 percent) 
and Qatar (7 percent). Almost all of this gas comes 
through pipelines, with Nord Stream supplying 
Finland and Germany, and the older Yamal-Europe 
line supplying Poland and Germany. Slovakia, which 
obtains a major competitive advantage from low en-
ergy prices, is almost exclusively dependent on a single 
(Russian) source.
The history of  discussions about gas supply is fraught 
with suspicions that a monopoly (or near monopoly) 
8 European Commission (2014), “Energy prices and costs report,” 
SWD 20 final/2, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/doc/2030/20140122_swd_
prices.pdf (accompanying European Commission (2014), “Energy 
prices and costs in Europe,” COM 21 /2).
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supplier is attempting to cut special deals with indi-
vidual countries in a divide and rule strategy. Russian 
President Vladimir Putin cultivated strong ties with 
the former Italian Prime Minis ter Silvio Berlusconi. 
Berlusconi, in signing a project for a pipeline (South 
Stream, recently cancelled by Russia) that was to send 
substantial quantities of  Russian gas to the Balkans 
and also via an extension pipeline to Italy and the 
Italian state-owned firm ENI, advised Brussels to 
“cultivate the same kind of  good relations that Rome 
enjoys with Moscow.”9 In Germany, Chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder cultivated an analogous relation-
ship with Putin, and after he retired from politics 
took a position with the energy giant Gazprom. 
When Russia negotiated the construction of  a new 
sea pipeline in the mid-2000s (North Transgas, then 
Nord Stream) to bring Siberian gas to North-Western 
Europe, despite the higher costs and potential envi-
ronmental threat of  an underwater line, the Baltic 
states and Poland felt that they were being cut out, 
and that they would consequently be vulnerable to 
9 “Putin and Berlusconi Seal ‘South Stream’ Pipeline Deal.” 
EurActiv, 18 May 2009, http://www.euractiv.com/energy/putin- 
berlusconi-seal-south-stre-news-221827.
Russian pressure over their own supplies. In 2006 the 
then Polish Defence Minister Radek Sikorski made 
the extreme comparison between the German-
Russian negotiations on Nord Stream and the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. In fact, however, Poland’s 
safety may have been increased by this pipeline, as the 
country has become more in dependent of  the conflict 
in the Ukraine, given that it can now receive Russian 
gas via Germany. The key is a network that provides 
the maximum flexibility: the EU has stipulated that 
all gas pipelines in the EU be reconstructed so as to 
allow for flows in both directions. 
4. Electricity supply networks are vulnerable to sys-
temic breakdowns as a result of overloads caused by 
random factors (climatic conditions, the failure of a 
particular unit). In the absence of flexible capacity, a 
demand spike can lead to massive failures. These af-
fect electricity supplies to control centres and internet 
communication, with further shutdowns of power 
plants resulting in a cascade. Such failures occurred in 
the US in August 2003 and in France and Italy one 
month later, in September. The prospect of network 
Dependence on energy imports
Source: “How Much Europe Depends on Russian Energy,” New York Times, 2 September 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/03/21/world/europe/
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failure also increases the risk of nuclear accidents, as 
control systems are incapacitated in widespread power 
outages. Many European countries are operating elec-
tricity systems at levels precariously close to their ca-
pacity limits.
The question of flexibility has become a major issue 
with regard to renewable energy sources. In particular, 
solar energy and wind generated power cannot be easily 
switched on or off, and it may be delivered by nature at 
times when it is not needed. In fact, electricity made 
from wind and sunlight is extremely volatile. In 
Germany, in 2013, electricity from wind had a nomi-
nally installed capacity of 35 gigawatt, peaked at 
around 25 gigawatt at certain hours of the year, was de-
livered at an average of 5.4 gigawatt and provided a 
“safe” supply of 0.42 gigawatt at a relative frequency of 
99.5 percent of all hours of the year. Germany is occa-
sionally, at moments when there is sun and high winds, 
exporting electricity to its neighbours at negative prices, 
because the capability to smooth the green electricity by 
temporarily shutting down conventional power plants 
has been exhausted. There is clearly not enough hydro-
electric capacity to smooth out the demand and supply 
fluctuations that arise from increased use of renewables. 
Smoothing the volatility of green electricity has be-
come a major issue in the debate about whether or not 
Germany’s green energy revolution will be successful.
The problem is that electricity cannot be easily and 
cheaply stored. The most effective solutions to the 
storage problem so far have mainly tended to involve 
rather simple mechanical arrangements, notably 
pumping water uphill in periods of surplus capacity 
and then using it to power turbines when demand in-
creases (which currently accounts for over 95 percent 
of power storage). The wider the area that is connect-
ed in a “smart grid”, the greater the potential should 
be to compensate for random shocks. Telephone sys-
tems, for instance, are today more interconnected than 
they were fifty years ago, and as a result are much less 
prone to periodic overloading and breakdown. The 
use of reservoirs as energy storage facilities could 
work well across frontiers: the development of a Ger-
man-Norwegian transmission system means that Ger-
man surplus electricity will be exported to Norway 
and used to fill hydro-electric reservoirs, and Germany 
can then import the electricity when it is required as a 
result of a German supply shortfall. However, the po-
tential to smooth the energy supply through pump 
storage lakes is very limited. For example, the Ifo 
Institute has calculated that around 3,500 average-
sized pump storage stations would be required to 
smooth Germany’s 2013 actual wind and solar power 
production.10 Germany currently has about one hun-
dredth of these, and plans for a plant at Jochberg in 
Bavaria has already caused furious protests by 
environmentalists. 
Each of these threats – climate change, nuclear acci-
dent, geopolitical blackmail, system disintegration 
and wind and sunshine volatility – is treated in very 
different ways. Since public debate is often driven by 
single headlines, a nuclear accident such as Fukushima 
produces a greater sense of danger than the vaguer 
(but more certain) long-term threat of climate change. 
The risk of system breakdown only enters the political 
debate after a concrete instance. Politics thus tends to 
respond too late to threats.
In addition, the geographic areas that are affected by 
these four types of threat vary. Cascading failures af-
fect at the worst neighbouring countries. Politically-
driven energy blockades are also targeted at individual 
states, although the geography of supply chains and 
pipelines means that there will also be collateral dam-
age. Nuclear reactor catastrophes prima facie involve 
a relatively localised area; in reality, however, radia-
tion clouds may spread over very wide distances cov-
ering a number of countries. Thus, for example, the 
concentration of French nuclear power plants along 
the Rhine constitutes a direct threat for Germany, giv-
en that western winds predominate in Europe. 
CO2 emissions result in a long-term build-up of CO2 in 
the entire atmosphere, and do not affect the regions 
where the CO2 originated specifically. They produce 
global climate change, not local environmental degra-
dation. Such emissions are, as a result, a powerful in-
stance of a tragedy of the commons. No particular 
country has a stake in reduction, if  that reduction is 
not generally followed. The application of an emis-
sions trading scheme in one area leads to increased 
costs there; but competitive advantages elsewhere. 
Apparently altruistic action energy to produce better 
and more sustainable energy outcomes may even have 
a perversely harmful general outcome. For one thing, 
carbon not burned in one part of the world might be 
shipped to another and burned there (direct carbon 
leakage). For another, resource owners might antici-
pate their sales of carbon resources to avoid selling 
them when green technologies and emission con-
10 See Sinn, H.-W. (2014), “Schafft es Deutschland, den Zappelstrom 
zu bändigen?,” 65th Annual Meeting of the Ifo Institute, 26 June.
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straints threaten market destruction. According to the 
so-called Green Paradox (Sinn, 2007 and 2008), the 
more serious attempts are to restrict future emissions, 
the greater the incentives to current producers to use 
their time-limited CO2 producing sources as quickly as 
possible. The attempt to slow down climate change ac-
celerates it. The logic of the Green Paradox predicts a 
dramatic fall in fossil fuel (including oil) prices as pro-
ducers scramble to use the window in which they can 
still sell their products.
A European carbon trading scheme is not, and obvi-
ously cannot be a substitute for a global regime. Other 
major world producers of CO2 emissions consistently 
produce powerful arguments why they should not take 
part in a common scheme. In particular, newly indus-
trialising countries argue that a limitation on carbon 
output would harm their chances of catching up with 
advanced countries in terms of general prosperity, and 
would condemn a large part of their populations to 
continued poverty. The aftermath of the financial cri-
sis, which brought a relative strengthening of emerg-
ing markets, has thus led to a decreased international 
willingness to cooperate on climate change. 
CO2 trading would be a desirable global approach to 
the climate change issue, but its application in a 
more limited geographic framework produces incon-
sistencies. The EU ETS launched in 2005 was in-
tended to represent a major effort on the part of  the 
EU to achieve the targets set out in the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol. It does not cover all of  EU emissions, but 
focuses on high-polluting indus-
trial sectors, including power 
generation, iron and steel, ce-
ment, glass, pulp and paper. This 
amounts to around two fifths of 
total EU emissions. Attempts to 
include aviation in 2012 were 
controversial and led to a dis-
pute with the US, when the EU 
proposed to apply the restric-
tions to American airlines. “Cap 
and trade” allows companies to 
trade allotted carbon permits; 
while a “Linking Directive” al-
lows carbon emitters to buy car-
bon credits generated from emis-
sions savings or offset projects, 
in other countries, and above all 
in emerging markets. 
The problems of the EU ETS are partly design flaws 
that followed from the particular path chosen. At the 
beginning, permits were over-allocated, and simply 
amounted to a subsidy for high polluting producers. 
Then the price of permits was affected by the econom-
ic slowdown after the financial crisis, and dropped 
precipitately, from 35 euros per ton in 2008 to 14 euros 
per ton in 2010, to around 5 euros per ton in 2013, and 
then rose slightly to 7.30 euros per ton at the time of 
writing (January 2015), rendering the signal that the 
price was supposed to generate meaningless. As a con-
sequence, incentives resulted that undermined the fun-
damental concept behind the proposal. 
The collapse of permit prices perversely led to a great-
er incentive to use coal than gas. Some Combined 
Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) plants with a higher ther-
mal efficiency were mothballed. The others are operat-
ing at well below their capacity. Given today’s prices 
of fuels the price of emission certificates would have 
to be about 70 euros per ton to make such plants prof-
itable (Karl, 2012 and 2013). Coal consumption in the 
EU rose after 2005, especially in Germany (Figure 2.5).
The price collapse of emission certificates was not just 
a consequence of the financial crisis, but also followed 
from the interaction of national energy schemes that 
were poorly coordinated. This effect was magnified by 
separate national attempts to reduce emissions in a 
more limited context by means of favourable feed-in 
tariffs for green energy. On a national level, these in-
centives looked as if  they successfully resulted in lower 
carbon emissions, as planned by the legislator. But 
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when the results interacted with other parts of the pol-
icy framework, in an international context, the out-
come looks much less satisfactory. As Sinn (2014) ex-
plains: “The green power produced in Germany not 
only replaces power from fossil fuels, but also sets free 
the corresponding emission certificates. These certifi-
cates migrate via the markets to coal-fired power sta-
tions in other EU countries, where they facilitate an 
increase in CO2 emissions – or a reduction in savings 
– which exactly matches the German savings.” 
There are other perverse consequences of national 
choices regarding the desirability of environmentally 
sustainable energy production. Notably, biomass pro-
duced energy was defined as carbon-neutral, so that 
no permits are required for energy production from 
biomass. Yet studies suggest that carbon emissions 
from biomass are 50 percent higher than from coal. 
The subsidies for biofuel had the additional unwanted 
effect of increasing food prices, squeezing low income 
earners throughout the world and generating wide-
spread popular unrest and political instability in 
2006–7 (including the “Arab spring”). 
Another repercussion of the effective provision of a 
subsidy regime via feed-in prices was that it set off  a 
race to capture the new rents produced. Europe, but 
not the US, experienced a substantial asset price bub-
ble in alternative energy provider stocks in the mid-
2000s, which collapsed in the wake of the general fi-
nancial crisis in 2008 (Bohl et al., 2014).
The de facto collapse of the ETS has fuelled a new de-
bate about substituting a less market-driven and more 
coordinated approach: a system of minimum prices 
with a built-in escalation (back-loading) in order to 
provide ever increasing incentives to cut carbon re-
lease. In this way, the scheme is starting to resemble 
what was originally presented as a simple alternative: 
a tax system. 
According to some analysts, the tax approach has the 
advantage that it can be used to penalise products 
from third countries whose manufacture involves large 
and environmentally harmful carbon emissions. Such 
an approach clearly takes energy policy deep into the 
domain of trade policy (Helm, 2012). Taxes are a dif-
ficult policy tool if  the time path of resource extrac-
tion either fails to react to price signals, or reacts ad-
versely. The “no reaction” scenario is likely if  extrac-
tion costs are never binding and if  the expected pre-
sent value of unit taxes is constant for all points in 
time. In this case, taxes will simply be borne by suppli-
ers without inducing a slowing down in extractions 
and hence without improving the climate. The “ad-
verse reaction” scenario is likely, if  extraction costs are 
never binding and if  the present value of unit taxes 
rises with the passage of time, as the expected growth 
rate of the tax is higher than the interest rate. In this 
case resource owners will again react according to the 
Green Paradox and anticipate their sales, which im-
plies that world-wide consumer prices will fall as a re-
sult of imposing the tax. 
Thus, improving the ETS mechanism by incorporat-
ing all major consumer countries of fossil resources 
may be the better alternative. Currently, an ETS mech-
anism already exists that incorporates the countries 
committed to binding reduction goals under the 
Kyoto Protocol and representing about 30 percent of 
worldwide emissions. If  the percentage is moved to-
wards 100 percent by incorporating the USA, China, 
India and other important countries, a tool would be 
available to effectively constrain CO2 emissions. 
However, persuading other countries (especially big 
emerging markets) to adopt an energy trading scheme 
is a difficult bargaining process. In the lead up to a 
new Climate Summit in 2015, in which such bargain-
ing is to be expected, there is a disincentive for Europe 
to fix the ETS prices before the negotiations, as an in-
crease could be presented as a “concession” to the oth-
er negotiating parties.
There are similar bargaining dilemmas in Europe, 
where different countries have adopted contrasting 
approaches to energy conservation. National energy 
conservation or green energy laws are especially prob-
lematic. The 2000 German Renewable Energy Law 
(German: Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz, EEG), of-
ten regarded as a model for managing an economic 
transition towards an ecologically sustainable future, 
increased energy costs and represented fundamental-
ly a tax on consumers. The government responded to 
complaints that high energy prices were putting 
German industry at a competitive disadvantage by 
offsetting the costs with subsidies. That action ap-
pears to run counter to the EU logic of  creating a 
competitive market. Its German proponents argued 
that it was legal because it was not a subsidy financed 
by the government through taxation, but the pay-
ments were covered instead by payments made by en-
ergy consumers.
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For many observers the German EEG offers an out-
standing example of how a reorientation of energy 
policy might be achieved. Germany tops international 
rankings for renewable power per capita, and with 
71  gigawatts it is the third largest renewable power 
producer in terms of capacity behind China (90 giga-
watts) and the US (86 gigawatts) (Renewable Energy 
Policy Network for the 21st Century, 2013). There 
have been dramatic increases in the share of the sus-
tainable energy sources of wind and solar energy. 
Some calculations try to put a price on the environ-
mental gains achieved. 
The exercise is costly, as consumers pay a high price 
for an outcome that reduces bad emissions. Industrial 
consumers pay a higher price for electricity in Europe 
than in any other part of the world, except for Japan: 
the contrast with the US is especially striking 
(Figure 2.6). The higher cost is a significant element in 
comparative competitiveness. There is also a consum-
er issue. From 2008 to 2012, EU household electricity 
prices increased considerably, at a rate of 4 percent 
annually. 
But the electricity prices in the EU vary considerably, 
and in this sense defy the logic of a single market that 
Europe established with the 
Single European Act in 1986 for 
most other sorts of economic ac-
tivity. Countries with a higher 
share of renewable energy also 
have significantly higher consum-
er prices (Figures 2.7 and 2.8; see 
also Macchiati and Scarpa, 
2014). 
Figure 2.7 shows how tax and ex-
cises contribute to – but are not en-
tirely responsible for – significant 
price disparities across the EU. 
Such price disparities violate the 
law of one price, one of the most 
fundamental efficiency require-
ments in economics, implying dif-
ferent marginal energy avoidance 
efforts among European consum-
ers. If anything, such disparities 
could be explained by the different 
local or regional environmental 
impact of energy consumption. 
For instance, there might be a dif-
ference in local air or traffic con-
gestion externalities that would justify a regional diversi-
fication of tax rates. However, the case for an interna-
tional diversification can hardly be made. It is true that 
there may be a case for such a diversification for differ-
ent national revenue needs due to different national debt 
and expenditure levels, for example, but broad-based 
taxes such as value added taxes and income taxes are ar-
guably far better suited to cover such needs. 
In Germany, national energy policy, which is largely 
responsible for the high domestic consumer prices, has 
come under heavy attack. At around 30 cents per kilo-
watt hour, German consumers now pay double the 
price for their electricity than French consumers. 
Thanks to the Renewable Energy Act, German con-
sumers had to pay around 16 billion euros more for 
green power than the conventional power equivalent 
in 2013. Energy-intensive industries are either relocat-
ing away from Germany, or have to be kept afloat 
through painful wage restraint. In both cases, the re-
sult has no impact on overall carbon emissions, but 
simply alters in a globally irrelevant way, the geogra-
phy of energy consumption. According to the German 
Fed eral Ministry of the Environment, the energy 
transformation will cost over a trillion euros. This 
amount equals around ten years’ worth of German re-
Retail electricity prices in 2012: industrial consumersa)
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unification transfers, or 330 high-speed rail links from 
Munich Central Sta tion to Munich airport. The sub-
sidies that have been pledged to the suppliers of re-
newable energy already amount to well over 200 bil-
lion euros. In 2013 the increased costs imposed by 
Germany’s energy policy cost 0.6 percent of GDP. 
Arguably, these costs could have been far more pro-
ductively invested in energy-efficiency measures, in-
cluding capacity enhancing networks linking previ-
ously isolated or unconnected markets. The financial 
crisis has highlighted the unpro-
ductive side-effects of feed-in tar-
iffs and subsidies: the crisis has 
led Spain to repeal renewable en-
ergy feed-in tariffs, and Italy to 
cap them (while sharply increas-
ing gasoline taxes).
The subsidies to renewable energy 
producers also appear to be a vio-
lation of the underlying princi-
ples, if  not the law, of the EU. 
Their legality was tested in the 
case of the Finnish wind farm 
supplier Alands Vindkraft, which 
complained that the Swedish 
Energy Agency Energimyndighe-
ten had only awarded certificates 
to producers physically located in 
Sweden. Although the European Court of Justice 
ruled – surprisingly to most observers – against the for-
eign plaintiffs, it is difficult to see how a systematic en-
ergy policy can be built up on jurisdictional practice 
that allows discrimination against foreign producers.
The German and Swedish practice raises a fundamen-
tal conceptual problem that has not yet been solved. Is 
the best way of solving energy supply problems to al-
low market mechanisms to work, within an overall 
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framework of priorities determined collectively by 
governments; or is it preferable to manage parts of the 
energy adjustment process separately in accordance 
with the preferences of particular national authori-
ties? The latter course has led to a deep incoherence in 
energy policies, and its elimination requires more pre-
cise agreement about energy priorities.
2.5 Flexible pricing and incentives
A fundamental philosophical division is discernible in 
energy discussions, around the choice between long-
term planning or fixing of prices in order to generate 
certainty about future signals on the one hand, and a 
response to short-term and noisy market signals on 
the other. The debate is most pronounced in the case 
of the two environmentally and politically most sensi-
tive issues: gas pricing, and nuclear energy. The dis-
tinction reflects the long legacy of past (and frequent-
ly contradictory) policies, and the difficulty of quickly 
establishing all the institutions that are really required 
to let market mechanisms work effectively through the 
generation of price signals. The cases of gas and nu-
clear energy illustrate the fundamental nature of the 
choice facing Europe’s policy-makers.
The greater the diversity of supply, and the more mar-
ket alternatives exist (including different forms of en-
ergy), the more resilient the energy economy becomes 
against unanticipated events, including attempts to 
blackmail energy users. In other words, diversity of 
supply limits the power of the resource providers. 
Marketisation can thus also provide a substantial im-
petus to improve political conditions in other parts of 
the world, and reduce the monopoly rents that corrupt 
politicians extract in resource-rich countries. 
A great deal thus depends on the adoption of an ap-
propriate energy mix in consuming countries. Flexi-
bility is discouraged wherever there is dependence on 
long-term price contracts. It is also discouraged by po-
litical considerations, as politicians see stable and low 
energy prices as a response to the demands of voters. 
An extreme example is the way in which Hungary’s 
populist Prime Minister Viktor Orban legislated lower 
energy prices and even raised the question of whether 
this issue should be inserted into the Hungarian 
constitution. 
There is a geographical divide in Europe between 
those countries that rely on spot markets and those 
that use long-term oil-indexed contracts to purchase 
and receive their natural gas supplies. Spot markets 
are more likely to develop in Northwest Europe with 
LNG import facilities and hubs that can provide gas 
buyers with access to multiple and geographically di-
versified suppliers. Oil-indexed contract markets, on 
the other hand, are more likely to exist in Central, 
Eastern, and Southern European countries, where 
only one or two suppliers provide gas to domestic 
markets and there is little gas supply diversification. 
The geopolitical strategy of President Putin is based 
around a pipeline view of the world, rather than a 
LNG vision (Melling, 2010; Wilson, 2014).
There is a substantial (and at present greatly under-
used) capacity for handling LNG imports in Western 
Europe (UK, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, 
Spain). Indeed, in recent years (after 2011), the pro-
portion of LNG imports has fallen. EU Regulation 
994/2010 provided for obligatory investment in infra-
structure that would allow the reversibility of gas sup-
plies, where economic calculations showed that such 
facilities would produce positive spillovers. Poland, 
which relies on imports for 74 percent of its consump-
tion (almost all of which normally comes from 
Russia), may now, as a result, cover half  of its demand 
through a reversal of flows in the Yamal pipeline, from 
Germany and the Czech Republic. On the other hand, 
Russian flows through Ukraine and Romania to 
Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey are not operated in ac-
cordance with the EU legislation, and there is no pro-
vision for reversibility. That result generates a political 
dynamic that undermines the formulation of a collec-
tive EU approach to economic aspects of European 
security policy. Long-term dependence reduces the 
opportunity for effective foreign policy coordination. 
One result of the Ukraine-Russia crisis of 2014 may 
be a greater awareness of the security threat, an en-
hanced willingness to construct LNG facilities, and an 
expansion of the market principle of spot pricing as a 
result, rather than long-term indexation to other en-
ergy products. That development is harder to imagine 
in the case of Russian-designed nuclear power plants 
in Eastern Europe, where technology dependence is 
far greater. 
Flexibilisation is an important principle in wholesale 
markets; but it can also play a major part in promot-
ing domestic energy efficiency. From a consumer point 
of view, a move to flexible pricing may be an increas-
ingly attractive way of steering demand away from 
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peak times, at which the production costs/marginal 
costs are high. Consumers are increasingly exposed to 
pricing policies that vary substantially with time (on 
an hourly, weekly, but also seasonal basis): such an ap-
proach is now common in transportation (rail and air 
fares, taxi tariffs with Uber). They may also increas-
ingly be able to use devices that react to price signals 
to reduce consumption for heating or for energy inten-
sive activities (for instance, domestic washing or dry-
ing machines, as well as in industrial food freezers). 
Storage of energy can be encouraged at the level of 
individual consumers, with more effective batteries be-
ing used to avoid demand at peak energy times. High 
(and varying) prices at peak times would help to 
smooth out consumption patterns. Some of the distri-
butional consequences of that move would require a 
delicate compromise: not all householders, for in-
stance, can be flexible in timing periods of high energy 
use (think of the use of washing machines in apart-
ment buildings with thin walls).
2.6 Inter-connectedness
Reducing extreme peaks of demand (and consequent-
ly of pricing) in an energy supply network that is push-
ing against capacity restraints requires a better linkage 
of supply systems that are still not fully integrated. 
The same is true for the potentially even bigger prob-
lem of smoothing peaks in green energy supply. If  the 
national smoothing capacity becomes exhausted 
thanks to the closure of conventional power plants, as 
is regularly the case in Germany, there is a case for 
selling the excess electricity to other national energy 
markets and use their smoothing capacity. There has 
been some development in the integration of regional 
markets (Figure 2.9). But the linkage projects – such 
as the French-Spanish link across the Pyrenees or the 
Steiermarkleitung in Austria – are plagued by long de-
lays (ranging up to 25 years); and a number of 
ENTSO-E (European Network of Transmission 
System Operators for Electricity) “Projects of Pan-
European Significance” have been cancelled. A recent, 
widely-quoted estimate suggests that annual savings 
could amount to 2.5 to 4 billion euros. Even once net-
works are built, their limited capacity and significant 
leakages imply significant geographical cost differenc-
es. Network operators (and indeed whole countries, 
such as Switzerland) profit from price differentials 
without completely eliminating them. 
Further improving the linkage requires a substantial 
investment in transmission systems. The European 
Commission assesses a need for 140 billion euros in in-
Regional energy networks
Source: Everis and Mercados (2010), p. 17.
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vestment by 2020, but it is difficult to see how this in-
vestment can be supplied by energy suppliers who are 
already burdened with very high levels of debts.
2.7 Conclusion
One response to the financial and debt crisis, which is 
also a crisis of European growth, is to demand higher 
levels of investment – both public and private – in 
Europe. The problem is that in the past, much public 
sector investment has been misdirected as a result of 
the political bargaining processes. However, private in-
vestment has also been misdirected (above all in large 
construction booms). Investment in energy networks 
may offer appropriate incentives to private producers 
looking at innovative ways of producing new clean en-
ergy sources. Since the search for funding also coin-
cides with a widespread sentiment that Europe should 
investigate large infrastructure investment projects, it 
may be conceivable to fund the new energy transmis-
sion channels, both electricity gridlines and gas pipe-
lines, with public or a mixture of public and private 
funding. A security levy on energy supply might be an 
appropriate way of ensuring the fiscal sustainability 
of such investment. 
In the past, major increases in electricity availability 
(and reductions in price) were the result of increased 
transportation capacity. Can these gains be repeated 
as a result of innovations in storage and transmission 
technology? Research into this technology might al-
low a repetition of the productivity gains of the first 
electrification revolution, in the late nineteenth centu-
ry, when electricity supply allowed the localised deliv-
ery of energy in appropriate quantities, replacing en-
ergy that had previously been generated at high cost 
through steam engines with mechanical transmission 
systems. Efficiency gains in energy supply holds out 
the best way of saving resources.
References
Bohl, M. T., P. Kaufmann and P. L. Siklos (2014), “What Drove 
the Mid-2000s Explosiveness in Alternative Energy Stock Prices? 
Evidence from U.S., European and Global Indices,” CIGI Paper, 
11 March.
European Parliament and Council of the European Union (1996), 
“Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 19 December 1996,” Official Journal of the European Union 40 
(L 27), pp. 20–8, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PD
F/?uri=CELEX:31996L0092&from=EN.
European Union (2012), “Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union,” Official Journal of the European 
Union 55 (C 326), pp. 47–200, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN.
Everis and Mercados (2010), From Regional Markets to a Single 
European Market, 28 April, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electric-
ity/studies/doc/2010_gas_electricity_markets.pdf.
Foratom (2014), What People Really Think about Nuclear Energy, 
Brussels, http://www.foratom.org/jsmallfib_top/Publications/Opinion 
_Poll.pdf.
French Government, General Commission for Strategy and Economic 
Foresight, (2014), The Crisis of the European Electricity System, 
http://www.strategie.gouv.fr/sites/strategie.gouv.fr/files/archives/ 
CGSP_Report_European_Electricity_System_030220141.pdf. 
GlobeScan (2011), Opposition to Nuclear Energy Grows: Global Poll, 
http://www.globescan.com/images/images/pressreleases/bbc2011_ 
nuclear_energy/bbc2011_energy.pdf.
Helm, D. (2012), The Carbon Crunch – How We’re Getting Climate 
Change Wrong – and How to Fix It, Yale University Press, New Haven.
International Energy Agency (2014), World Energy Outlook 2014.
Karl, H.-D. (2012), „Erneuerbare Energieträger zur Stromerzeugung: 
unterschiedlich nah an der Wettbewerbsfähigkeit,“ in: Rundgespräche 
der Kommission für Ökologie der Bayerischen Akademie der 
Wissenschaften 41, Die Zukunft der Energieversorgung, pp. 43–5.
Karl, H.-D. (2013), „Wettbewerbsfähigkeit erneuerbarer Energien 
in der Stromversorgung,“ Energiewirtschaftliche Tagesfragen 63, 
pp.  30–44, http://www.et-energie-online.de/Portals/0/PDF/zukunfts 
fragen_2013_05_komplett.pdf.
Kharecha, P. A. and J. E. Hansen (2013), “Prevented Mortality and 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Historical and Projected Nuclear 
Power,” Environmental Science & Technology 47, pp. 4889–95.
Macchiati, A. and C. Scarpa (2014), “The European Electricity 
Market Killed in its Cot: Short Story of the Cronus of Brussels,” 
Mercato Concorrenza Regole, pp. 101–16.
Melling, A. J. (2010), Natural Gas Pricing and its Future: Europe as 
the Battleground, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
Washington D.C.
OECD, Nuclear Energy Agency, (2010), Public Attitudes to Nuclear 
Power, https://www.oecd-nea.org/ndd/reports/2010/nea6859-public-
attitudes.pdf.
Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century (2013), 
Renewables 2013: Global Status Report, http://www.ren21.net/por 
tals/0/documents/resources/gsr/2013/gsr2013_lowres.pdf.
Sinn, H.-W. (2007), “The Green Paradox,” 20 June, http://www.pro 
ject-syndicate.org/commentary/the-green-paradox.
 
Sinn, H.-W. (2008), “Public Policies against Global Warming: A 
Supply Side Approach,” International Tax and Public Finance 15, 
pp. 360–94.
Sinn, H.-W. (2014), “13 Theses on the German Energy Transfor-
mation,” CESifo, Munich, 8 July, http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/ 
policy/Sinns-Corner/Sinn-Juni2014-14-Thesen-zur-Energiewende.
html. 
Stern, N. (2006), The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern 
Review, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (Mass.).
Wilson, A. (2014), Ukraine Crisis: What it Means for the West, Yale 
University Press, New Haven.
66EEAG Report 2015
Chapter 3 EEAG (2015), The EEAG Report on the European Economy, “European Regional Disparity: Borders Strike Back” CESifo, Munich 2015, 
pp. 66–77.
EuropEan rEgional 
Disparity: BorDErs strikE 
Back
3.1 Introduction 
The original premise of the Single Market was that the 
promotion of economic integration would bring pros-
perity to the European Union, lower income dispari-
ties across member states, and by reducing differences 
between member states and within regions, it would 
enhance social and political cohesion within Europe. 
However, five years after the eruption of the European 
government debt crisis, the economic disparities feel 
larger than ever, the forces of economic integration 
seem to be weaker than before and social cohesion 
also appears to be crumbling. Do national borders 
matter more to economic outcomes since the crisis?
This chapter explores this issue by analysing the pat-
tern of the evolution in regional GDP per employee on 
the one hand, and unemployment on the other. The ev-
idence suggests that regional disparities decreased sig-
nificantly before the financial crisis both in terms of 
GDP per employee and unemployment. In addition, 
these regional disparities became less and less national, 
thus, over time country level differences contributed 
less and less to regional differences. However, this trend 
appears to have reversed since the beginning of the cri-
sis: country-specific effects now matter more than be-
fore. In other words, borders are back.
3.2 The age of convergence: disappearing national 
borders
The first crucial question concerning regional dispari-
ties is whether they have declined in the European 
Union. Prior to the crisis there was a strong sense that 
disparities are declining. This section presents some 
basic facts about regional disparities in the European 
Union, focusing on labour productivity and unem-
ployment. The findings do indeed suggest a decline in 
disparities, but they also indicate that there were signs 
of potential problems a few years before the crisis 
started. 
3.2.1 GDP per employee
There are several ways to present GDP data to illus-
trate disparities in GDP across space over time. 
Figure  3.1 below illustrates what happened to GDP 
per employee in the European Union. We think that 
using GDP per employee is more appropriate at the 
regional level than the more frequently used measure 
of GDP per capita. This is because population and 
employee levels are much less correlated at a regional 
level than at a country level due to commuting. For ex-
ample, the population of the region of inner London 
is much lower than its number of employees. Hence 
the focus of our analysis is GDP per employee, that is, 
labour productivity. We use these two terms 
interchangeably. 
Firstly, we present the classic graph on the relation-
ship between initial productivity levels and subse-
quent growth to see whether there was a stronger ten-
dency towards low-productivity regions growing fast-
er than high-productivity ones during the period 
1991–2011 (ß-convergence). Secondly, we plot the 
standard deviation of log real GDP per employee to 
see whether the dispersion of GDP per employee dis-
tribution decreased over time (σ-convergence).1
Figure 3.1 shows the EU27 regions where the horizon-
tal axis shows the productivity level in 1991 and the 
vertical axis represents subsequent average growth 
over a 20 year period. The figure also indicates wheth-
er a region belongs to an old member state (EU15) or 
to a new member state (EU27 excluding EU15). The 
figure suggests the presence of ß-convergence as less 
productive regions tend to exhibit higher labour pro-
ductivity growth than the more productive regions. 
Moreover, regions of the new member states grew 
faster than old member states’ regions as their initial 
labour productivity was lower. It is also important to 
1 See Barro (2012) for a recent overview of the empirics of conver-
gence, and Gennaioli et al. (2015) for an application to regional 
convergence. 
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point out that the slopes of the fitted regression lines 
indicate that the slopes, and thus the speed of conver-
gence, for both groups of countries are roughly the 
same.2 The strong convergence of the new member 
states suggests that old and new members belong to 
the same convergence club.
Next we use the standard deviation of the log real 
GDP per employee to characterise the overall change 
in disparities among European regions (σ-conver-
gence). The left side of Figure 3.2 shows the indicator 
2 This simple figure shows unconditional ß-convergence. Including 
additional specific country factors may not change the speed of con-
vergence, but may well change the intersection of the fitted line with 
the horizontal axis that indicates the long term relative productivity 
levels at which both the old and new member states grow at the same 
rate.
for the old member states, where-
as the right side of the figure 
shows the data for regions of the 
old and new members together. 
The graph in the middle shows 
the indicator for the old member 
states without the crisis countries 
(without Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Spain and Portugal). We ex-
pressed GDP both in the pur-
chasing parity standards of 2005 
(PPS) and in euros of 2005 when 
we calculated real GDP per em-
ployee. The time evolution of 
both indicators is very similar: 
they show a secular decline in dis-
parity until about 2005. There is 
one important difference between 
the left and the right hand side 
graph that is worth mentioning. The disparity in la-
bour productivity among the regions of old member 
states (EU15) increased after the mid-2000s. By con-
trast, the disparity among the regions of old and new 
member states (EU27) declined as of the mid-2000s. 
The perceived effect of the crisis is that it has increased 
disparities among the regions of Europe along several 
dimensions. Figure 3.2 suggests that the increase in 
disparities in labour productivity started several years 
earlier. However, although disparity grew due to an in-
crease in disparity both in crisis and non-crisis EU15 
countries, a comparison of the left hand side graph 
and the middle graph strongly suggests that the bulk 
of the increase in disparity was due to the crisis coun-
tries. Some regions of Italy started falling behind, 
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while some regions of Ireland and Spain became more 
productive than the EU15 average. 
It is worth noting that GDP per employee in terms of 
2005 euros shows a larger disparity than GDP per em-
ployee in terms of PPS. This is not surprising. The for-
mer only corrects for price level differences within 
countries over time, while the latter also corrects for 
price level differences across countries.3 Since richer 
countries tend to have higher price levels than poorer 
ones, GDP per capita expressed in PPS data shows less 
disparity than the data expressed in euros. 
Finally, to attach explicitly geographic locations to the 
data, we plot GDP per employee relative to the EU15 
average in 1991 and in 2011 for the European Union on 
a map (see Figure 3.3). Illustrating the level data relative 
to the EU15 average allows us not 
only to gauge the changes over 
time, but also to pin point them to 
successful and unsuccessful geo-
graphic locations. As far as the suc-
cesses are concerned, most new 
member states from Eastern 
Europe had a GDP per capita of 
less than 40 percent of the 
European average in 1991, while 
several regions in Eastern Europe 
enjoyed a level of above 40 percent 
3 It is important to note that price indices 
are only available at the country level. Thus, 
adjustment for price level changes both 
over time and across space can be carried 
out with country level prices and PPS 
indices.
in 2011. The Budapest region of Hungary and the 
Bucharest region of Romania are both close to the 
EU15 average. There was also a significant labour pro-
ductivity improvement in the regions of Eastern 
Germany, France, Spain and Ireland. As for the failures: 
several regions in Italy had lower labour productivity 
levels in 2011 than in 1991. There are regions in several 
countries from Germany to United Kingdom that fell 
behind in relative terms. Thus, while several European 
regions caught up in relative terms, others fell behind.
3.2.2 Unemployment
Differences in unemployment rates are another key in-
dicator of regional disparity. Figure 3.4 shows the 
standard deviation of regional unemployment rates 
Figure 3.3
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since 1999. The data suggests a substantial decline in 
unemployment disparity up until 2008. Since then dis-
parities in unemployment rates have been on the rise. 
In particular, the disparities in unemployment rates 
are now higher than at any time since 1999. It is also 
worth mentioning that the decline in the disparity in 
regional unemployment rates stopped in 2007, while 
the decline in disparity of GDP per employee ground 
to a halt 2–3 years earlier.
Figure 3.5 shows the spatial distribution of unemploy-
ment across European regions in 2007 and 2013. Most 
European regions had an unemployment rate of be-
low 10 percent in 2007. Few regions, and interestingly 
few German regions, had an unemployment rate of 
higher than 10 percent at that time. The situation has 
changed dramatically since then. The majority of re-
gions still have unemployment rates of just under 
10 percent, but all German regions now have rates of 
less than 10 percent. By contrast, the unemployment 
rates in all of Ireland’s regions were over 10 percent in 
2013, but below 6 percent in 2007. 
More importantly, the spatial distribution of unem-
ployment in 2013 shows stronger border effects than 
that in 2007. The French regions experience an unem-
ployment rate around 10 percent lower than the 
Spanish regions on the other side of the border. 
Similarly, unemployment in Greek regions is dramati-
cally higher than that in neighbouring regions in 
Bulgaria. The French region next to the German bor-
der also tends to exhibit a higher unemployment rate 
than the neighbouring German regions. This pattern 
was less pronounced before the crisis.
3.3 Polarisation and the crisis: neighbour versus 
country effects 
One crucial question concerning regional differences 
is whether the economic performance of a region is 
shaped by its neighbouring regions, or by the national 
economy. Did economic integration in the European 
Union reduce the effect of national borders represent-
ing differences in institutions and national economic 
policies, or do national borders still have significant 
economic effects? Did the crisis alter the economic ef-
fect of national borders? In this section we restricted 
ourselves to the old member states, the EU15 coun-
tries, as the forces of economic integration have had a 
longer time to unfold their effect in these states than in 
the EU27 countries.
3.3.1 GDP per employee
In an attempt to shed light on the effect of national 
borders on the economy, we begin by decomposing 
the standard deviation of the log regional real GDP 
per employee into within-country and between-coun-
try components. The former represents the regional ef-
fects, and the latter represents the country-specific ef-
fects. Figure 3.6 shows that between-country standard 
deviation in labour productivity, or country specific 
factors, declined between 1994 and 2008. At the same 
time, the within-country standard deviation, or the re-
gional factors within countries, remained flat through-
out the period. This could be interpreted as a sign that 
the effect of borders on disparity changed over time: 
countries converged to each other, and disparities 
Figure 3.5
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across regions were increasingly 
explained by factors unrelated to 
the county’s average GDP per 
employee. However, since the be-
ginning of the crisis, country spe-
cific factors have been on the rise 
again.
To learn more about whether 
neighbour or country-specific ef-
fects matter more to regional real 
GDP per employee, we calculated 
its within-period elasticity with 
respect to neighbours and nation-
al labour productivity for every 
year.4 Figure 3.7 shows that elas-
ticity with respect to national la-
bour productivity was far greater 
than elasticity with respect to 
neighbour labour productivity as 
of 1990. If  anything, national 
elasticity has slightly increased 
since the mid-1990s. This increase 
was far more pronounced as of 
the beginning of the crisis, which 
suggests that regional labour pro-
ductivity is strongly related to the 
national average, and much less 
to neighbour productivity.
To get a better idea of how coun-
try specific factors are relevant 
relative to local regional factors, 
we regressed the four-year aver-
age growth in regional real GDP 
per employee on the change in 
neighbour and national real GDP 
per employee (all variables were 
normalised with the log real GDP 
per employee of the EU15). The 
results are presented in Table 3.1. 
The evidence suggests that na-
tional effects became stronger 
and more important relative to 
neighbour effects as of the begin-
4      We regressed the log of regional real 
GDP per employee on the log of neighbour 
real GDP per employee and on the log of 
national real GDP per employee. The point 
estimates of the cross-sectional OLS for 
each year correspond to elasticities. All real 
GDP per employee data is normalised with 
EU15 average real GDP per employee. 
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a) Regional real GDP per employee in 2005 PPS.
b) EU15 excludes Eastern German regions.
Source: European Regional Database 2013 (Cambridge Econometrics) and EEAG calculations.
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Table 3.1  
 
 
 
 
Neighbour and national effects on the growth of regional real GDP  
per employee over the previous four years in EU15 regionsa) 
 
2007 2011 
Growth in neighbours real GDP per 
employee over previous 4 years 
0.230** 
(0.095) 
0.116 
(0.088) 
Growth in national real GDP per 
employee over previous 4 years 
0.615*** 
(0.105) 
0.978*** 
(0.102) 
Constant – 0.001 
(0.001) 
– 0.001 
(0.001) 
Number of observations 187 187 
R2 0.339 0.645 
a) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10; standard errors are in parenthesis; 
OLS regressions; EU15 excludes Eastern German regions; regional real 
GDP per employee in 2005 PPS are normalised with EU15 average. 
Source: European Regional Database 2013 (Cambridge Econometrics) 
and EEAG calculations.  
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ning of the crisis.5 In particular, neighbour and na-
tional labour productivity growth had a significant 
positive effect on regional productivity growth be-
tween 2004 and 2007, while only the national effect re-
mained significant between 2008 and 2011. In addi-
tion, the coefficient of national labour productivity 
growth also increased. This data, together with 
Figures 3.6 and 3.7, seems to suggest that national 
borders never went away: national policies and institu-
tions always mattered a great deal, but during the cri-
sis they became even more important. 
Our next question is: to what extent do neighbour ef-
fects matter? In particular, does it make any difference 
whether the neighbouring region is in another coun-
try? Here we only considered regions in EU15 coun-
tries, which have both foreign and domestic regions as 
neighbours. We regressed growth in regional GDP per 
employee on growth in GDP per employee of foreign 
and domestic regional neighbours and the national 
economy. The results are presented in Table 3.2. It 
shows that national effects were important both be-
fore and during the crisis, as in the case where we con-
sidered all regions. However, the productivity growth 
of the domestic and foreign neighbours had no signifi-
cant effect on regional productivity growth in either of 
the two time periods. Thus, there was no significant 
cross-border effect between regions on two sides of a 
5 This and other simple regressions are used in this chapter to char-
acterise the properties of the data, and we do not intend to imply that 
they necessarily represent a causal relationship even if  we use the term 
“effect”. 
national border. National effects 
therefore dominated regional growth 
in the border areas.
When do cross-border productivity 
growth effects emerge? They may 
emerge in the presence of  cross-bor-
der specialisation. Cross-regional 
complementarity in industrial 
structure can lead to positive corre-
lations between labour productivity 
growth across neighbouring regions 
due to complementarity in produc-
tion.6 If  those regions are located in 
different countries, cross-border 
correlation may emerge. To check 
this idea, we computed the 
Krugman Specialisation Index 
(KSI) using six-industry disaggre-
gation of  total employment in each 
region.7 KSI measures the difference between the in-
dustrial structures of  a geographic unit of  interest 
and a reference group.8 The geographic units of  in-
terest in our case are the European regions with for-
eign neighbours. The index takes the value between 
zero and two. It is zero if  the industrial structure of 
the region is identical to that of  its foreign regions. A 
higher value implies a more different, and hence a 
more specialised industrial structure, and greater 
complementarity between the region and the refer-
ence. The index for each region is computed with for-
eign neighbours once the domestic neighbours aver-
age as reference group, and once the foreign neigh-
bours average as reference group. The KSI based on 
foreign neighbours is plotted against the KSI based 
on the domestic neighbours to see relative to which 
group the degree of  specialisation is larger. We also 
wanted to see whether the pattern changed during 
the crisis, which is why we prepared the graph for 
2006 and 2011. The results are presented in 
Figure 3.8. On the horizontal axis KSI is based on 
domestic neighbours as the reference group, and on 
the vertical axis KSI is based on foreign neighbours 
as the reference group. 
6 For a theoretical analysis of the spatial evolution of industrial 
structure, see among others Puga (1999). 
7 The six industries are Agriculture (A); Manufacturing & Energy 
(B-E); Construction (F); Distribution, Communications and 
Transport (G-J); Financial & Business Services (K-N); Non-market 
Services (O-U).
8 Formally, the Krugman Specialisation Index is defined as 
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Table 3.2  
 
 
 
 
Comparing the domestic and foreign neighbour effect on growth 
in regional real GDP per employee over the previous four years  
in EU15 regionsa) 
  2007 2011 
Growth in foreign real GDP per 
employee rate over previous 4 years 
– 0.024 
(0.060) 
0.080 
(0.075) 
Growth in domestic real GDP per 
employee rate over previous 4 years 
0.213 
(0.176) 
0.321 
(0.207) 
Growth in national real GDP per 
employee over previous 4 years 
0.758*** 
(0.182) 
0.691*** 
(0.244) 
Constant 0.001* 
(0.001) 
– 0.001 
(0.001) 
Number of observations 72 72 
R2 0.554 0.660 
a) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10; s andard rrors are in parenthesis; 
OLS regressions on 4 years differences; EU15 excludes Eastern 
German regions; regional real GDP per employee in 2005 PPS are 
normalised with EU15 average. 
Source: European Regional Database 2013 (C mbr dge Econom trics) 
and EEAG calculations.  
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The figure suggests that the ma-
jority of regions were more simi-
lar to their domestic neighbours 
in terms of industrial structure 
than to their foreign neighbours. 
This is because the KSI index 
pairs represented by a dot on the 
figure lay above the 45-degree line 
for the majority of the regions, 
thus, the KSI index for these re-
gions is higher when the reference 
group consists of foreign, rather 
than domestic neighbours. This 
suggests that there tend to be 
more complementarities between 
neighbouring regions, which are 
on different sides of the border, than between neigh-
bouring regions on the same side of the border. 
Previously, however, we found no systematic relation-
ships between the growth of a region and its foreign 
neighbours. These two findings seem to imply that 
there are unexploited opportunities in cross-border 
specialisation.
3.3.2 Unemployment
Turning to unemployment, Figure 3.9 shows the de-
composition of the standard deviation of unemploy-
ment across regions into within-country and between-
country components. Again, the former represents re-
gional factors, and the latter represents country spe-
cific factors. The figure shows that the within-country 
standard deviation was flat throughout the period be-
tween 1997 and 2013. By contrast, the between-coun-
try standard deviation followed a declining path until 
2007–2008, but sharply increased afterwards. This 
means that the observed increase in the disparities be-
tween regional unemployment rates characterised by 
the evolution of standard deviation in Figure 3.4 oc-
curred primarily due to the increase in the disparities 
between unemployment rates across countries. By 
contrast, disparities in unemployment rates within 
countries remained largely the same. Thus, country 
specific factors are the primary reason for the decline 
in regional disparities before 2008, and their increase 
afterwards.
To give an alternative characterisation of neighbour 
versus national effects on regional unemployment 
rates, we calculated its within-period elasticity with re-
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a) A lower value of the Krugman Specialisation Index indicates a more similar industrial structure to the reference group.
b) EU15 excludes Eastern German regions.
Source: European Regional Database 2013 (Cambridge Econometrics) and EEAG calculations.
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spect to neighbour and national unemployment rates.9 
The elasticities are shown in Figure 3.10. Firstly, elas-
ticity with respect to neighbour unemployment rate 
was higher than elasticity with respect to the national 
unemployment rate until 2008. Thus, changes in local 
labour market conditions mattered more than changes 
in their national counterparts for regional unemploy-
ment rates. After 2008 the former elasticity rates de-
clined steeply, while the latter rose sharply. By 2013, 
the national unemployment rate mattered more than 
its neighbour counterpart. Hence Figure 3.10 yet 
again suggests that the crisis made national borders 
matter more than previously.10
To better gauge the extent to which regional and coun-
try factors respectively explain unemployment, we re-
gressed the 4-year change in regional unemployment 
rate on the 4-year change in neighbour and national 
unemployment rates for EU15 
countries in the years 2008 and 
2013. The results are presented in 
Table 3.3. The coefficients suggest 
that both neighbour and national 
unemployment rates have a signif-
icant association with the region-
al unemployment in both periods. 
This, in turn, points to an interde-
pendence of regional labour mar-
9 We regressed the log of regional unem-
ployment rate on the log of neighbour un-
employment rate and on the log of national 
unemployment rate. The point estimates of 
the cross-sectional OLS for each year cor-
respond to elasticities. All unemployment 
rates are normalised with EU15.
10 One reason why borders mattered dur-
ing the crisis is the welfare policies that 
were still conducted primarily at the nation-
al level, see Bertola (2007).
kets through commuting flows 
(see Patacchini and Zenou, 2007). 
However, the neighbour effect is 
smaller during the crisis than be-
fore it, while the national effect is 
larger. The evidence again sug-
gests that the crisis made the local 
effects weaker and the national ef-
fects stronger.
We now turn to the EU15 regions, 
which have both domestic and 
foreign neighbours, to assess the 
difference between the two neigh-
bours’ effects. We run the same re-
gressions as for Table 3.3 and the 
results are presented in Table 3.4. 
Firstly, the effect of the change in the national unem-
ployment rate on regional unemployment was signifi-
cant both before and during the crisis. Moreover, the 
effect, represented by the coefficient, became stronger 
during the crisis, conforming with our results so far 
that the crisis reinforced national effects. Secondly, the 
domestic neighbour effect was significant but small in 
both periods. Curiously, it was positive before the cri-
sis and negative during it, suggesting that an increase 
in the unemployment rate in a region was associated 
with a decline in the unemployment rate of its domes-
tic neighbours. This could imply a lack of labour mo-
bility within the country. Thirdly, the effect of foreign 
neighbours was insignificant before the crisis, but pos-
itive during the crisis. The co-movement of the region-
al unemployment rate with the unemployment rate in 
the foreign region suggests that there was labour mo-
bility across the border, leading to the equalisation of 
0.30
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National
a) Unemployment rates are normalised with EU15 average.
Source: Eurostat, last accessed 30 December 2014, and EEAG calculations.
Elasticity of regional unemployment rates with respect
to neighbour and national unemployment ratesa)
Figure 3.10
Table 3.3  
 
 
 
 
Neighbour and national effects on changes in regional  
unemployment rates in EU15 regionsa) 
  2008 2013 
Change in neighbours unemployment 
rate over 4 years 
0.277*** 
(0.097) 
0.160** 
(0.070) 
Change in national unemployment 
over 4 years 
0.571*** 
(0.107) 
0.827*** 
(0.065) 
Constant 0.008 
(0.012) 
0.015* 
(0.009) 
Number of observations 174 189 
R2 0.488 0.916 
a) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10; standard errors are in parenthesis; 
OLS regressions on 4 years differences; all unemployment rates are 
normalised with EU15 average. 
Source: Eurostat, last accessed 30 December 2014, and EEAG calcu-
lations. 
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unemployment rates. This cross-border labour mobil-
ity implies that although national labour market con-
ditions mattered more during the crisis than prior to 
it, borders became more blurred as workers sought 
jobs on the other side of the border to a greater extent 
than before the crisis.  
Our final piece of evidence on regional unemployment 
rates can be found in Figure 3.11, which shows the es-
timated distribution of regional unemployment rates 
normalised with the EU15 average for 2001, 2007 and 
2013. We paired together 2001 with 2007 and 2007 
with 2013 to contrast the changes in unemployment 
distribution before and during the crisis. The left side 
of the figure shows a decline in regional inequality in 
unemployment from 2001 to 2007. In particular, the 
left tail of the distribution below 
0.5 was reduced primarily due to 
the fall in average unemployment, 
taking the regions with low un-
employment closer to the mean. 
More importantly, the mass on 
the high unemployment part of 
the distribution above 1.65 on the 
right declined significantly. Thus, 
the number of regions with un-
employment levels of more than 
twice the EU15 average was re-
duced. Hence unemployment be-
came less polarised across 
European regions before the 
crisis.
However, the crisis changed eve-
rything, as shown by the right 
side of Figure 3.11. The number of regions with over 
1.65 of the EU15 unemployment average increased 
(the density for 2013 is higher than the density for 
2007 above 1.65), and the number of regions with un-
employment below 0.5 declined. European regions 
therefore became more polarised in terms of unem-
ployment rates.
The change between 2001 and 2007 is particularly in-
teresting. After analysing the distribution of regional 
unemployment for the EU15 countries, Overman and 
Puga (2002) argue that there was a polarisation in re-
gional unemployment between 1986 and 1996. This 
was because both the number of regions with less than 
the EU15 average unemployment rate and the number 
of regions with more than twice the average EU15 un-
Table 3.4  
 
 
 
 
Comparing the domestic and foreign neighbour effect on changes  
in regional unemployment rates in EU15 countriesa) 
  2008 2013 
Change in foreign neighbours 
unemployment rate over 4 years 
– 0.048 
(0.110) 
0.162*** 
(0.058) 
Change in domestic neighbours 
unemployment rate over 4 years 
0.084** 
(0.042) 
– 0.090*** 
(0.023) 
Change in national unemployment 
over 4 years 
0.631*** 
(0.122) 
0.917*** 
(0.036) 
Constant – 0.026 
(0.021) 
0.001 
(0.012) 
Number of observations 67 72 
R2 0.414 0.924 
a) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10; Standard errors are in parenthesis; 
OLS regressions on 4 years differences; all unemployment rates are 
normalised with EU15 average. 
Source: Eurostat, last accessed 30 December 2014, and EEAG calcu-
lations. 
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employment rate increased. The authors claim that 
this polarisation was partly caused by the fact that un-
employment is more regional than national. In other 
words, unemployment levels in neighbouring regions 
started to align independent of national boundaries. 
These geographic clusters caused the polarisation in 
unemployment. 
Overman and Puga (2002) construct a similar graph 
to Figure 3.11, whereby the distribution of relative 
European regional unemployment in 1996 is very sim-
ilar to the distribution on our graph for 2001; and 
their estimated distribution for 1986 is very similar to 
our estimated distribution for 2007. Thus, the evolu-
tion in the distribution of unemployment suggests po-
larisation for the EU15, while the evolution in the dis-
tribution of regional unemployment between 2001 
and 2007 indicates that unemployment became more 
uniform. Overman and Puga (2002) suggest that 
neighbour effects are stronger than national labour 
market policies, hence transnational and regional la-
bour market policies are required to reduce polarisa-
tion in regional unemployment. Our figure implies 
that this may not be the case, as there was a significant 
reduction in polarisation between 2001 and 2007 when 
labour market policies became less, rather than more 
coordinated (see Bertola, 2013, 2014). Our regressions 
suggest that during the crisis, polarisation did not oc-
cur because unemployment became more localised. 
By contrast, polarisation in European unemployment 
occurred because unemployment became more 
national.11
3.4 Regional disparities and policy coordination
Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union states that 
one of the objectives of the EU is “[…] to promote 
economic and social progress and a high level of em-
ployment […] in particular […] through the strength-
ening of economic and social cohesion […]”. The rel-
evant instruments adopted to promote “economic and 
social cohesion” are primarily left to the member 
states and lower levels of government. Only a small set 
of supranational policy instruments exists in the form 
of EU cohesion policy directly motivated by the ef-
fects on regional and national income inequality of 
the European economic integration process. We argue 
that the evidence on the evolution of disparities before 
and after the crisis indicates that uncoordinated na-
11 For a recent and more comprehensive analysis of the European re-
gional labour markets, see Beyer and Smets (2015).
tional economic policies led to a fall in regional dis-
parities at first, and to their subsequent rise. This hap-
pened despite the presence of supranational redistrib-
utive policy instruments.12
These supranational policies, called cohesion policies, 
are the second largest item in the EU Budget.13 Low 
GDP levels are an important criterion for making EU 
funds accessible to specific countries and regions both 
in theory and in practice. There is a negative correla-
tion between GDP levels and funds received under the 
EU cohesion policy. In addition, to ensure that cohe-
sion policy supports investments that otherwise would 
not have been made, the disbursement of funds is also 
conditional to a set of economically debatable addi-
tional indicators. There is a large body of literature as-
sessing the effects of EU cohesion policies on conver-
gence. Studies based on poor early data sets did not 
find evidence for EU cohesion policies having any ef-
fect (Boldrin and Canova, 2001). More recent studies, 
however, did find that the policies have helped to re-
duce disparities between core and peripheral regions 
(Leonardi, 2006; Becker et al., 2010). The problem, 
however, is that although convergence across the re-
gions of Europe occurred (see Figure 3.1 for exam-
ple), it is hard to establish what would have happened 
in the absence of structural policies.
The evidence gathered in this chapter suggests that 
convergence did indeed take place in the European 
Union, and particularly in the EU15 countries, which 
are the main focus of our analysis. Disparities in terms 
of labour productivities and unemployment rates de-
clined. This decline primarily occurred due to a reduc-
tion in disparities between countries, and, to a much 
lesser extent, to a reduction in disparities across re-
gions within countries. However, the disparities in 
terms of labour productivity started rising again some 
time in the mid-2000s (see Figure 3.2). This was pri-
marily due to divergence between the crisis and non-
crisis countries, but we also found some divergence 
within the non-crisis countries. In terms of unemploy-
ment, the disparities increased again after 2008 due to 
the crisis. The increase in disparities both in terms of 
labour productivity and unemployment was primarily 
due to an increase in disparities between countries 
and, to a much lesser extent, due to an increase in dis-
parities across regions within countries (see Figures 3.6 
and 3.9). 
12 A theoretical analysis of such supranational policies can be found 
among others in Martin (1999, 2005).
13 For a more detailed discussion see Aghion et al. (2003) among 
others.
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The evidence suggests that country specific factors 
played a more important role in shaping the conver-
gence process than sub- or super-national ones. This 
conclusion leads us to the same factors that were at the 
heart of the crisis in Europe, which our previous reports 
EEAG (2013, 2014) have already discussed. Here we 
take the theoretical perspective from Bertola (2014), 
who demonstrates how uneven macroeconomic condi-
tions across countries are linked to uneven policy choic-
es and to a new set of macroeconomic outcomes. 
Expectations of fast convergence with the core were al-
ready high in the periphery in the 1990s, and were rein-
forced when the euro was firmly announced at the 
Madrid Summit in 1995. Due to the elimination of ex-
change rate uncertainty, capital flew from the capital-
rich core to the capital-poor periphery. Capital outflow 
depressed wages in the core while capital inflow raised 
wages and employment in the periphery. This led to fall-
ing disparities both in terms of labour productivity and 
unemployment across regions, primarily due to falling 
disparities across countries, while disparities across re-
gions within countries did not change much. The lack of 
investment and the subsequent stagnation in the core – 
and in Germany in particular – made it necessary to im-
plement labour market reforms aimed at enhancing the 
downward flexibility of wages and inducing a period of 
wage restraint that improved the competitiveness of 
workplaces.14 At the same time, a credit-driven boom 
with increased internal demand and rising wages, which 
eventually turned into a bubble, made similar reforms in 
the periphery superfluous.15 The lack of coordination in 
policy choices reversed the convergence of the European 
regions – initially in terms of labour productivity before 
the crisis even broke out – while the bursting bubble sub-
sequently reversed it in terms of unemployment rates.16 
Primarily, national policies shaped both the initial con-
vergence and the subsequent divergence process. The 
seed of the divergence and decline in cohesion currently 
being observed was already planted by uncoordinated 
policies during the convergence period. 
3.5 Conclusion
Convergence across European regions was not driven 
by cohesion policies, but by expectations, and its re-
14 See Sinn (2003, English version: 2007).
15 Bertola (2014) shows under what conditions this holds. See also 
Sinn (2014), Chapter 2. 
16 The periphery does not include Italy, as the latter did not benefit 
from substantial capital inflows before the crisis although it is one of 
the crisis countries. The root of the Italian problem is different from 
the problem of the periphery, but is still related to a lack of policy 
coordination.
versal was caused by the uncoordinated policy choices 
of the core and periphery countries, as well as the 
bursting credit bubble in the periphery; and not by a 
lack of structural funds. National borders are now 
back with a vengeance. They never really went away, 
but merely blurred slightly. Country specific factors 
such as optimistic expectations about convergence, na-
tional economic reforms, and country specific crisis 
management, by contrast, were crucial in shaping re-
gional disparities over time. Whatever the effect of su-
pranational cohesion policies, they seem to be domi-
nated by national policies and by the lack of coordina-
tion between them.
Thanks to the creation of the euro, monetary policy is 
coordinated. The Fiscal Compact attempts to coordi-
nate some aspects of fiscal policy. However, the last 
twenty years of the European Union suggest that 
there are other economic areas in which a lack of pol-
icy coordination can give rise to a severe crisis.
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Migration in the european 
union: too Much of a good 
thing?
4.1 Introduction
The principle of the free movement of labour – along 
with capital, goods and services – is one of the central 
tenets of the European Union. But in recent years it 
has come under attack. There are proposals to restrict 
the ability of migrants to access welfare benefits, and 
limit the ability of EU citizens to move within the EU. 
These proposals are one aspect of a general shift in 
sentiment, which also encompasses immigration from 
outside the EU. Several member states have already 
tightened their entry criteria. 
The British government has recently engaged in stri-
dent anti-immigration rhetoric. It has toyed with the 
adoption of a target for net immigration into the UK 
in the tens of thousands per annum, and has been 
considering tightening entry criteria for non-EU citi-
zens to the UK (Lewis et al., 2012). However, its stated 
aims have been frustrated by its limited ability to con-
trol migration within the EU, and a large net inflow of 
EU citizens continues. There are plans to place more 
restrictions on the access of new immigrants to wel-
fare benefits.1 Similar noises have been coming from 
Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany. 
In 2008 Belgium started writing to unemployed recent 
immigrants from other EU states. In 2013 it intensi-
fied this programme, instructing more than 2,700 un-
employed EU citizens to return to their home coun-
1 In November 2014 the British Prime Minister David Cameron pro-
posed restricting the access of EU immigrants to Britain to housing 
benefit and tax credits for at least four years after arrival. While such 
a restriction could be enforced for non-working migrants within the 
first five years of residence in the UK according to existing EU trea-
ties and laws, it could not be implemented for working migrants or 
those seeking work, since they are guaranteed equal treatment to per-
manent residents under EU treaties. An alternative solution not re-
quiring changes to EU treaties would entail restoring the insurance 
principle in social insurance and making eligibility for housing benefit 
dependent on a history of national insurance contributions. Tax cred-
its (a tax concession to low-paid workers) would be harder to deal 
with. The European Commission has accused the UK of creating 
problems for itself  by providing excessively generous non-contributo-
ry social assistance. 
tries within thirty days or risk being returned, on the 
grounds that they had become an unreasonable bur-
den on the welfare system.2 Most of those written to 
were from Romania, Bulgaria, Italy and Spain. Over 
10 percent of Belgian residents are foreign nationals. 
But Belgium was not violating EU rules with its pro-
gramme, it was merely applying them. EU law allows a 
country to send back citizens from another EU mem-
ber after six months if  they lack the means to support 
themselves and to pay for health insurance. As in the 
UK, the Belgian government has come under pressure 
from far right nationalist anti-immigration parties like 
Vlaams Belang, which has influenced the policies of 
the New Flemish Alliance (the largest party in the 
Belgian parliament) and the moderate Flemish 
Liberals.
Since 2010 the French government has been conduct-
ing large-scale deportation programmes for Sinti and 
Roma, involving the demolition of camps in France 
by police forces, often following arson and other hos-
tile acts by the local population. The programme was 
deemed “voluntary” as the individuals received 
300 euros for accepting both deportation and a re-en-
try ban. In the first quarter of 2013 alone, the police 
destroyed around 40 Roma camps, 15 of them on the 
outskirts of Paris.3
 
The German government is considering capping its 
voluntary scheme of providing child benefits to immi-
grants’ children not residing in Germany at the levels 
paid in their respective countries of residence, echoing 
UK government proposals to reform overseas pay-
ment of child benefit.4 The German proposal affects 
people who come to work in Germany while their chil-
dren stay at home with grandparents or other rela-
tives. In December 2013, payments were made for 
92,000 children outside Germany, 41,000 of which live 
in Poland alone, where the purchasing power of a euro 
2 A. Byrne (2014), “Free flow of labour stemmed as Belgium cracks 
down on migrants,” Financial Times, 16 March, http://www.ft.com/
cms/s/0/d736fe48-a912-11e3-bf0c-00144feab7de.html?siteedition=uk.
3 S. Harraudeau (2013), “Roma in Frankreich: Fakten und Daten,” 
Arte Journal, 17 June, http://www.arte.tv/de/roma-in-frankreich-fak-
ten-und-daten/7556828,CmC=7552026.html. 
4 J. Vasagar and G. Parker (2014), “Germany considers capping child 
benefit for migrants,” Financial Times, 27 August, http://www.ft.com/
cms/s/0/48e0faec-2df4-11e4-8346-00144feabdc0.html on 23rd  Sep-
tember 2014. 
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is 1.8 times that in Germany. Germany is also intro-
ducing laws to limit the rights of out-of-work mi-
grants from other EU states to remain in the country, 
as well as time-limited bans on re-entry in cases of 
fraud (German Government, 2014).
The rhetoric has grown louder since the financial crisis 
of 2008–9, the European public debt and banking crises 
that followed, and the lingering stagnation of the EU’s 
economy and high unemployment. The rise of right-
wing nationalist and anti-immigration parties is wide-
spread. Their growing popularity has forced main-
stream politicians to shift to the right and adopt the 
same rhetoric. The UK Independence Party (UKIP) is 
forcing the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition 
government to harden its line on im mi gration. 
Anti-migration sentiment has grown with the enlarge-
ment of EU membership to include poorer countries 
in Eastern Europe, widening income disparities within 
the Union. This has raised fears among various elec-
torates that large numbers of low-paid workers from 
Bulgaria and Rumania will migrate to richer north-
western states and undercut low-skilled local workers 
in the labour market, raising unemployment (directly 
and indirectly) and placing a higher burden on the 
welfare state. The relatively generous social security 
provisions of Northern Europe have been portrayed 
as a magnet for migrants – the “welfare magnet” – im-
plying that migration is stimulated by the prospect of 
generous welfare benefits. This parallels the US where 
operation of the “welfare magnet” has been thorough-
ly documented (Borjas, 1999). 
The rise of militant Islam since 9/11 – 11 September 
2001 – and the belief that the West faces a growing ter-
rorist threat is also a factor. Liberal Western European 
attitudes to religion, religious practices, religious sym-
bols and aspects of dress, like the wearing of head-
scarves, or the acceptability of irreverence towards reli-
gion, have clashed with those of mostly Islamic, immi-
grant groups. The murders of the Charlie Hebdo jour-
nalists in France on 7 January 2015, by people claiming 
to be avenging insults to Islam, have galvanised public 
opinion in France and around the world, as the most 
direct and shocking assault on the liberal value of free-
dom of expression. That the killers were not recent im-
migrants, but French citizens deepens the horror, that 
Western democracies are threatened by an “enemy 
within”, nurtured by these societies themselves. The re-
cent “Pegida” demonstrations against Muslims in 
Germany that spread from Dres den, and the counter-
demonstrations that followed, point to the apparently 
growing polarisation in Western societies. There are 
signs of a lack of integration of immigrants with na-
tive populations, pockets of poverty and unemploy-
ment concentrated among immigrant communities, 
and intermittent outbreaks of unrest and violence. 
France has unresolved problems with the banlieues, 
where disaffected populations of unemployed low-
skilled immigrants from the Middle East and North 
Africa erupted into violence in October 2005. Sweden 
faces problems of discrimination against immigrants 
in the Stockholm hinterland and around Malmo. The 
Netherlands was rocked by the murder of Theo van 
Gogh by an Islamist in 2005 (Buruma, 2006). These ex-
periences have raised concerns about the possibility of 
integration. Indeed, the very viability of a multicultur-
al society is being called into question. Western gov-
ernments’ responses to the Islamist threat have them-
selves contributed to the alienation of immigrant 
groups.
Meanwhile poverty and violence in Africa and the 
Middle East have led to a stream of asylum-seekers 
and people desperate to get into Europe by any possi-
ble means. Thousands die, packed by ruthless agents 
into overcrowded boats, trying to sail from North 
Africa to Italy and Spain. The survivors of these jour-
neys have imposed costs on the economies that have 
had to receive them. The issue of whether or not to 
rescue would-be immigrants from Africa whose boats 
sink in the Mediterranean poses an awkward moral 
dilemma for the EU and member states, particularly 
Italy. What quantities of resources should be devoted 
to this effort? Italy operated a surveillance and rescue 
operation, Mare Nostrum, which has now been termi-
nated due to its cost (estimated at 9 million US dollars 
a month) to the Italian state. It has been succeeded by 
the more modest Operation Triton carried out by 
Frontex, the EU’s border forces, at an estimated cost 
of around 3 million euros a month. The European au-
thorities fear that the existence of a rescue operation 
encourages traffickers and agents to send migrants to 
sea in unseaworthy vessels, risking their lives. But pur-
suing a policy of not rescuing shipwrecked voyagers to 
discourage illegal immigration also is immoral.
 
Besides Africa, Italy receives many illegal immigrants 
from Albania. The UK is to contribute 12 million 
British pounds to France’s costs of policing the port of 
Calais, where crowds of illegal immigrants, desperate 
to get into the UK, mob, and try to hide in or under 
trucks boarding cross-channel ferries. In 2013 Ger-
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many took in over 35,000 asylum-seekers who original-
ly had entered other EU countries, although the Treaty 
of Dublin (1990) stipulates that the country of first en-
try is responsible for dealing with asylum-seekers. 
It follows that there are at least four key aspects to the 
immigration issue. One is the migration of EU citi-
zens, who have the right to move freely and work 
wherever they wish in the Union. For such individuals, 
migration is driven largely by their desires in response 
to economic and social incentives. Migration is effec-
tively supply-driven. Individual member states are not 
able to restrict the movements of the citizens of the 
Union, except indirectly, through the design of their 
welfare systems or other aspects of labour markets. 
This is the part of immigration that has attracted a lot 
of media attention in recent years, as the numbers are 
large and EU laws restrict member states’ freedom of 
action. 
A second aspect is immigration from outside the EU 
of citizens of non-member states. This is largely under 
the control of EU member states, as they are free to 
limit numbers and apply any selection criteria to as-
piring immigrants, including their educational level, 
occupation, wealth or other criteria. Non-EU citizens 
who have been admitted to one member state do not 
have the right to move freely between EU member 
states. EU states are free to grant access to social secu-
rity benefits to whatever extent they wish. These mi-
grants pose less of a problem for governments. Of 
course, the questions of how immigration policies 
should be designed, whether current policies are ap-
propriate and what improvements, if  any, might be 
made nevertheless remain. 
A third aspect of immigration is the flow of illegal im-
migrants and asylum-seekers from Africa, the Middle 
East, and other parts of the world.
A fourth aspect is the movement of students taking 
advantage of the international market for higher edu-
cation. A growing number of students from India, 
China, and other emerging economies are coming to 
European universities to study. The UK higher educa-
tion system derives a substantial fraction of its income 
from overseas students. It is useful to consider stu-
dents separately from other migrants because they 
most often intend to stay in the host country for the 
duration of their studies, and in some cases stay on 
briefly to obtain some post-qualification work experi-
ence after their studies. 
Given the breadth of this topic, this chapter focuses 
on the issues surrounding the free movement of EU 
citizens within the EU that have attracted a great deal 
of attention in recent years. 
4.2 European Union laws on free movement
The rights of free movement for workers go back to 
the early days of the European Communities. They 
were included in the Treaty of Paris (1951) that set up 
the European Coal and Steel Community, which gave 
freedom of movement to workers in those industries. 
The 1957 Treaty of Rome extended these rights to 
workers in the European Economic Community. They 
were subsequently extended to the family members 
and other citizens of EU member states. More recent 
directives have clarified the terms on which migrants 
can access welfare benefits.
The principle is set out in the broadest terms in 
Article 3, paragraph 2, of  the Consolidated Version 
of  the Treaty of  the European Union5, which states 
that: 
“The Union shall offer its citizens an area of free-
dom, security and justice without internal frontiers, 
in which the free movement of persons is ensured in 
conjunction with appropriate measures with respect 
to external border controls, asylum, immigration 
and the prevention and combating of crime.”
The principle is further elaborated upon in Article 20 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union6, which establishes citizenship of the Union, 
and gives citizens inter alia
 
“[…] the right to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member States.” 
Article 21 of the same treaty repeats the right of citi-
zens’ free movement. Article 45 guarantees that 
“[…] freedom of movement for workers shall be se-
cured within the Union.” 
And that 
“[…] such freedom of movement shall entail the ab-
olition of any discrimination based on nationality 
5 European Union (2012a).
6 European Union (2012b).
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between workers of the Member States as regards 
employment, remuneration and other conditions of 
work and employment.” 
Directive 2004/38/EC7 amends and consolidates a 
number of earlier directives on the free movement of 
EU citizens and family members. It grants an unquali-
fied right of residence in the territory of any member 
state for up to three months. All Union citizens have a 
right of residence for more than three months if  they 
are workers or self-employed persons; or if  they have 
enough resources not to become a burden on the so-
cial assistance system of the host member state and 
have comprehensive sickness insurance; or if  they are 
students or family members of an EU citizen.
According to Directive 2004/38/EC, EU citizens (and 
non-EU family members who have lived with them) 
automatically acquire the unconditional right to per-
manent residence in another member state once they 
have lived there legally for five years, and are entitled 
to all tax-financed social benefits and other local 
amenities just like a native. This means that immigra-
tion into the welfare system is possible without ever 
participating in the official labour market, subject to 
the constraint that no social benefits are available for 
the first five years. The qualifying period is reduced to 
three years for workers and self-employed persons 
who have been resident for three years when they 
reach the age at which they qualify for an old-age pen-
sion, and to two years or less for persons who become 
permanently incapacitated and unable to work, or 
who have had a work-related accident.
EU citizens who were workers or self-employed con-
tinue to be regarded as such if  they become temporar-
ily unable to work because of illness or accident, are 
involuntarily unemployed and are looking for a job, 
have had a fixed term job that has come to an end, or 
embark on vocational training. 
The directive makes clear that an EU citizen’s depend-
ency on social assistance will not automatically lead to 
being ordered to leave the country. Furthermore, a 
state may not attempt to expel an EU citizen or their 
family members if  the citizens are workers or self-em-
ployed persons, or entered the host member state to 
seek employment, in which case, they may not be ex-
pelled for as long as they can show that they are con-
tinuing to seek work and have a genuine chance of 
finding it.
7 European Parliament and Council of the European Union (2004).
Nevertheless, a case recently brought before the 
European Court of Justice has established that na-
tionals of one member state who travel to another 
solely to claim benefits there may be excluded from re-
ceiving certain social benefits during the initial five-
year period.8 Thus, while the existing treaties and di-
rectives strictly limit the freedom of member states to 
do so, it remains possible for them to temporarily (for 
five years) refuse certain benefits to people who may 
be classified as “welfare tourists”. 
4.3 How much immigration has there been?
It is important to bear in mind the scale of the issue, 
and the patterns of movement that have taken place in 
recent years. Eurostat publishes figures for a “crude 
rate of net migration plus adjustment.”9 Data for se-
lected countries is given in Figure 4.1 below. The fig-
ure shows the rapid inflow into Germany in the early 
1990s following unification and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, when Germany absorbed about two-
thirds of Europe’s East-West migration, followed by a 
long period of modest net immigration, rising again 
since 2009 to just over 0.5 percent based on provision-
al figures for 2013. Immigration to France, by con-
trast, has been low, which is perhaps unsurprising in 
view of the harsh measures taken by the Sarkozy gov-
ernment. The rate of net inflow into Spain in the boom 
years between 1997 and 2008 is strikingly high, as is 
the flow into Ireland between 1995 and 2008; again, 
while the Irish economy was booming. These dramatic 
inflows have turned negative since the financial crisis. 
A net outflow of workers may be making a modest 
contribution to lowering the rate of unemployment in 
these countries. Portugal shows a similar pattern. A 
net inflow between 1993 and 2010 has turned clearly 
negative. Interestingly, the data for Poland, a country 
8 In this case the persons who moved to Germany had been there for 
more than three months but less than five years, and so could not claim 
a right of permanent residence in Germany. As they were not seeking 
work and did not have sufficient resources to maintain themselves, they 
could not claim a right of residence in Germany and were not entitled 
to certain benefits. Court of Justice of the European Union (2014), 
“Economically inactive EU citizens who go to another Member State 
solely in order to obtain social assistance may be excluded from certain 
social benefits,” Press release No 146/14, Luxem bourg, 11 November, 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-11/
cp140146en.pdf. 
9 The “crude rate of net migration plus adjustment” is calculated by 
taking the actual increase in population over the period of time in 
question and deducting from it the estimated natural change in popu-
lation, i.e., the change that would occur in the absence of migration, 
based on estimated fertility and mortality rates. This, in principle, 
gives the same answer as taking the data on immigration and sub-
tracting the estimated emigration. For many countries the two meth-
ods give almost identical answers, but for some there are differences. 
However, as the direct figures on emigration are subject to wide mar-
gins of error, the “crude rate of net migration plus adjustment” figure 
may be the better estimate. 
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famous for being a massive source of emigration into 
the rest of the EU since joining in 2004, does not show 
a massive net outflow. There has been a consistent 
small net outflow since 1990, with a small increase in 
the rate in around 2005–6, but the numbers look mod-
est, compared to the inflows into Spain and Ireland. 
The net inflow into the UK has clearly grown since 
1996, peaking at around 0.5 percent in 2005, shortly 
after Poland joined the EU when many Polish workers 
moved to the UK.
Although the intra-EU flows have been large enough 
to cause anxiety among electorates and politicians, it is 
surprising that they are not larger, in view of the huge 
disparities in real wage rates, and particularly in unem-
ployment rates. The outflows from the crisis countries 
– Greece, Ireland, Portugal, 
Spain, Italy and Cyprus – were 
relatively modest. Obviously mi-
grants still face considerable so-
cial and economic obstacles, de-
spite the guarantee of free 
movement.
The net migration figures do not 
tell the whole story. Behind them, 
there have been a variety of devel-
opments in gross in- and outflows. 
In the case of the UK (Figure 4.2) 
both the gross outflows and in-
flows have grown substantially 
since the 1990s, and, as shown 
above, net migration has changed 
markedly. Gross flows were around 
200,000 per year until the early 
1990s. There was a small net out-
flow every year from 1970 to 1982, 
with the exception of 1979 when 
there was a net inflow. Since then 
gross flows have increased, with 
the gross inflow rising to nearly 
600,000 in the early 2000s and the 
outflow to between 300,000 and 
400,000, giving a net inflow of 
roughly 200,000 since 2000. A 
clear upward jump in the net in-
flow between 2004 and 2005 coin-
cides with the accession of Poland 
and other new members to the 
EU, at which point there was a 
large movement of people from 
Poland to the UK (the UK was 
one of few EU member states that did not restrict these 
flows). Net migration to the UK was 243,000 in the year 
to 31 March 2014, according to provisional estimates. 
In the case of  Germany, on the other hand, gross 
flows started at a high level in 1998, but they have not 
grown since then, as Eurostat data in Figure 4.3 
shows. Both immigration and emigration fell from 
around 700,000 persons in 2008 to around 300,000 in 
2009. Since then emigration has continued to fall 
modestly, while immigration has grown sharply, 
reaching 600,000 in 2012.
The cumulative effect of these movements of people is 
that in 2011 (the most recent year for which figures are 
available), the foreign-born population of Germany 
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was 13.1 percent of the total, compared to 12.0 per-
cent in Britain, 11.6 percent in France and 9.0 percent 
in Italy.
While opposition to immigration has grown in those 
Northern European countries that have had sustained 
net inflows of people, the fact that several million of 
their citizens are living in other European and non-
European countries is mentioned less frequently in 
public debates. Emigration gets far less attention than 
immigration, and indeed the data on emigration is far 
poorer.
Migration at rates recently experienced will have a sub-
stantial effect on population sizes in the decades ahead. 
In most cases it will partly offset a 
large fall in population that would 
occur in the absence of migration. 
While migrants may be younger 
than the native populations on av-
erage, the ageing of populations 
continues, with steadily rising de-
pendency ratios. Figure 4.4 fea-
tures data from Europop2013, the 
most recent population projec-
tions to 2080. Based on current 
assumptions about migration 
flows, fertility and mortality, the 
population of Germany will fall 
from 82  million to 50 million in 
the absence of migration, while it 
will be 65 million according to the 
central projection. The popula-
tion of the United Kingdom, 
which totalled 64 million on 
1 January 2013, is projected to rise 
to 85 million according to the cen-
tral projection, but to just 65 with 
no migration. The population of 
France is forecast to rise from 
66 million to 79 million according 
to the central projection and to 
69 million without migration. The 
difference is not entirely account-
ed for by net inward migration; it 
also takes into account the fertil-
ity of migrants and their own pro-
jected migratory behaviour. The 
data underlying Figure 4.4 is fea-
tured in Table 4.A.1 in the 
ap pendix. 
The share of people with foreign backgrounds is fore-
cast to rise substantially between 2011 and 2061 
(based on calculations of Eurostat staff; see Lanzieri, 
2011), as shown by Figure 4.5.
4.4 Effects of migration
The problem with migration, like many aspects of in-
ternational trade, is that it produces clear losers as well 
as winners. While the migrants themselves are among 
the winners, and some sections of the receiving econo-
my gain (some workers, employers, shareholders, and 
property owners), those groups of workers who com-
pete for jobs with migrants are losers. They suffer 
0
200
400
600
800
1.000
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Migration in Germany
Source: Eurostat, last accessed on 25 September 2014.
Persons (thousands)
Immigration
Emigration
Figure 4.3
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
 2013 current population on 1 Jan.
 2080 central projection for 1 Jan.
 2080 no migration projection
Persons (millions)
Source: Eurostat, Europop 2013 population projection.
Projected population of EU member states
Figure 4.4
84EEAG Report 2015
Chapter 4
more unemployment and their wages are pushed 
down. Immigration adds to pressure on public infra-
structure: public services become more congested. 
Housing also becomes scarcer or more expensive or 
both as rents and property prices are pushed up. Tax 
payers may stand to lose out in cases where migrants 
make heavier use of social welfare than the indigenous 
population and, despite working and paying taxes, 
contribute less than they receive in terms of transfers 
and free public goods, as members of lower-income 
groups in a redistributive fiscal system. 
What makes migration a particularly inflammatory is-
sue is that the losses caused by it are immediate and 
up-front: people can see jobs being taken by migrants, 
houses occupied, new shops and religious establish-
ments appearing. The benefits – as the labour market 
adjusts to produce more jobs, and the supply of hous-
ing grows to meet demand – are slower to appear and 
less obvious. The beneficial effect of migrants lower-
ing the dependency ratio and easing the pension prob-
lem is even less apparent.
4.4.1 Effects on employment and wages in receiving 
economies
In principle, an inflow of migrants will increase the 
supply of labour in the economy and either reduce a 
shortage of it (or increase a surplus), or, if  wages can 
adjust, cause wages to fall, relative to what they would 
otherwise have been, while the additional workers are 
absorbed into employment. On the demand side of 
the labour market, the increase in 
consumption caused by migrants 
increases labour demand, thereby 
limiting its negative effects on 
some workers (Borjas, 2014). If  
labour is viewed as a single homo-
geneous factor of production, the 
fall in wages applies to all work-
ers. At the same time, the return 
to capital increases. In an extreme 
and ideal case where there are no 
fixed factors of production and 
firms face a perfectly elastic sup-
ply of capital – because they can 
effectively raise funds on an inter-
national capital market, which 
enables them to invest and in-
crease the economy’s capital 
stock, causing production to ex-
pand – wages might even be restored to their pre-im-
migration level.10 To the extent that capital mobility is 
less than perfectly elastic and fixed factors such as 
land play a role, only a partial restoration of wages is 
possible.
Immigration is likely to affect all workers in the same 
way when the composition of  the immigrant work-
force is similar to that of  the host country, in terms 
of  age, education and skills. In practice, immigrants 
tend to be different. Some countries have had waves 
of  relatively low-skilled immigrants, such as Ger-
many, France, Italy and other European countries, 
while others have experienced the immigration of  rel-
atively skilled workers, the United States being a case 
in point. Immigrants tend to be younger and more 
entrepreneurial than the existing workforce. Euro-
pean economies are increasingly restricting immigra-
tion from outside the European Union to limit over-
all numbers and to grant entry to workers whose 
skills meet shortages and serve other national objec-
tives. Typically, this means granting entry to highly 
educated immigrants and excluding low-skilled 
workers.
In cases where immigrants are less skilled than the 
existing work-force, an influx of  such immigrants 
lowers the wages of  unskilled workers relative to 
skilled workers. This kind of  immigration is likely to 
be resisted by low-skilled workers, who see their jobs 
being taken by cheap foreign labour, and supported 
by higher skilled workers and employers whose earn-
10 Dustmann et al. (2008) provide a fuller analysis of these effects.
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ings and profits rise because the factors of  produc-
tion that they offer are complements to, rather than 
substitutes for those offered by the immigrants. The 
immigration of  skilled workers has the opposite ef-
fect on workers: the skill-differential narrows (rela-
tive to what it otherwise would have been). Low-
skilled workers and employers stand to gain. The im-
migration of  skilled workers may generate productiv-
ity gains or adjustments in production technology, 
which also benefit existing residents; or at least miti-
gate the negative effects of  immigration (Lewis, 
2012). If  migration is restricted to meet skill short-
ages, or expands the supply of  groups of  workers for 
whom demand is rising over time and whose relative 
earnings are growing, it may dampen relative wage 
growth without causing wages to actually fall, and 
may not be perceived as a threat to the existing work-
force. The migration of  health care professionals to 
the UK is a case in point. Such individuals lessen a 
shortage of  National Health Service staff  and are 
not perceived to have depressed the earnings of  doc-
tors and nurses. This kind of  immigration generally 
encounters little opposition. 
There have been many studies of the wage and em-
ployment effects of immigration, and indeed many 
surveys of these studies. The following paragraphs 
summarise findings from a small number of them, 
which convey the general thrust of writing on this 
topic.
Dustmann et al. (2008) report on a number of  studies 
of  immigration in the UK, which find that it has very 
modest effects on wages and the employment of  exist-
ing workers. Disentangling the effects of  immigration 
is not straightforward statistically, and the results de-
pend to some degree on the methods and assump-
tions used. Nevertheless, the broad message is clear. 
The authors report study-findings that immigration 
has no effect on the wages of  young Austrians. Studies 
for Israel have found a positive effect on Israeli wages 
(although not statistically significant), while studies 
for Spain have found no effect. For the US, while 
some earlier research had found modest negative ef-
fects, more recent studies have found that immigra-
tion has a zero or positive effect on wages. In their 
own work on the UK, Dustmann et al. (2008) find no 
effect on the employment of  native workers. This, 
however, does not prove that no effect exists, as the 
failure to find an effect may simply mean that the 
available data is not good enough to reach a 
conclusion. 
When they break down the labour force into groups 
with different levels of  skill (low, medium and high), 
Dustmann et al. (2008) find, however, that the em-
ployment of  the medium skill group is reduced, 
while the employment of  high-skill workers is in-
creased. For existing workers with intermediate 
skills an increase in immigration amounting to 
1  percent of  the native population leads to a de-
crease of  1.8 percentage points in the employment 
rate, a decrease of  1.1 percentage points in the par-
ticipation rate, and an increase of  1 percentage point 
in the unemployment rate. This confirms a theoreti-
cal result reached by Sinn (2005) whereby an unem-
ployment system with benefits not immediately 
available to immigrants implies that immigrants 
drive domestic residents of  the same skill group into 
unemployment, given that they have lower reserva-
tion wages due to their initial non-eligibility for un-
employment benefits. However, these effects are off-
set by an increase in the employment of  natives with 
high skills. For the latter group, a similar inflow of 
immigrants leads to an increase of  1.1 percentage 
points in employment and participation rates, and 
has no effect on the unemployment rate. Dust mann 
et al. (2008) do not find a significant effect on work-
ers with low skills. As for the effects of  immigration 
on wages, Dustmann et al. (2008) report that they 
seem to be positive rather than negative. 
Further analysis by the same researchers confirms a 
widely-held belief  about immigrant workers, namely 
that they tend to be more highly skilled than the native 
work-force, but work in less-skilled jobs than their ed-
ucations and qualifications merit, particularly in the 
early years following migration.
A large body of research on employment and wage ef-
fects supports these conclusions. Examples include 
Kerr and Kerr (2011) who survey a wide range of ma-
terial for many European and non-European coun-
tries. The British government itself  argues that immi-
gration has few adverse effects on the employment 
and earnings of UK natives (UK Government, 2014). 
The report concludes that
 
“[…] there is relatively little evidence that migration 
has caused statistically significant displacement of 
UK natives from the labour market in periods when 
the economy has been strong. However, in line with 
some recent studies, there is evidence for some la-
bour market displacement in recent years when the 
economy was in recession.” 
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It finds that 
“[…] displacement effects are also more likely to be 
identified in periods when net migration volumes 
are high […]” 
and that any effects that exist are likely to be concen-
trated on low-skilled natives. The report states that
“[...] the labour market adjusts to increased net mi-
gration when economic conditions are good. But 
during a recession, and when net migration volumes 
are high as in recent years, it appears that the labour 
market adjusts at a slower rate and some short-term 
impacts are observed.”
It goes on to remark that: 
“To date there has been little evidence in the litera-
ture of a statistically significant impact from EU 
migration on native employment outcomes [...]” 
and 
“[...] where there has been a displacement effect 
from a particular cohort of migrants, this dissipates 
over time – that is, any displacement impacts from 
one set of new arrivals gradually decline as the la-
bour market adjusts, as predicted by economic 
theory.”
The latter statement seems plausible insofar as immi-
grants are entitled to full unemployment benefits after 
they have worked in the economy for some time and 
therefore adopt the higher reservation wages stem-
ming from the availability of the unemployment 
benefits.
This summary of research may suggest that immigra-
tion within the EU has mainly displaced low-skilled 
native workers. Economic principles suggest that mi-
gration has the strongest negative effects on those who 
are the closest substitutes for immigrants, as stated 
above. The finding that low-skilled natives have suf-
fered most from immigration depends on whether the 
immigrants in question are predominantly low-skilled. 
This is true of some, but not all EU countries. 
Evidence provided by Ottaviano and Peri (2012) sug-
gests that the main negative effects of new immigrants 
may be on previous immigrants, as natives and immi-
grants may be imperfect substitutes even within skill 
groups for various reasons.
4.4.2 Effects on countries with a net outflow of 
migrants
Most of the excitement is generated by immigration 
rather than emigration, but migration has effects on 
the countries that migrants leave. Poland and others 
saw waves of emigration after joining the EU in 2004. 
Since 2009 there have been significant outflows from 
Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Greece. There is often 
concern in these countries that the most able and en-
trepreneurial workers are leaving, resulting in a brain 
drain and diminishing the economy’s potential for 
growth. In principle, emigration might be expected to 
reduce unemployment and raise wages (of the groups 
of workers who emigrate). Remittances sent back to 
their country of origin by emigrants are a major 
source of income in some developing countries. 
However, although we do not have data on this phe-
nomenon for Europe, the indications suggest that it is 
not a major factor. The experience of Poland indicates 
that moderate emigration may have benign effects.
 
Poland has a long history as a source of emigrants. To 
some degree, the post 2004 exodus was business as 
usual. The scale of emigration was nevertheless dra-
matic. Between 1 May 2004 and 1 January 2008, ap-
proximately 6 percent of the population of a working 
age went abroad. In January 2008 there were 
2,270,000  Poles abroad as “temporary migrants”, 
690,000 of them in the UK, 490,000 in Germany, and 
200,000 in Ireland, with the rest mainly in other EU 
countries. Polish migrants to the UK were dispropor-
tionately highly educated, many of them from small 
towns and villages; while migrants to Germany were 
relatively less educated. 
Kaczmarczyk and Okólski (2008) note that: 
“The outflow of men was more than 50 percent 
greater than that of women; the loss in males 
amounted to 4.4 percent of the population, while 
the loss in females was 2.2 percent. The largest loss 
according to age was noted in the group 25–29 years, 
and it stood at 9.3 percent. The other groups lost, 
respectively: 20–24 years – 8.8 percent; 30–44 years 
–  3.8 percent; 45+ years –  1.1 percent; and 15–
19 years – 0.8 percent.”
Young and relatively well-educated men were particu-
larly likely to migrate, especially to countries that did 
not impose temporary restrictions after Poland’s EU 
accession. Middle-aged and less highly educated men 
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were also inclined to migrate, but they tended to move 
to Germany, Italy, or the Netherlands.
 
Before accession, Poland, like many other Central and 
Eastern European countries, had severe job shortages 
and high unemployment. The unemployment rate was 
roughly 20 percent in 2002. The labour market im-
proved steadily thereafter. An improvement was al-
ready visible in 2003, and gained additional momen-
tum after May 2004. Between the second quarter of 
2004 and the first quarter of 2007 the number of un-
employed persons fell from 3.1 million to 1.5 million. 
In 2007 the unemployment rate fell below 10 percent. 
The Polish economy grew vigorously after accession 
to the EU. There is no evidence that out-migration 
hindered growth. The labour market effects of out-
ward migration per se appear to have been modest, 
rather in line with the evidence on effects of inward 
migration in the UK and Germany. 
The actual emigration figures were much higher than 
had been anticipated in various studies financed by 
the EU in the years before accession. For example, 
Bauer and Zimmermann (1999) predicted that only 
2–3 percent of the population of Eastern European 
countries would emigrate after EU accession over 10–
15 years. Similar estimates were published by Boeri 
and Brücker (2001). 
4.4.3 Migration and social cohesion
This is a report by the European Economic Advisory 
Group, and most of the analysis here is of the eco-
nomic causes and effects of migration. However, much 
of the recent political debate surrounding migration 
has been propelled by its social implications, not its 
economic effects. 
Examples of the effects of migration abound, but it is 
difficult to gauge the scale of the phenomena from 
them. People see jobs being taken by migrants and 
housing being sold or rented to migrants. They see 
changes in the shops in their local areas. They may see 
businesses run by immigrants, employing immigrant 
workers, and selling services and goods to the same 
immigrant communities. These businesses may appear 
to employ workers at less than the minimum wage, 
which is possible since the immigrant workers believe 
that they are not eligible for social security benefits if  
they become unemployed, and are therefore less likely 
to press for minimum wages to be paid. Similarly, their 
conditions of work may fall short of legal standards 
of health and safety. These practices may then under-
mine the pay and conditions of work of native work-
ers in the same country, creating resentment and op-
position to immigration. This kind of scenario is often 
reported. 
At the other end of the scale, namely at the pro-migra-
tion end, employers argue that without migration, 
they would not be able to obtain workers of the right 
calibre for the job at the right price, or occasionally at 
any price. These employers may look for high-level 
skills that are in short supply, e.g. skills in electronics, 
information technology, and medical research, or they 
may look for low-level skills, e.g. in agriculture where 
farms look for seasonal workers to harvest crops, and 
other sectors where it is often claimed that the indige-
nous work force is not willing to do the work at rea-
sonable wages. Speaking about the benefits of mobili-
ty, Boris Johnson, Mayor of London, pointed out in a 
speech that the most striking thing about Prince 
Albert, consort of Queen Victoria and a revered figure 
who brought Christmas trees and many other charm-
ing innovations to the British Isles, had one met him at 
the time, would have been that he was German. The 
superior academic performance of pupils in London 
schools compared with the rest of the UK is attribut-
ed to the cultural diversity of the city. It is one of the 
ironies of the migration debate that opposition to mi-
gration seems strongest in areas that have little migra-
tion, whereas areas with more migration are relatively 
relaxed about it. 
Societies require some degree of mutual understand-
ing and trust among their members to be able to func-
tion satisfactorily. The American sociologist Robert 
Putnam has labelled this as “social capital”. More so-
cial capital, deeper trust and understanding, enables 
societies to function better. This may explain why 
some of the small and homogeneous Scandinavian na-
tions have performed so well economically and social-
ly, although they lack the advantages of natural re-
sources possessed by the United States, a more dispa-
rate nation. Collier (2013) argues that excessively rap-
id immigration can undermine trust across society, as 
a growing presence of recent immigrants with differ-
ent cultures and practices to those of the native popu-
lation causes the latter to retreat within itself, “hunker 
down” in Collier’s phrase, and not cooperate effective-
ly with the new arrivals. Migration tends to introduce 
new, easily recognised persons into a society. There is a 
long history of societies – tribes, clans, communities, 
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and states – identifying some group or another as out-
siders, and variously giving them less favourable treat-
ment than insiders, treating badly, or expelling them 
altogether. The instinct to expel outsiders, symbolical-
ly purifying the clan, is ancient and seems deep seated; 
even in modern societies that regard themselves as so-
phisticated. This accounts for the ease with which hos-
tility to migrants, and particular groups with identifi-
able characteristics, can be excited, and the tendency 
of the popular media to use inflammatory language 
about them. It reflects the tendency of the native pop-
ulation to “hunker down” and the decline in social 
capital. For these reasons Collier (2013) argues in fa-
vour of limiting the pace of immigration, to give time 
for recently arrived migrants to become absorbed into 
the host society. 
Despite the qualitative and anecdotal nature of the ev-
idence, the social effects of migration exert a powerful 
influence. Some would even argue that economics has 
nothing to do with the case. Facchini and Mayda 
(2008) document the influence of attitudes to migrants 
on policy towards migration. They find that there is 
not a total disconnection between economic realities 
and social perceptions. Data for many OECD coun-
tries shows that people with more education and high-
er incomes, groups who are on the whole more likely 
to benefit from migration, have more positive attitudes 
towards it. Given the prevalence of hostility towards 
migration, they conclude that it is puzzling why coun-
tries allow as much migration as they actually do. 
According to their analysis, the median voter would 
vote against it, and if  democracy worked in a simple 
textbook way, migration would be prohibited. They 
argue that, in practice, migration continues because 
various interest groups who benefit from it, such as 
business, can lobby effectively for it. 
4.5 Migration and the welfare state
Politicians and economists have shown increasing 
concern about welfare migration, or the idea that mi-
grants are drawn to their country not only because of 
wage differences, but also because of the benefits of a 
redistributive state.11 Following the surge of immigra-
tion figures, various countries have hardened their 
stance on immigration in recent years. 
11 For scholarly debates see Auerbach and Oreopoulos (1999), Borjas 
(1999 and 2014), Borjas and Trejo (1991) or Sinn (2002). 
As all EU countries are democracies that guarantee 
individual freedom, migration between EU-countries 
is driven by economic factors. These are predominant-
ly differences in wages, availability of jobs, taxes and 
availability of public benefits, including transfer pay-
ments and freely available public goods. 
If  the EU countries differed only by their wages, and 
labour markets were flexible, migration would proba-
bly be efficient. As it can be assumed that a person mi-
grates only when his or her annualised migration costs 
in the sense of pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs of 
staying abroad (while commuting regularly back 
home) are lower than the wage increase s/he can real-
ise through migration, migration increases the aggre-
gate EU GDP net of migration costs. In fact, the invis-
ible hand of market forces allocates people across 
space such that the joint GDP net of objective and 
subjective migration costs is maximised. 
If, however, the countries sustain redistributive tax 
and expenditure systems that impose a net burden on 
the skilled, high-wage earners and offer fiscal net ben-
efits to the less-skilled, low-wage earners, migration is 
distorted, and it can no longer be assumed that the 
free migration decision maximises EU GDP net of mi-
gration costs. States with an above-normal redistribu-
tive system attract too few skilled people and too 
many unskilled. The latter is the deeper reason for the 
current concern about EU-internal migration in some 
parts of the EU with well-developed welfare benefits. 
In the European Union these concerns have led to pro-
visions that make the direct immigration into welfare 
states difficult. While each EU citizen has the right to 
live and work in every other EU state, welfare benefits 
without work are constrained. Thus a migrant who 
does not come to work as an employee or be self-em-
ployed, but prefers not to work, is not, in principle, eli-
gible for welfare benefits for the first five years of resi-
dence. Only after five years does s/he receive a perma-
nent right of settlement and eligibility to the same tax 
financed social benefits as a domestic resident. 
Someone who takes on dependent work, on the other 
hand, is immediately integrated into the fiscal system 
and must pay all taxes and contributions while partici-
pating in all tax and contribution financed benefits 
available to nationals. 
It is debateable whether these provisions are sufficient or 
appropriate to limit welfare migration, and whether they 
might even act as a deterrent to useful migration. What 
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is clear, however, is that it makes no sense to ask the 
blanket question of whether or not migration per se is 
good or bad. Instead, different judgements and possibly 
policy reactions are necessary for different types of in-
centives affecting the migration decisions. Two polar 
cases are non-working migrants and working migrants.
4.5.1 Non-working migrants
The fact that non-working migrants are fully integrat-
ed into the welfare state after a waiting period of five 
years clearly gives rise to distorted migration incen-
tives, although these incentives are smaller than they 
would be in the absence of such a period. Consider, for 
example, a migrant aged 60 who comes with savings 
sufficient to finance five years of residence. This person 
will be fully eligible to social welfare at the age of 65, as 
then s/he will be unable to work and will therefore be 
entitled to receive a sort of pension in terms of ordi-
nary welfare until his or her death. Given that this 
“pension” would in many Northern EU states be much 
bigger than an ordinary wage income at home, there is 
an incentive for inefficient welfare migration.
As a remedy, a home country principle could be intro-
duced for non-working migrants between EU coun-
tries. The basic idea is that all EU countries must take 
care of their poor in a reasonable way and provide 
them with satisfactory social benefits. However, they 
should not restrict the places where these people want 
to consume their benefits, be it at home or any other 
country. The migration decision in this case would be 
strictly welfare enhancing. There would be no welfare 
migration, but everyone would enjoy the right to mi-
grate to countries where the welfare benefits would buy 
him or her a higher living standard. Thus, a welfare re-
cipient from Northern Europe could freely move to 
Southern, poorer countries, consuming his or her ben-
efits there. Arguably, this idea makes the home country 
principle harmonise well with the EU’s basic aim of se-
curing free migration, while the current residence prin-
ciple discriminates against the migration of welfare re-
cipients from well-to-do countries, given that they 
would have to be satisfied with the local benefit levels. 
4.5.2 Working migrants
It is extremely difficult to come to a similar judgment 
on the current treatment of working migrants as two 
basic arguments need to be considered. 
The first is the fact that migrants will participate in 
the pay-as-you-go pension system. As no such system 
is actuarially fair and all systems involve redistribu-
tion from later to earlier generations, it is clear that 
migrants will normally make a positive net fiscal con-
tribution for the existing population. This contribu-
tion is particularly large if  immigration is of  a perma-
nent dynastic nature. As the immigrants’ children 
will, via their own contributions to the system, take 
care of  the funds needed to finance their parents 
when old, the first generation’s gross contributions to 
the pay-go system is a net fiscal externality benefitting 
the resident society (Sinn, 2001). This net fiscal exter-
nality, which acts as an entry fee, could be extremely 
large. In Sinn’s words: 
“Obviously, the pay-go system involves a substan-
tial entrance fee for immigrant families, which is a 
major gain for the incumbent population.” 
The second concerns the fact that all modern states 
sustain huge redistribution machinery through the 
public budget. Every working migrant pays taxes and 
contributions in proportion to, or even progressively 
with, his or her income, but participates in the public 
goods and services that the state provides on more or 
less equal terms. Thus, migrants with above average 
skills and incomes tend to be net contributors, while 
those with below-average skills are net recipients of 
public resources. 
Taking the first and the second consideration together 
implies that, from a fiscal perspective, high-skilled im-
migrants definitely benefit domestic residents. Their 
net pension contributions add to the net contributions 
in the redistributive state. 
For the less-skilled strata of the immigrant population 
the situation is more ambiguous, as it is unclear 
whether their net contributions to the pension system 
are large enough to outweigh the net receipt of bene-
fits from the redistributive state. The answer largely 
depends on the length of time that immigrants stay in 
a country, and particularly on whether immigration is 
permanent in the dynastic sense, or whether immigra-
tion is more similar to temporary commuting. 
In earlier studies Sinn and Werding (2001) and Sinn et 
al. (2001) found that in 1997, the net fiscal costs of an 
immigrant resident in Germany for less than a decade, 
a valid assumption for most migrants, were 2,367 eu-
ros per year. However including long-term immi-
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grants, and assuming that the children of these immi-
grants would contribute to the pay-go system, they 
found that, on average, the fiscal net cost of an average 
immigrant was 726 euros per year.12 
By contrast, in their study of  the fiscal effect of  mi-
gration into the United Kingdom, Dustmann and 
Frattini (2014) have found that the fiscal effects of  im-
migrants were positive on the whole, migrants from 
outside the European Economic Area being among 
the ex ceptions.13 
The difference in these studies could stem from the 
fact that the UK maintains a less generous welfare sys-
tem and, perhaps for that reason, attracts far better 
qualified immigrants than Germany. While 46 percent 
of immigrants to the UK have a tertiary education, 
only 21 percent of immigrants to Germany fall into 
this category, for example.14 Another reason could be 
that Dustmann and Frattini (2014), in the absence of 
better data, have been forced to approach the problem 
by making a great many assumptions as to how immi-
grants would participate in certain public expenditure 
and revenue categories, while Sinn and Werding (2001) 
were able to base their analysis on the German Socio-
Economic Panel, a micro survey from a representative 
sample of the population residing in Germany. Thus, 
for example, Dustmann and Frattini (2014) assume 
that immigrants and domestic residents of the same 
age living in the same region consume the same 
amount of health care and social protection, and they 
allow for systematic deviations between these two 
groups only to the extent that there are differences in 
age and place of residence.15 Sinn and Werding (2001), 
by contrast, were able to simply count the actual use 
of medical and social protection among the immi-
grants and the domestic population without having to 
resort to theories or assumptions. 
Another, more recent study that was also based on the 
German Socio-Economic Panel is that of Bonin 
(2014). The author comes to the conclusion that an av-
erage foreigner in the year 2012 paid 3,300 euros more 
in taxes than s/he received in terms of social transfers 
and free schooling. While this result prima facie seems 
12 Sinn et al. (2001), p. 227.
13 They summarise their findings as “[...] when considering the resi-
dent immigrant population in each year from 1995 to 2011, immi-
grants from the European Economic Area (EEA) have made a posi-
tive fiscal contribution[...] while Non-EEA immigrants, not dissimilar 
to natives, have made a negative contribution.” They add that: 
“Notable is the strong positive contribution made by immigrants 
from countries that joined the EU in 2004.”
14  OECD (2014), p. 48.
15 See Dustmann and Frattini (2014), pp. 41 and 42. 
to confirm Dustmann and Frattini (2014), it in fact 
does not, as the latter not only take the cost of school-
ing, but all government expenditure into account. 
Bonin (2014) mentions that extending his study in a 
similar way would change the sign of the fiscal bal-
ance he calculated, but does not provide the num-
bers.16 Adjusting the Bonin calculations for the rest of 
government expenditure to make it compatible with 
Dustmann and Frattini (2014) as well as Sinn and 
Werding (2001) turns Bonin’s number into minus 
1,800 euros. Even if  defence spending were taken out 
of this figure on the grounds that defence might come 
close to a pure public good, whose cost is unrelated to 
the size of the population, the fiscal balance still 
would be minus 1,450 euros per year. Interestingly 
enough, in a generational accounting variant of his 
calculations, Bonin does take all government expendi-
ture into account and finds that in present value terms 
and over a full lifetime, the average migrant costs the 
German state 79,100 euros.17 
An aspect that compounds the difficulties of properly 
calculating the potential externalities of migration for 
the domestic population is the existence of natural 
public goods like forests and lakes, or public goods 
that were produced a long time ago and that involve 
only small variable maintenance costs like railways, 
canals or other parts of the public infrastructure. The 
free access to such public goods may involve much 
higher negative congestion externalities for the do-
mestic population that would legitimate a sort of 
membership fee for the “nation club”. Just as a mar-
ket-equilibrium with freely accessible private clubs 
and congestion externalities inside the club would not 
be able to function properly, a migration-equilibrium 
with freely accessible nation clubs also might not be 
efficient. Perhaps the net contributions to the pay-go 
system can be interpreted as such a club fee. There 
may be some “pure” public goods that do not suffer 
from congestion externalities, such as national de-
fence, for which costs do not depend on the size of the 
population. For these goods, inward migration in-
creases the number of taxpayers contributing and low-
ers the tax burden on each one. 
Given the difficulties of properly calculating the rele-
vant migration externalities for countries other than 
Germany, whose Socio-Economic Panel offers exact 
empirical data on at least the direct pecuniary costs 
and benefits accruing to migrants such as taxes, con-
16 See Bonin (2014), p. 56. 
17 Bonin (2014), ibidem. 
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tributions and social transfers, it is hard to conclude 
this chapter with clear policy proposals for working 
migrants. By and large it seems to us that the EU is on 
the right track by defending the four fundamental 
freedoms: the free movement of capital, services, 
goods and people. 
However, concerning the non-working migrants who 
receive both net welfare benefits and free access to the 
existing public goods in the nation club, an abolition 
of the EU’s residence system might be worth consider-
ing. After making sure that all EU countries satisfy 
certain minimum welfare standards, the home country 
principle might be advisable for non-working mi-
grants. Such a system would not encourage welfare 
migration, and is compatible with the EU’s right of 
free movement, as welfare recipients would not be 
constrained from choosing their country of residence 
by being threatened with a deprivation of their social 
entitlements. 
4.5.3 Evidence on welfare migration
What about the actual experience of welfare migra-
tion? Does this appear to have been an important phe-
nomenon in the past? In Switzerland, for example, 
there appear to have been very few actual “welfare mi-
grants”, despite the substantial political discussion of 
the topic.
Giulietti and Wahba (2012) distinguish between two 
aspects of the welfare-magnet hypothesis. One is the 
extent to which immigrants make more use of the wel-
fare system than the native population. The other is 
the extent to which the existence of generous welfare 
systems influences the migration decision: whether to 
migrate and, if  so, to which destination. Of course, 
these two issues are linked, but they are not exactly the 
same thing.
Do migrants make more use of the welfare system 
than the native population? The evidence is mixed. 
Using Swedish data for 1990 to 1996 Hansen and 
Lofstrom (2003) find that that after controlling for ob-
servable characteristics, immigrants use welfare more 
than natives, but the difference is smaller the longer 
they have been in Sweden. This contrasts with findings 
of Borjas and Trejo (1991) for the United States. 
Riphahn et al. (2010) found that Turkish immigrants 
in Germany were more prone to welfare use than na-
tives. After controlling for a set of individual and 
household characteristics, however, the difference is 
statistically significant only for second-generation im-
migrants. A review of various studies by Barrett and 
McCarthy (2008) concludes that the evidence across 
countries is mixed. 
On the question of  whether generous welfare benefits 
induce greater migration, evidence is provided by De 
Giorgi and Pellizzari (2009), using the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP) and the 
OECD Database on Unemployment Benefit En-
titlements and Replacement Rates. Measuring wel-
fare generosity by the net replacement rate, the ratio 
between the income received when not working (e.g. 
unemployment benefits) and the average wage, they 
look at immigration in the EU-15. They find that, al-
though welfare generosity does indeed influence mi-
gration decisions, the effect is small. In a study of 
OECD countries, Pedersen et al. (2008) find that 
while social networks are an important pull factor 
for immigrants, welfare – measured by social expend-
iture in percent of  GDP – does not exert a significant 
role. Thum (1995, 2000), on the other hand, shows 
that network effects strengthen the long-term effects 
of  fiscal incentives, since via network effects today’s 
migration depends partly on the fiscal and wage in-
centives of  the past. Moreover, the results of 
Pedersen et al. (2009) might be due to immigration 
policies that restrict the entry of  some types of  work-
ers. Examining the skill composition of  immigrants, 
Brücker et al. (2002) find that welfare-generous coun-
tries attract low-skilled workers, whilst countries 
with low social spending are more likely to be a mag-
net for high-skilled workers, since taxes are also low 
in these countries. As a result, welfare generosity may 
induce a negative sorting of  immigrants. The skill 
differences between emigrants from Poland to Ger-
many and those to the UK, who tended to be more 
highly skilled (which is discussed above in Section 
4.4.2), supports the view that welfare generosity in-
duces a sorting of  immigrants.
4.5.4 The race to the bottom
While generous public welfare may affect migration, 
the reverse may also be true: Migration may affect the 
generosity of public welfare systems. It has been 
feared that free migration induces a “race to the bot-
tom” in welfare provision. Indeed, this is the result of 
a large body of public finance literature starting with 
the work of Oates (1972), Musgrave (1959) and oth-
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ers.18 While the term “race” may be an overstatement, 
the redistributive activities of the state are curtailed by 
clear incentives and legal requirements to keep public 
budgets under control. 
A telling example of this effect is the social reforms of 
New York’s Mayor Lindsey. These reforms made New 
York so attractive for welfare recipients that poor peo-
ple from all over the US flooded into the City to reap 
the benefits. The result was that New York came close 
to bankruptcy in the early 1970s and had to abandon 
the programmes. 
Allowing unrestricted migration into welfare states 
has parallels with allowing potential purchasers of in-
surance to sign contracts after learning whether or not 
damage has occurred. Of course, the insurance market 
would collapse under such rules, as no insurer would 
be able to make profits.
These difficulties point to a fundamental incompatibil-
ity among the goals of free migration, social inclusion 
and sustaining a welfare state. One of these goals may 
have to be sacrificed or constrained in order for the 
others to be achievable. As, in our opinion, neither the 
welfare state nor the right to move freely among the 
EU member states should be touched, the inclusion 
principle, regrettably, may need to be diluted, at least in 
the short term. This is another argument in favour of 
the home country principle for non-working migrants. 
4.6 Conclusions and policy recommendations
Migration has become a major issue in recent years. 
The enlargement of the EU, with 100 million people 
from poorer Eastern European countries becoming 
members, most recently from Bulgaria and Rumania, 
has put the combination of comprehensive welfare 
systems based on the inclusion principle and free 
movement of labour under considerable strain. There 
is anxiety among the populations of longer-estab-
lished member states that large numbers of people will 
migrate to them, putting job prospects, pay, and con-
ditions of work at risk. Less-skilled, lower-paid work-
ers are particularly concerned at this prospect, as they 
see their jobs under threat. 
Moreover, there are fears that the generous welfare 
state acts as a magnet that will prove particularly at-
18 See for example Hettich and Winer (2004), Josselin and Marciano 
(2004), and Sinn (2003). 
tractive to low-skill low-paid migrants. Some of these 
workers may migrate not to work, but to collect bene-
fits; while for others the decision to migrate into low-
paid jobs is incentivised by the redistributive activities 
of the state, which involve the implicit payment of im-
migration premia for the less-skilled. By the very defi-
nition of the redistributive state, the low-paid are like-
ly to be the net beneficiaries of progressive taxation 
and public spending. 
The public finances of host countries may therefore 
come under pressure. Migration will also put more 
pressure on housing markets, raising prices and rents, 
unless the production of new housing responds suffi-
ciently. Public infrastructure like roads, railways, 
schools and hospitals may be more congested, at least 
in the short run before the supply of these goods can 
be adjusted, but when it is adjusted, marginal conges-
tion costs translate into marginal pecuniary costs of 
the state. 
These are the economic effects described in the litera-
ture on the subject. But public animosity and political 
rhetoric on migration may be fuelled predominantly 
by other factors, social and political. The lingering re-
cession, high unemployment in many countries, and 
falling real incomes for low-wage workers, while the 
rich get richer and richer, is creating a sense of injus-
tice. The larger inflows and outflows of migrants, in 
this age of greater mobility, create a greater sense of 
social instability, as greater numbers of new and unfa-
miliar people move into neighbourhoods. The lack of 
trust between newly-arrived migrant groups and es-
tablished residents reduces social capital, and makes 
society work less effectively. Mainstream politicians 
are challenged by populist fringe parties with anti-im-
migration policies, and have been adapting their own 
policies. 
It is a great irony that the EU has too little labour mo-
bility to enable a monetary union to function satisfac-
torily, but has too much mobility for social harmony 
and for a redistributive welfare state to operate fairly 
and at reasonable cost. Successive British govern-
ments, which have advocated enlargement of the EU 
to slow down progress towards ever deeper union, 
may now feel they are hoist with their own petard. 
The evidence on the economic effects of migration 
suggests that they are in fact relatively modest. Wages 
fall, but not by much. Unemployment increases in the 
short run, but labour markets adjust, unless wage ad-
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justments are hampered by minimum wages; more 
jobs are created; unemployment falls back to its for-
mer levels. A report issued by the British government 
in 2014 argued that the economic costs are modest at 
most. It remains true that while costs are modest, im-
migration redistributes incomes and creates winners 
and losers.
The effects on public finance are contested. German 
studies, based on Socio-Economic Panel accounting 
suggest that migrants are likely to be net beneficiaries, 
receiving substantially more social benefits and public 
goods from the welfare state than they contribute in 
terms of taxes and social security contributions. 
British studies, based on indirect econometric evi-
dence, find modest effects in the other direction for 
EU citizens, and the same direction for non-EU 
citizens. 
A factor that tilts the balance in favour of more immi-
gration is the demographic transformation that most 
European countries face. All EU member states ex-
pect old-age dependency ratios to rise over the next 
fifty years and most will actually have shrinking popu-
lations. According to current forecasts, migration is 
likely to alleviate this problem, but it is important to 
note that migration from outside Europe is a crucial 
element here, since internal migration within the EU 
may redistribute the current EU population more effi-
ciently around the EU, but it cannot offset the EU-
wide population decline. 
 
What lessons for public policy can be drawn from 
these facts? As we showed, migration would be effi-
cient from an overall EU perspective if  it were not dis-
turbed by the migration incentives of the redistribu-
tive state. Migrants would move up to the point where 
the “last” migrant enjoyed a wage increase that equals 
his or her marginal migration cost. If  wages reflected 
marginal productivities, as they would in a perfectly 
functioning market economy, this condition would en-
sure an allocation of people across space so as to max-
imise EU GDP net of migration costs. Under these 
circumstances, free migration would be efficient. 
If  the welfare state redistributes incomes, migration 
decisions will be distorted as low-skilled migrants re-
ceive an immigration premium, while high-skilled 
ones pay an immigration fee. Given that taxes and 
benefits differ widely across the European Union, ex-
cessive immigration of low-skilled people into the 
Northern European welfare states is likely. 
The home country principle for non-working mi-
grants, which keeps the responsibility for welfare pay-
ments for a couple of years with the countries of ori-
gin rather than the countries of residence, could be a 
solution. This principle is compatible with free migra-
tion, as the welfare recipient has the right to consume 
his or her benefits in any other EU country. For work-
ing migrants, however, the current rules based on in-
clusion principles should not be changed. 
The home country principle is also beneficial insofar 
as it eliminates the incentive for countries attractive to 
welfare migrants to curtail their social expenditure, 
thus inducing the risk of a race to the bottom. Even if  
in some distant future the EU countries have become 
equal, such that no net migration will occur in equilib-
rium, the incentives summarised under the term “race 
to the bottom” risk would bring about an equilibrium 
with too little redistribution. The home country prin-
ciple would eliminate such incentives. 
An alternative means of eliminating the forces of sys-
tems competition would be the harmonisation of so-
cial benefits. However, for the time being such a solu-
tion would be very difficult to implement and may ac-
tually do more harm than good, given the huge differ-
ences in living standards and productivities across the 
EU. If  a common social safety net were to be put in 
place today in Europe, there is the danger that large 
swathes of the Union would suffer intolerable levels of 
unemployment.
Apart from these considerations, the current magni-
tude of migration from East to West in the EU follow-
ing the accession of Bulgaria and Rumania are likely 
to be temporary. They stem from a removal of a bar-
rier to movement. This is more a stock-adjustment 
phenomenon, than a change in a permanent flow. 
The experience of Poland suggests that a large frac-
tion of the migrants from Bulgaria and Rumania may 
want to return to their home countries when job pros-
pects and wages improve there. The likely return of 
many migrants in a few years is another reason why 
some of the current problems may be temporary. As 
growth returns, unemployment falls, and real wages 
start to rise again in the future, labour markets will ab-
sorb immigrants more effectively, and social problems 
will recede. Unfortunately, however, the incentives to 
undercut the welfare of other countries so as not to 
become a target for welfare migration would remain, 
unless the home country principle is introduced. 
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At the same time, there is a case for the EU doing 
more to speed up the economic development of new 
member states. The sooner incomes converge across 
the Union, the sooner the pressure of migration will 
dwindle. While convergence is a laudable goal, evi-
dence on regions that we discuss in another chapter of 
this report is not very encouraging. 
It is obviously not appropriate to make permanent 
policy changes to address a short-term issue. EU 
member states may wish to use the freedoms they cur-
rently have under existing EU laws to limit welfare 
benefits to migrants who have not established perma-
nent right of residence. This will give the electorate the 
sense that natives cannot be ripped off  by welfare 
tourists, and may stem resistance to migrants. 
For the longer term, if  free movement continues to 
lead to unacceptably high rates of net inward migra-
tion to some EU members, there are a variety of 
changes to social welfare systems that can be made. 
Apart from introducing the home country principle 
for welfare recipients, it might be wise to strengthen 
the insurance principle in welfare, and relate benefit 
payments more closely to contributions into the sys-
tem. Under such a scheme, there are no distortions 
from the inclusion principle. Rights to benefits ac-
quired in the various EU member states where a per-
son had made contributions would be portable across 
the borders, as is the case with social security pensions 
today. Recipients would be able to take their benefits 
to whatever state they happened to be residing in. The 
cost of benefits should be borne by the states that re-
ceived the contributions. Such a scheme would require 
a vast amount of data collection across the EU and 
harmonisation of social security systems, if  run cen-
trally. However, such a centralised system is not neces-
sary if  claims can be directed towards the countries 
where they were acquired, regardless of the country of 
residence. 
Member states can use stiffer tests of availability for 
work as a means of reducing payments to welfare 
tourists. Of course, this may be one aspect to the “race 
to the bottom” that one wants to avoid. 
One of many complaints about immigrants is that, be-
cause they believe that they cannot apply for unem-
ployment benefits if  they lose their jobs, they are will-
ing to work for low pay, often below the minimum 
wage, and under very poor conditions of health and 
safety at work. In the UK few if  any firms have been 
penalised for paying less than minimum wages, al-
though anecdotal evidence suggests that this practice 
is widespread. It may be that the UK government is 
willing to turn a blind eye to the practice. There are 
two potential solutions to this problem. One option is 
that governments perform more rigorous tests of 
availability for work and enforce minimum pay laws, 
so that native workers are not undercut by migrants 
who believe they have no welfare rights.19 The other is 
that minimum pay laws are abolished and wage setting 
is returned to market forces. The latter avoids a prob-
lem of minimum wages, which is that they risk limit-
ing the availability of jobs for the low-skilled and turn 
immigration into a direct route into unemployment. 
However, the abolition of minimum pay laws does not 
address popular fears that migrants drive down al-
ready-low wages even further and undercut the em-
ployment of the existing population. 
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Table 4.A.1 
Population projections for the European Union 
 2013 current population 
on 1 Jan. 
2080 central projection 
for 1 Jan. 
2080 no migration 
projection 
Belgium 11,161,642 16,614,305 10,254,226 
Bulgaria 7,284,552 4,925,270 4,798,771 
Czech Republic 10,516,125 10,998,397 7,986,243 
Denmark 5,602,628 6,792,190 5,128,723 
Germanya) 82,020,578 65,378,410 50,201,169 
Estonia 1,320,174 1,029,443 1,053,324 
Ireland 4,591,087 5,895,992 5,395,583 
Greece 11,062,508 7,697,872 7,108,055 
Spain 46,727,890 47,599,370 30,190,375 
France 65,578,819 78,842,668 68,713,709 
Croatia 4,262,140 3,471,568 3,022,548 
Italy 59,685,227 65,059,083 39,469,771 
Cyprus 865,878 1,253,155 717,636 
Latvia 2,023,825 1,351,057 1,462,345 
Lithuania 2,971,905 1,841,709 2,294,330 
Luxembourg 537,039 1,287,296 479,224 
Hungary 9,908,798 8,685,213 6,936,101 
Malta 421,364 481,567 333,268 
Netherlands 16,779,575 16,718,275 14,633,500 
Austria 8,451,860 9,562,386 5,964,504 
Poland 38,533,299 29,582,117 26,844,419 
Portugal 10,487,289 7,113,878 6,367,101 
Romania 20,020,074 16,338,339 15,789,732 
Slovenia 2,058,821 2,006,508 1,500,376 
Slovakia 5,410,836 3,868,254 3,581,459 
Finland 5,426,674 6,381,733 4,829,970 
Sweden 9,555,893 14,110,527 9,448,922 
United Kingdom 63,896,071 85,148,887 64,710,496 
Iceland 321,857 467,187 397,561 
Norway 5,051,275 8,851,414 5,077,041 
Switzerland 8,039,060 11,870,552 6,188,784 
a) Until 1999 former territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Source: Eurostat Europop 2013 population projection. 
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